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SUMMARY
Thesis statement: Efficient architectural support for debugging correctness and per-
formance of programs can be achieved at low cost and minimal performance over-
heads.
Moore’s law has enabled rapid advances in computer hardware. There are billions of tran-
sistors inside modern day processors. This increasingly powerful hardware has been ex-
ploited by increasingly complex software. As a result, software is prone to a variety of
bugs – some of which have even become security exploits. Over the past years, there have
been several incidents related to program bugs and their consequences have ranged from
monetary losses to costing human lives. Correctness debugging ensures that a program
does not exhibit any unintended behavior during runtime.
While there can be no second thoughts on whether a program should be correct, en-
suring good performance of software is equally important. Performance debugging mech-
anisms are aimed at locating performance bottlenecks and helping to improve program
runtime. With multi-core processors becoming rapidly popular in today’s market, the need
to boost performance is even higher. These multi-core processors have an added value
only if the software vendors can take full advantage of the available cores. Hence, scalable
program performance is important in these platforms.
Prior works have studied either software-based or hardware-based solutions to address
program correctness and performance. Software-based solutions are low-cost and flexible
but usually incur very high performance overheads. Hardware-based solutions are efficient
with low performance overheads but are usually expensive and inflexible. If we can get
xix
the best of both worlds by leveraging the flexibility and low-cost from software and effi-
ciency from hardware, that would make debugging solutions more attractive for software
developers.
In this dissertation, three novel techniques that provide hardware support to facilitate
memory debugging, dynamic taint propagation and comprehensive cache miss classifica-
tion are explored. All of our techniques have two common goals namely low-cost and effi-
ciency. When possible, we incorporate programmability into hardware. This amortizes the
cost of hardware by making it usable for multiple purposes. Our contributions define a new
direction that renews architects’ commitment to build hardware that are more programmer-






Computing has rapidly evolved over the decades as a result of phenomenal growth in hard-
ware, software and communication technologies. Software, in particular, has become in-
creasingly complex which has led to a large number of bugs. There is little value in having
a sophisticated program that does not compute its result correctly. Further, global connec-
tivity enabled by the Internet puts computer users at higher risk of being exposed to security
attacks especially if their programs have vulnerabilities. Consequently, ensuring program
correctness is a significant aspect of the software development cycle.
Table 1 shows a few examples of correctness bugs from the past. These bugs come from
a broad spectrum of program errors such as race condition in parallel programs, error in
system clock, and integer and buffer overflows. Their consequences are also varied: some
are disastrous costing human lives (e.g., Therac-25 [42], Patriot bug [66]) while others are
relatively benign (e.g., Twilight Hack [51]). Such incidents deteriorate users’ confidence
on software and software vendors have to ensure that their products do not cause losses to
end-users.
Inadequate support for software testing has been estimated to cost $22 billion annually
to the US economy [70]. Hence, tools that ensure correctness of programs are of paramount
importance in this era where computers have become accessible to users everywhere. Cor-
rectness debugging mechanisms attempt to make sure that the program does not exhibit any
unintended behavior at runtime.
An all correct program without good performance is unlikely to lend any commer-
cial success to the software product. Performance debugging is an active area of research
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Table 1: Examples of Correctness bugs and their effects.
Incident Cause and Effect
Therac-25 Race condition in radiation administering program
1985-87 cost three human lives.
Morris Worm Buffer overflow in gets() function in finger daemon led to
1988 Denial of Service attacks and estimated $100 million loss.
MIM-104 Patriot Bug Error in system clock led to clock drift of one-third of a second.
1991 Failed to intercept Iraqi scud and cost 28 human lives.
Ariane 5 Rocket Integer Overflow in 64-bit Floating Point to 16-bit integer
1996 conversion led to rocket crash.
Twilight Hack Buffer overflow by loading specially crafted save file that
2008 reloads ’The legend of Zelda: Twilight Princess’ [51]
on Wii [52] console.
that caters to developing tools helping programmers to identify the causes for performance
bottlenecks. Performance analysis involves determining whether the program achieves in-
tended performance and is subtly different from performance debugging. Modern proces-
sor features like Intel Precise Event Based Sampling (PEBS) [31] and AMD Instruction
Based Sampling [21] are incorporated primarily to identify performance bottlenecks in
programs.
With the arrival of multi-core processors in the market, the computing landscape has
been rapidly redefined for computer architects, software programmers and end-users. Al-
though multiprocessor systems have long been a subject of research for architects, their
widespread use has spawned an abundant number of interesting practical problems that
await solutions. Multi-core hardware provides the starting point for a paradigm shift in
programming newer computing platforms, and programmers are responsible for writing
better-running programs and for utilizing multiple cores to help the increased core count
have a direct impact on the end-user. In order to harness the full potential of these multi-
core architectures, scalability of applications is an important requirement. An end-user
who invests in buying an eight-core machine ideally expects his/her application to run
eight times faster or the aggregate throughput of the machine to be eight times higher than
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a single-core machine. For this reason, application writers who parallelize their programs,
are interested in achieving a speedup that equals or approaches the number of cores to
satisfy their end-users.
Writing scalable parallel applications can be a daunting task even for seasoned pro-
grammers. Until recently, it was mostly the purview of a small group of people who needed
to solve computationally expensive problems, had extensive training at parallel program-
ming and had access to very expensive parallel machines. The vast majority of sequential
programmers are now suddenly left to face an uphill task of adapting to these new multi-
core architectures. Necessary and adequate tools are needed for such programmers to ad-
dress scalability, adaptability and programmability challenges faced by them on multi-core
platforms.
1.2 Architectural Support for Debugging
While it is clear that we need tools to address software correctness and performance, trade-
offs involving their choice of implementation also needs to be understood. Debugging
tools are either software-based or hardware-based. Software-based solutions typically in-
strument the original program with extra code to monitor program behavior. This provides
the advantage of flexibility, that is, the software can be instrumented for any desired de-
bugging task by simply inserting the necessary debugging code. However, as a result of
instrumentation, the code size grows and the underlying hardware has to execute additional
instrumented code. Hence, these software tools incur huge performance overheads. For
example, software-based memory (correctness) debugging tools such as Valgrind [60] and
Purify [35] incur very high overheads (up to 30× slowdown) that prevent their use in pro-
duction (live) runs. Also, without careful (less intrusive) instrumentation, software-based
performance debugging tools (e.g., MTOOL [26]) can potentially alter program behavior
and memory access patterns failing to observe a problem that might otherwise occur in real
hardware.
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Another possibility is to consider simulation-based studies [6, 43, 44]. Simulators
model the underlying hardware behavior and programs are tested on such tools. This pro-
vides the advantage of simulating program behavior for any given architecture without
actually incurring the cost of building actual hardware. Simulations are, however, typically
time consuming to evaluate an entire program execution. For example, MemSpy [43] re-
ports up to 57.9× slowdown and SM-prof [6] reports up to 3000× slowdown depending
on the type of inputs. Hence, such an approach is feasible only when program inputs are
significantly scaled down to keep the simulation time reasonable. This restricts inputs and
might considerably decrease programmer’s confidence in reaching any suitable conclusions
since a correctness bug can go undetected or a performance bug that occurs on realistic in-
puts might go unnoticed. It is also very difficult to model the actual hardware accurately
using simulators.
An alternative to solve the problems posed by software-only solutions is to build cus-
tom hardwired logic to detect bugs [17, 20]. These hardwired techniques target specific
types of program bugs and can achieve better performance without significant slowdowns.
Depending on the nature of the program bug, these solutions are sometimes acceptable for
software developers because it helps them avoid expensive errors in programs. However,
architects are usually reluctant to invest in specific hardwired schemes because they are
usually expensive and require periodic upgrades as new bugs are discovered. Also, hard-
ware manufacturers have to incorporate such hardwired solutions in their future products
to maintain backward compatibility for existing programs.
A reasonable trade-off between the two types of solutions would be to take advantage
of the low-cost and flexibility offered by software-based solutions while incorporating the
efficiency of hardware-based tools. Low cost enables adoption of these tools by a wide
range of programmers. This is usually achieved by keeping the amount of changes to
hardware as low as possible. Further, programmable hardware amortizes the cost. By
providing programmability, we incur the cost of building the new hardware but get the
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advantage of using the same hardware for multiple purposes. Efficiency is achieved by
not affecting performance-critical parts of the processor. This helps keep the performance
impact low and enables usage of such tools after deployment. It is especially useful for
software programmers because they can capture bugs after program deployment. A second













Can’t leverage hardware 
for better applications
How to file for 
unemployment benefits ?
Why should 
I buy new 
hardware?
(b) UnBalanced
Figure 1: Hardware-Software Ecosystem.
In general, computer architects, software developers and end-users (who depend on pro-
grammers for applications) form a dependent ecosystem (Figure 1). Architects design high
performance architectures and deliver them to software developers, who in turn, exploit
the newly designed hardware features to develop newer and better applications. End-users
are enticed by these better applications and invest in buying the hardware that sustains a
healthy ecosystem (Figure 1(a)). Once the programmers are unable to leverage the new
hardware for better applications, they fail to meet end-users’ expectations. This jeopar-
dizes architects’ abilities to develop better hardware and destabilizes the balance of the
ecosystem (Figure 1(b)).
In essence, end-users are satisfied when the applications are bug-free and performance
is good. Software developers are happy when they have appropriate tools to address both
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software correctness and performance. Architects have the responsibility to help program-
mers by providing adequate hardware support to aid debugging. We draw inspiration from
here and explore ideas that would form stepping stones in this promising direction.
1.3 Overview
This dissertation contains six chapters.
• Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of correctness and performance debugging, and
the reasons why architects should invest effort in building hardware support for de-
bugging.
• Chapter 2 provides necessary background for this dissertation. We introduce spe-
cific problems in the domain of correctness debugging, namely, memory debugging
and tainting. We then identify an important performance bottleneck in programs,
namely, cache misses, and describe why it is important to measure their impact. As
we transition to multi-core architectures, the effects of cache misses become even
more crucial in making programs scalable. Cache misses caused by false sharing
are a major scalability limiter, and we provide a programmer-centric definition along
with real-world examples of false sharing misses.
• Chapter 3 describes MemTracker, a programmable hardware mechanism for detect-
ing memory-related bugs. MemTracker provides a high degree of flexibility to users
for implementing several different memory checkers and even combining them at
ease. MemTracker’s low (<5%) execution time overheads enable its use in live runs.
• Chapter 4 describes FlexiTaint, a programmable accelerator for taint propagation in
hardware. Tainting is a popular Dynamic Information Flow Tracking mechanism to
track certain values during runtime. Its applications range from tagging untrusted
values and raising alarms when used in spurious ways [17], to tracking heap-based
pointers for accelerating memory leak detection. Our evaluation results show that
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FlexiTaint offers flexibility to track completely different taint propagation policies
simultaneously at low (<5%) execution time overheads.
• Chapter 5 describes CacheDoc, a comprehensive cache miss classification study.
Cache misses are usually categorized as cold misses (when cache blocks are ac-
cessed for the first time), replacement misses (when cache blocks replace other cache
blocks because of insufficient capacity or due to conflicts arising from mapping sev-
eral cache blocks to the same set) and coherence misses (when cache blocks are
shared between cores and are involved in coherence actions). We explore a series of
design points for classifying replacement and coherence misses and study accuracy
versus cost trade-offs involved in these designs.
• Chapter 6 presents conclusions of this work.
1.4 Scope of this Dissertation
The main goal of this work is to motivate the reader with the need for tools that can help
solve some of the widely known, and some of the emerging issues in software correctness
and performance. We describe how our proposed solutions can be integrated into mod-
ern processors by outlining the necessary hardware modifications to incorporate them. We
evaluate our ideas through simulations that model the modified processor platforms and
we study the results. Our work shows promising trends in achieving low-cost and effi-
cient solutions for some of the important problems in software debugging. We envision
this dissertation as a beginning to a long road which will have a plethora of efficient and




In this chapter, we introduce two well-known problems in correctness debugging and one
important problem in performance debugging. Specifically, we first describe the need for
memory debugging, the merits and demerits of existing techniques and why we need pro-
grammable hardware support to detect memory bugs. Second, we describe how tainting
can be used as a dynamic data flow tracking mechanism and discuss some of the previ-
ous works that perform taint propagation in software and in hardware. Third, we identify
cache misses as a performance bottleneck and describe the need to diagnose and classify
these cache misses. With the increasing significance of multi-core processors, cache misses
caused by false sharing are especially detrimental to the scalability of parallel programs on
these platforms. We present a “programmer-centric” definition of false sharing misses and
provide several real-world examples where scalability of applications is affected by these
misses.
2.1 Memory Debugging
Increasing software complexity enabled by rapid improvements in hardware technology
and architecture, has resulted in a wide range of programming bugs. One particularly
important and broad class of programming errors is erroneous use or management of mem-
ory (memory bugs). This class of errors includes pointer arithmetic errors, use of dangling
pointers, reads from uninitialized locations, out-of-bounds accesses (e.g., buffer overflows),
memory leaks, etc. Many software tools have been developed to detect some of these er-
rors. For example, Purify [35] and Valgrind [60] detect memory leaks, accesses to unallo-
cated memory, reads from uninitialized memory, double frees, freeing of statically allocated
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memory, and some dangling pointer and out-of-bounds accesses. Some memory-related er-
rors, such as buffer overflows, are also a well-known source of security vulnerabilities. As
a result, security tools often focus on detection of such errors or specific error manifestation
scenarios. For example, StackGuard [16] detects buffer overflows that attempt to modify a
return address on the stack.
In order to monitor memory-related bugs, a software detection tool (checker) must in-
tercept memory accesses (loads and/or stores) and perform the following set of actions:
• State lookup: For each access, the checker must find the state of the memory location,
e.g., determine whether the location is allocated, initialized, stores a return address,
etc.
• State check: Once the state is obtained, the checker must verify if the access is al-
lowed for a memory location with such state, e.g., determine whether a load reads
from an initialized memory location.
• State update: For certain accesses, the checker could potentially update the state of
the memory location, e.g., a write access changes an uninitialized memory location
into an initialized one.
Since memory read and write instructions are executed frequently, the overhead of inter-
cepting and checking them is very high. Slowdowns of 2× to 30× have been reported for
some popular software tools like Valgrind [73].
Architectural support has been proposed to reduce performance overheads for detect-
ing some memory-related problems [62, 77, 81, 82, 83]. Many of these schemes allow
loads and stores to be intercepted in hardware without inserting instrumentation instruc-
tions around them. After intercepting an access, a checker still needs to perform a state
check and possibly a state update. Previously proposed schemes disagree on whether state
checks and updates should also be performed in hardware, because that decision deter-
mines the trade-off between performance and the ability to support different checkers. One
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approach is to hardwire the meaning of each state for a specific checker [81], which allows
one specific checker or a family of checkers to be implemented very efficiently. Another
approach is to perform interception in hardware and dynamically insert software handlers
for state checks and updates [15]. Finally, a number of existing approaches express state as
access permissions or monitored regions. Such state can quickly be checked in hardware to
determine whether the access can proceed without any additional checker activity. If a state
update (or additional checking) is needed, a software handler is invoked [62, 77, 82, 83].
Overall, existing architecture support is either i) hardwired for a particular checker, or
ii) requires software intervention for every state update. This can lead to significant per-
formance degradation for checkers with frequent state updates. In our approach named
MemTracker (described in Chapter 3), we overcome the above-mentioned problems by
providing a programmable substrate to implement many different memory checkers along
with the hardware performing most of the memory checks.
2.2 Tainting
While memory debugging (described in Section 2.1) specifically targets program bugs as-
sociated with memory-related events such as loads, stores, allocation and deallocation of
memory buffers, access permissions, etc., memory checkers cannot fully guarantee soft-
ware correctness. A growing concern in the software community is the increasing number
of security threats posed by program bugs that can be used as exploits. To help deal with
these problems, a variety of runtime checking and tracking approaches have been proposed.
A number of these proposals have adopted dynamic taint propagation, or tainting. Typi-
cally, a tainting scheme associates a taint with every data value. Figure 2 shows an example
of taint propagation. The taint is usually a one-bit field that tags the value as safe (untainted)
or unsafe (tainted). Data from trusted sources starts out as untainted, whereas data from an
untrusted source (e.g. network) starts out as tainted. Taints are then propagated as values
are copied or used in computation. To detect potential attacks, a tainting scheme looks for
10
















Figure 2: Tainting an “unsafe” input value and propagating the taint in a Data-Flow Graph
of a program segment. A “jump” on a tainted value is detected as unsafe operation.
unsafe uses of tainted values. For example, using a tainted value as a jump target address
is considered unsafe because such a jump may allow the attacker to hijack the control flow
of the application.
Tainting, in general, can be used as a generic Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
(DIFT) technique to tag data values of interest and track their flow through program exe-
cution. Taint propagation is performed either in software or hardware. Several software-
based taint propagation schemes have been proposed as comprehensive solutions against
specific types of security attacks [32, 50, 53, 61, 79]. However, software-only schemes have
large performance overheads and have significant problems with self-modifying code, JIT
compilation, and multi-threaded applications. Multi-threaded applications are especially
difficult due to potential race conditions between data and the corresponding taint value
updates. Hardware-assisted schemes try to avoid these drawbacks [39, 18, 10, 68, 64].
Many hardware tainting schemes suffer from two problems that limit their practicality.
First, their implementations require non-standard commodity components and a redesign
of most of the core’s datapath. Since taint bits are added to every value in memory and
in the processor, wider memory, registers, buses and bypasses are needed. The second
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problem is limited flexibility in specifying taint propagation rules, and in the number of
taint bits associated with a value. Most schemes [50, 79] provide single-bit taints with
little or no flexibility in how that taint is propagated. Those that allow multi-bit taints do
so by significantly increasing the implementation cost, as memory modules, buses, and the
processor core must be designed to accommodate the largest supported taint [18]. Similarly,
schemes that provide some flexibility in specifying taint propagation rules are still limited
to simple rules that mainly target only one particular use of tainting, e.g., tainting of inputs
to detect attacks. In our approach named FlexiTaint (described in Chapter 4), we overcome
the above-mentioned disadvantages by i) using off-the shelf memory modules and through
minimal modifications to the processor core and ii) providing programmable hardware to
implement several different taint propagation policies.
2.3 Performance Debugging
While ensuring program correctness through memory debugging and tainting is very im-
portant, maximizing the performance benefits offered by current processors is also critical
to a successful software product. Some of the performance bottlenecks are related to the ap-
plication itself, e.g., the number of instructions that can be executed simultaneously at any
given time, popularly referred to as Instruction Level Parallelism. Many other bottlenecks
result from the application’s interaction with the underlying hardware. Such bottlenecks
include excessive cache misses, mispredicted branch instructions, etc.
With the growing popularity of modern day multi-core architectures, tapping their po-
tential requires efficient use of the multiple cores on the chip. Applications must be written
so that their performances scale linearly, or as close to linearly as possible, with the number
of available cores. This is often extremely challenging, even when the underlying applica-
tion is amenable to parallelization. Parallel applications have a number of possible perfor-
mance problems that either do not exist in serial applications or that can be aggravated by
the sharing of resources.
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Processor vendors understand that making processors with increased raw performance
is not sufficient: customers must see a real performance difference. This requires that soft-
ware vendors write their applications to take advantage of the increased raw performance.
This is not a trivial task, and therefore, most processor vendors currently support a number
of performance counters to aid this task [36]. Performance counters aid programmers in
finding and eliminating performance bottlenecks in their code (i.e., performance debug-
ging). Since it is much harder to realize the performance potential of multi-core and many-
core processors, processor vendors should be willing to invest some additional resources to
aid in performance debugging issues introduced with multi-core and many-core processors.
Ideally, these resources would include performance counters for additional multi-core and
many-core events, and hardware to detect those events.
A natural question to ask is whether hardware support brings significant value to per-
formance debugging given the wide variety of software-only performance debugging tools
available. For at least three aspects, the answer is “absolutely.” Tools that interface with
the performance counters are extremely popular because they i) can collect information
on an enormous variety of performance bottlenecks and present it in a usable way (i.e.,
pinpoint problems in the source code), ii) are very fast, and iii) are very accurate. In con-
trast, software-only tools i) typically only measure a small set of events since they must
trade off execution time overhead and the amount of information collected, ii) are gener-
ally slow even when only measuring a small number of events (e.g., SM-prof [6] reports
up to 3000× slowdown depending on the amount of shared data references), and iii) are
not reliably accurate because in many cases they cannot model hardware perfectly and/or
perturb the program execution by interleaving software instrumentation into that execu-
tion. Having a tool that is fast, accurate, and can measure a number of events of interest is
extremely valuable.
Memory accesses that miss in caches frequently consume additional latency and de-
grade program performance. While cache misses certainly affect the performance in single
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core machines, their effects are even more pronounced in multi-core processors. A variety
of memory system behaviors that result in poor application scaling manifest themselves as
additional cache misses. Therefore, determining the source of the additional misses can be
of great help to a programmer. The “source” of a cache miss includes both the underlying
reason why the hardware did not have the line in the cache as well as the place in the code
that triggered the miss.
Hardware may incur additional cache misses for parallelized applications for a number
of reasons. The most common ones for shared memory systems are: i) Reduced temporal
and spatial locality from input data partitioning, ii) inter-thread communication, via both
true sharing (i.e., intentional communication) and false sharing (i.e., unintentional commu-
nication), and iii) destructive sharing (i.e., additional conflict misses from cache sharing).
False sharing and destructive sharing, in particular, are issues that often surprise pro-
grammers; without sufficient knowledge of the underlying hardware, the presence of these
misses is mysterious and even frustrating. They can also have a devastating impact on
parallel scalability (Section 2.4). For example, programmers often use an array of coun-
ters or accumulators (one per-thread) when parallelizing reductions. Without appropriate
padding, if these structures are frequently accessed, the application will incur a huge in-
crease in cache misses due to false sharing. Another frequent programmer behavior is
partitioning a data structure into power-of-two-sized chunks. If the chunks are aligned in a
shared cache (i.e., map to the same sets), and the cache’s associativity is not sufficient, the
application will incur a huge increase in cache misses due to destructive sharing [29]. This
also frequently occurs if threads’ stacks are power-of-two aligned.
One way to help distinguish between the above three causes of cache misses is to clas-
sify misses using the common categories: i) compulsory, ii) capacity, iii) conflict, and iv)
coherence [30]. A cold miss occurs when the requested block has never been in the cache
before. Capacity and conflict misses are collectively called replacement misses. These
misses occur when a block is re-accessed after it has already been fetched into the cache
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and then evicted to accommodate another block. Capacity misses are replacement misses
due to limited cache size. Conflict misses are caused by limited cache associativity; these
would be hits in a fully associative cache of the same size. Finally, coherence misses are
caused by sharing of data between cores. These misses occur when a block is invalidated
or downgraded in a core’s cache, and then re-accessed by that core. Unlike the other three
classes of misses (compulsory, capacity, and conflict), a coherence miss finds the block in
the cache, but the block is in a non-usable state: a read finds the block in an invalid state,
or a write finds the block in invalid or shared states.
Classifying cache misses into these categories can help identify the root cause of the
misses. For example, a large jump in conflict misses in a shared cache between a single-
threaded run and a multi-threaded run likely indicates destructive sharing. It is also helpful
to additionally classify coherence misses as being caused by true or false sharing since
these have fundamentally different sources, and are addressed by the programmer in dif-
ferent ways. Cache miss classification helps programmers to use techniques, such as array
grouping to reduce communication delays [63] or cache conscious data placement [8, 11],
to minimize the effect of such misses. Although our aim is to primarily help programmers,
we derive other potential benefits from identifying various types of cache misses. For ex-
ample, victim caches can choose to store blocks that frequently suffer conflict misses [13].
Prefetchers can improve performance by bringing in blocks that suffer a large number of
capacity misses.
We note that performance of applications can be improved only if programmers, com-
pilers, and/or dynamic optimizers carefully apply appropriate fixes to reduce the number
of cache misses in the program. Different types of cache misses require different types
of fixes, and knowing the dominant type of cache misses is helpful when deciding on an
approach to fixing them. For example, conflict misses and false sharing misses are fre-
quently addressed through padding the memory, while true sharing misses might require
fundamental redesign of the algorithm. Although there is no doubt that the effort required
15
differs depending on the type of miss, not all misses of a particular type are amenable to
the same fixes. For example, fixing false sharing misses by padding a data array may intro-
duce additional cache misses due to conflict with other cache blocks. Hence, depending on
the type of miss and its sorrounding access patterns, potential performance improvement
is likely to vary across different cases. Nevertheless, identifying the sources and causes
(type) of these cache misses helps programmers to understand program behavior and to
decide which techniques to use for improving program performance.
There have been several proposals for cache miss classification off-line or in architec-
tural simulators [30, 44, 71]. A pure software-based scheme to dynamically classify cache
misses can degrade the application performance by several orders of magnitude [6]. This
is unacceptable not only because it is slow but also because it can significantly alter the
execution path of a parallel program, minimizing the utility of the generated cache miss
classification. Collins et al. [13] have proposed a hardware scheme that identifies conflict
misses in a cost-effective manner. However, their definition of a conflict miss differs from
the classical definition and is primarily directed towards helping prefetchers and victim
caches. To our knowledge, our scheme named CacheDoc (described in Chapter 5) is the
first to provide a comprehensive cache miss classification mechanism that can be performed
on-the-fly to drive performance counters and hardware-assisted profiling.
2.4 False Sharing and its Implications on Scalability
In Section 2.3, we analyzed the need to classify cache misses into compulsory, replacement
and coherence misses. Coherence misses, in particular, are becoming increasingly relevant
for multi-core processors and needs to be better understood by programmers who are much
more familiar with compulsory and replacement misses that occur in single core processors.
In this section, we provide a programmer-centric definition of false sharing and true sharing
misses and then discuss several real-world examples where false sharing misses occur and
how removing these misses improves scalability.
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2.4.1 Definition
In cache coherent CMPs, data sharing between threads primarily manifests itself as coher-
ence misses which can further be classified as true sharing and false sharing misses.
True sharing misses are a consequence of actual data sharing among cores and are
intuitive to most programmers, e.g., a consumer (reader) of the data must suffer a cache
miss to obtain the updated version of the data from the producer (writer). The scalability
issues stemming from true sharing misses can typically be addressed only by changing the
algorithm, distribution of the work among cores, or synchronization and timing.
In contrast, false sharing misses are an artifact of data placement and a cache block
holding multiple data items. Scalability issues arising from false sharing are often relatively
easy to alleviate by changing alignment or adding padding between affected data items. A
false sharing miss occurs if a block contains two data items (X and Y), core A accesses item
X, core B uses item Y and invalidates the block from A’s cache, and then core A accesses
item X again. The resulting cache miss is a false sharing miss because that access would
be a cache hit if X and Y were in different cache blocks. Note that, if after the coherence
miss on an item X, core A accesses item Y before the block is evicted or invalidated again,
the miss is in fact a true sharing miss. As shown in Figure 3, in this situation, the cache
miss is not avoided by placing X and Y in separate blocks, and hence, the miss on X is
not a false sharing miss. This definition of false sharing is based on Dubois et al. [23], and
it differs from earlier definitions [24, 71] in that it attempts to classify coherence misses
according to whether they are “essential” (true sharing) or “non-essential” (false sharing).
We adopt this definition as a baseline because it more accurately captures whether or not
the miss can be eliminated (not just traded for another miss) by separating data items into
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Figure 3: The miss on X is a not a false sharing miss — it is only replaced by another miss
if X and Y are placed in separate blocks.
/ / Each t h r e a d p r o c e s s e s i t s own
/ / s e q u e n c e o f i n p u t e l e m e n t s
i n t p a r t i a l r e s u l t [NUM THREADS ] ;
/ / T h i s i s t h e work done i n p a r a l l e l
. . .
i n t i n p u t e l e m e n t = . . . ;
p a r t i a l r e s u l t [ t h r e a d i d ] += i n p u t e l e m e n t ;
. . .
Figure 4: A parallel reduction showing false sharing on an array of counters (one-per-
thread). The merging of partial results is omitted for space.
2.4.2 Real-World examples
We provide examples, taken from code written by experienced programmers, to illustrate
some common situations where false sharing occurs and its sometimes devastating impact
on parallel scalability.
Our first example involves an array of private counters or accumulators (one per-thread),
which is often used when parallelizing reductions as shown in Figure 4. There is no true
sharing in this code because each thread is reading and writing a unique array element.
False sharing occurs when two threads’ counters lie in the same cache block. This kind
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/ / Count o c c u r r e n c e s o f v a l u e s i n p a r a l l e l
/ / Each t h r e a d p r o c e s s e s i t s own range o f
/ / i n p u t e l e m e n t s , u p d a t i n g t h e sh ar ed
/ / o c c u r r e n c e c o u n t f o r each e l e m e n t ’ s v a l u e
# d e f i n e MAXIMUM 255
i n t c o u n t e r a r r a y [MAXIMUM+ 1 ] ;
/ / T h i s i s t h e work done i n p a r a l l e l
. . .
i n t i n p u t e l e m e n t = . . . ;
c o u n t e r a r r a y [ i n p u t e l e m e n t ] + + ;
. . .
Figure 5: A parallel histogram computation illustrating false sharing on an indirectly ac-
cessed array. Locking of counter array elements is omitted for brevity.
of code is common in web search, fluid simulation, and human body tracking applica-
tions [22]. A common fix is to add padding around each counter. We provide a real-world
example from a loop in the One Newton Step Toward Steady State CG Helper II() func-
tion from the facesim benchmark in the PARSEC-1.0 suite. The benchmark authors spent
multiple days identifying false sharing from this loop as the primary source of performance
problems [22]. We ran the facesim benchmark with the native input on an 8-core Intel Xeon
machine and observed that without padding, false sharing limits the benchmark’s parallel
scaling to 4× (Section 5.3.2). After adding padding, the benchmark achieves linear scaling
(8×). A profiling tool that automatically identifies and reports false sharing misses would
have greatly helped the programmer.
Our second example involves an indirectly accessed data array, as shown in Figure 5
and often occurs in histogram computation, used in image processing applications and in
some implementations of radix sort [22]. The pattern of indirections is input-dependent, so
the programmer and compiler cannot predetermine how many accesses will occur to each
element, and which threads will perform them. This example involves both true and false
sharing. True sharing occurs when two threads update the same element. False sharing
occurs when two threads access two different elements in the same cache block, which
occurs much more frequently. For example, with 64-byte blocks and 4-byte elements, a
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/ / The t a s k o f each t h r e a d i s t o up da t e one row o f t h e g r i d
. . .
f o r ( i = ( i t e r a t i o n %2); i < wid th ; i += 2) {
f l o a t v a l = g r i d [ t a s k i d ] [ i ] + g r i d [ t a s k i d ] [ i −1] +
g r i d [ t a s k i d ] [ i +1] + g r i d [ t a s k i d −1][ i ] +
g r i d [ t a s k i d + 1 ] [ i ] ;
g r i d [ t a s k i d ] [ i ] = v a l / 5 . 0 ;
}
. . .
Figure 6: A red-black Gauss-Seidel-style array update showing false sharing on a finely
partitioned array.
block contains 16 elements; with a completely random access pattern, false sharing would
occur 15 times more likely than true sharing. A common fix is to either add padding
around each element or use privatization (use a separate array for each thread and then
merge partial results at the end). Without privatization, a histogram benchmark from a
real-world image processing application achieves only a 2× parallel speedup when run on
a 16-core Intel Xeon [36] machine. With privatization, the benchmark achieves near-linear
scalability.
Our final example of false sharing involves finely partitioned arrays, such as one might
find in red-black Gauss-Seidel computations as shown in Figure 6. In many applications, a
data array is partitioned such that each partition will only be written to by a single thread.
However, when updating elements around the boundary of a partition, a thread sometimes
needs to read data across the boundary (i.e., from another partition). In our example, syn-
chronization on each element is avoided by treating the data as a checkerboard, with alter-
nating red and black elements. Even-numbered passes update red cells, and odd-numbered
passes update black cells. An update involves reading the Manhattan-adjacent neighbors,
which are guaranteed to be a different color than the cell being updated. Thus, even if those
neighbors belong to another partition, they will not be updated during the current pass.
Both true and false sharing occurs in this example. The first time a thread accesses a
cache block across a partition boundary, it is reading data written by another thread during
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the previous pass. Thus, it incurs a true sharing miss. However, if that other thread is ac-
tively updating elements in the same cache block, this will trigger additional misses that are
all due to false sharing. This situation is most likely when partitions are small; for example,
if a parallel task is to update one row, and the tasks are distributed to threads round-robin.
This kind of computation is common in scientific codes (i.e., applications that involve solv-
ing systems of differential equations) [22]. We ran an early real-world implementation1 of
red-black Gauss-Seidel with the above task distribution on an 8-core Intel Xeon processor.
Parallel scaling is limited to 3x. Padding around each cell can eliminate false sharing, but
with significant loss in spacial locality. A better solution is to group multiple rows together
to be processed by the same thread, or to use a two separate arrays, one for red and one for
black cells. In our case, using separate arrays and grouping rows improved the scaling to
almost 6x.
2.4.3 Summary
This chapter introduced two important classes of problems in correctness debugging, namely,
memory debugging and taint propagation. Cache misses were identified as a key perfor-
mance bottleneck, and real-world examples were shown where false sharing misses can
result in poor application scalability in multi-core architectures. We also discussed several
related works, and how that work affects correctness and performance debugging.
1We gratefully acknowledge researchers at Applications Research Lab, Intel Corporation for providing us
with an early version of Gauss-Seidel benchmark.
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CHAPTER III
MEMTRACKER: MEMORY ACCESS MONITOR AND
DEBUGGER
3.1 Motivation
Designing architecture support for tracking memory access behavior involves trade-offs
between two choices: to sacrifice performance by designing hardware support that is not
checker specific, or to sacrifice generality by hard-wiring specific checks for performance.
Unfortunately, both alternatives are unappealing: users are reluctant to enable memory ac-
cess tracking mechanisms that have significant performance overheads, while architecture
designers are unwilling to implement hardware that is checker-specific. To overcome this
problem, we propose a hardware mechanism, which we call MemTracker, that can perform
interception, state checks, and state updates in hardware, while still remaining generic and
not hard-wired for any particular checker.
MemTracker is essentially a programmable state machine. It associates each memory
word with a state and treats each memory action as an event. States of data memory lo-
cations in the application’s virtual address space are stored as an array in a separate and
protected region of the application’s virtual address space. Each event results in looking up
the state of the target memory location, checking if the event is allowed given the current
state of the location, and possibly raising an exception or changing the state of the location.
To control state checking and updates, MemTracker uses a Programmable State Transition
Table (PSTT).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents an overview of
our MemTracker mechanism, Section 3.3 presents some hardware implementation details,
Section 3.4 presents the setup for our experimental evaluation, Section 3.5 presents our
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experimental results, Section 3.6 discusses related work, and Section 3.7 summarizes our
findings.
3.2 Overview
To provide context and a motivating example for our discussion of MemTracker, we first
describe an example checker. We then describe our MemTracker mechanism and how it
can be used to implement the example checker.
3.2.1 HeapData: an Example Memory Access Checker
Many typical programming mistakes, such as use of dangling pointers or neglecting to ini-
tialize a variable, are manifested through accesses to unallocated memory locations or to
loads from uninitialized locations. Detection of such accesses is one of the key benefits of
tools such as Purify [35] and Valgrind [60], and has also been used to evaluate hardware
support for runtime checking of memory accesses in HeapMon [62]. To help explain our
new MemTracker support, we will use HeapData, an example checker that is functionally
similar to the checker used in HeapMon. This checker tracks the allocation and initializa-
tion status of each word in the heap region using three states: Unallocated, Uninitialized,
and Initialized. The state transitions for this checker are shown in Figure 7. All words in
the heap area start in the Unallocated state. When a block of Unallocated memory words is
allocated (e.g. through malloc()), the state of each word changes to Uninitialized. The
first write (e.g. using a store instruction) to an Uninitialized word changes its state to Ini-
tialized. The word then remains in the Initialized state until it is deallocated (e.g. through
free()), at which time it changes back to the Unallocated state.
Only an Initialized word can be read, and writes are allowed only to Uninitialized or
Initialized words. Memory allocation is valid only if all allocated words are in the Unallo-
cated state, and deallocation is valid only if all deallocated words are either Uninitialized
or Initialized. All other reads, writes, allocations, and deallocations are treated as errors



























Figure 7: State transition diagram for the HeapData checker.
In addition to these three states from HeapMon [62], our HeapData checker has a Non-
Heap state which is used for all data outside the heap region. This new state allows us
to treat all memory accesses in the same way, without using an address-range filter [62]
to identify only heap accesses. The NonHeap state permits loads and stores, but prohibits
heap allocations and deallocations. The Operating system can identify which pages are
for the heap because the heap segment is typically grown through the brk system call.
Therefore, it can initialize heap memory locations to Unalloc and non-heap locations to
NonHeap.
Overall, our example HeapData checker reacts to four different kinds of events (loads,
stores, allocations, and deallocations), and keeps each word in the application’s data mem-
ory in one of four different states.
We note that HeapData and other checkers in our experiments are used only to illus-
trate how MemTracker can be used and to evaluate MemTracker’s performance. We do
not consider the checkers themselves as our contribution, but rather as familiar and useful




For each word of data, MemTracker keeps an entry that consists of a few bits of state.
These state entries are kept as a packed array in main memory, where consecutive state
entries correspond to consecutive words of data. This packed array of state entries is stored
in the application’s virtual address space, but in a separately mapped (e.g. via mmap)
region. Whenever a new physical page is mapped for data, the operating system has to
determine whether a physical page exists for the corresponding state addresses. If not, a
new physical page is mapped for state information. This operation needs to performed
for statically mapped pages at the time of loading the program as well as for dynamically
mapped pages in the heap section of the program where pages are mapped on demand. In
order to prevent accidental or malicious overwrites to pages containing state information,
we provide an extra “state permission bit” apart from the normal Read, Write, Execute
permission bits. Pages containing “state” information have state permission bit set and the
other permission bits are turned off. This permits MemTracker to access the state pages
safely and restricts normal load and store instructions from accessing the state information.
This approach avoids custom storage for state and benefits from existing address translation
and virtual memory mechanisms. Also, we can use existing structures like Translation
Lookaside Buffer (TLB) to perform virtual address translation for state addresses. We
provide a “state” permission to TLB in addition to the read, write, execute permission
bits. If regular load/store accesses a “state” page directly, an exception is raised. For
memory pages that are shared between multiple processes, there are two possibilities - i)
all processes could share state and, hence the OS can allocate the same physical page, or ii)
each process could choose to maintain state for the shared page separately and, hence the
OS can allocate a separate physical page for each process.
When an event (e.g., a load) targets a memory location, the state entry for that location
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can be found using simple logic (see Section 3.3.2). Our MemTracker mechanism reads
the current state of the memory location and uses it, together with the type of the event, to
find the corresponding transition entry in the programmable state transition table (PSTT).
Each entry in PSTT specifies the new state for the memory location, and also indicates
whether to trigger an exception. Entries in the PSTT can be modified either through invok-
ing Operating System or trusted software, allowing MemTracker to implement different
checkers.
3.2.3 Events
MemTracker treats existing load and store instructions as events that trigger state lookups,
checks, and updates. Other events, such as memory allocation and deallocation in Heap-
Data, should also be able to affect MemTracker state. However, these high-level events
are difficult to identify at the level of the hardware and differ from checker to checker. To
support these events effectively, we extend the ISA with a small number of user event in-
structions. User event instructions can be used in the code to “annotate” high-level activity
in the application and library code. The sole purpose of these instructions is to be Mem-
Tracker events. These instructions only result in MemTracker state lookups, checks, and
updates, and do not actually access the data associated with that state. The number of dif-
ferent user level instructions supported in the ISA is a trade-off between PSTT size (which
grows in proportion to the number of events) and sophistication of checkers that can be
implemented (more user event instructions allow more sophisticated checkers). Note that,
if binary compatibility with existing systems that do not implement MemTracker is a de-
sign requirement, existing no-op or unused opcodes in the ISA should be carefully selected
to implement user events. Similarly, for new systems without MemTracker support, user
event opcodes should be treated as no-ops. In this work, we model MemTracker with 32
user event instructions, which is considerably more than what is actually needed for the
checkers used in our experimental evaluation.
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In terms of the number of affected memory locations, MemTracker must deal with two
kinds of events: constant-footprint and variable-footprint events. An example of a constant-
footprint event is a load from memory, where the number of accessed bytes is determined by
the instruction’s opcode. The handling of these events is straightforward: the state for the
affected word or set of words (e.g. for a double-word load) is looked up, the transition table
is accessed, and the state is updated if there is a change. An example of a variable-footprint
event is memory allocation, in which a variable and potentially large number of locations
can be affected. We note that variable-footprint events can be dynamically replaced by
loops of constant-footprint events, either through binary rewriting or in the processor itself
in a way similar to converting x86 string instructions into µops [31].
In this work, we use a RISC processor without variable-footprint (e.g. string) load
and store instructions, but we provide support for variable-footprint user events to sim-
plify implementation of checkers. Instructions for variable-footprint user events have two
source register operands, one for the base address and the other for the size of the tar-
get memory address range. This implementation allows simpler checker implementations,
and avoids code size increase and software overheads of looping. However, in our sim-
ulation, each variable-footprint event is treated as a series of constant-footprint events
with each accessing one word at a time. Hence, the overheads due to variable-footprint
events are fully accounted for. In fact, these overheads are likely overestimated because
more efficient implementations (e.g. handling a double word or an entire cache block at a
time) of variable-footprint events are possible. In our MemTracker implementation, 16 of
our 32 user event instructions are variable-footprint, and the rest are word-sized constant-
footprint events (sub-word events are discussed in Section 3.2.5). Note that we only need
two variable-footprint and five constant-footprint user events to simultaneously support all
checkers used in our evaluation. The remaining user events are there to provide support for
more sophisticated checkers in the future.
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3.2.4 Setup for the HeapData Checker
To implement the HeapData checker from Section 3.2.1, we use two variable-footprint user
event instructions, UEVT0 for allocations and UEVT1 for deallocations. We instrument
the user-level memory allocation library to execute UEVT0 at the end of the allocation
function, and UEVT1 at the start of the deallocation function. Figure 8 gives a simple
illustration for how variable footprint instructions like UEVT0 and UEVT1 are used by our
example heap checker.
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Figure 8: Example Instructions with variable footprint (e.g., UEVT0 is used to annotate
memory allocation and UEVT1 to annotate memory deallocation) and constant footprint
(e.g., store).
As explained in Section 3.2.3, a variable-footprint event instruction takes the start-
ing address and the number of affected memory words, and it performs the state lookup,
check, and update for each of those memory locations. For example, UEVT0 is used as
an allocation of memory event in the HeapData checker, and in Figure 8 we show
how it changes the state of 4 words of memory at address X from Unallocated to Uninitial-
ized. Similarly UEVT1 is used to denote a freeing of memory event, and is shown
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in Figure 8 for 3 words at address Y. As an example of an instruction with constant mem-
ory footprint, we also show a store instruction to memory location X, which changes its
state from Uninitialized to Initialized. Figure 9 shows the PSTT configuration for the heap
checker, which is a tabular equivalent of states and transitions described in Section 3.2.1,
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Figure 9: State transition table for our example HeapData checker. Entries with “E” trigger
exceptions.
It should be noted that the need to modify the memory allocation library is not specific
to MemTracker – all tools or mechanisms that track allocation status of memory loca-
tions require some instrumentation of the memory management library to capture alloca-
tion and deallocation activity. Compared to software-only tools that perform such checks,
MemTracker-based implementation has the advantage of eliminating the instrumentation
of load/store memory accesses and the associated performance overhead. Even for ap-
plications that frequently perform memory allocations and deallocations, the number of
loads/stores still easily exceeds the number of allocations and deallocations1, and hence
even such applications benefit considerably from MemTracker.
3.2.5 Dealing with Sub-Word Accesses
MemTracker keeps state only for entire words, so sub-word memory accesses represent a
problem. For example, consider the shaded transition entry in Figure 9, which corresponds
1In fact, several load/store instructions are executed during each heap allocation and deallocation
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to a sub-word store to an Uninitialized word. Since the access actually initializes only part
(e.g. the first byte) of the word, we could leave the word in state 2 (Uninitialized). However,
a read from the same part of the word (first byte) is then falsely detected as a read from
uninitialized memory. Conversely, if we change the state of the word to 3 (Initialized), a
read from another part of the word (e.g. the last byte) is not detected as a problem, although
it is in fact reading an uninitialized memory location.
In this trade-off between detecting problems and avoiding false positives, the right
choice depends on the circumstances and the checker. To allow flexibility in implementing
checkers, sub-word load/stores are treated as separate event types in the PSTT. This allows
us to achieve the desired behavior for sub-word accesses. For example, during debugging
we can program the PSTT of the HeapData checker (Figure 9) such that sub-word stores to
uninitialized data leave the state of the word as uninitialized to detect all reads from unini-
tialized locations. In live runs, we can avoid false positives by programming the PSTT to
treat a sub-word write as an initialization of the entire word.
When treating sub-word accesses as accesses to the entire word, our experiments did not
have any false negatives (reads of uninitialized sub-words that might slip through without
being noticed) because our benchmark suites, that are thoroughly tested and well struc-
tured, operate on data blocks that were multiples of word sizes. However, when sub-word
accesses are treated in a paranoid fashion, i.e. when sub-word access does not set the
state of the entire word to Initialized, numerous false positives are in many benchmarks,
especially in the SPECint suite which frequently uses character and short integer arrays.
Alternatively, both false positives and false negatives on sub-word accesses can be
avoided by i) Keeping state for each byte at a cost of increasing memory overhead needed
for state. The same mechanisms described for word-level granularity still apply at byte-
level tracking, or ii) Encoding the necessary semantic information as part of the state, like
the solution proposed by [9].
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3.2.6 Event Masking
It may be difficult to anticipate at compile time which checkers will be needed when the ap-
plication is used. Therefore, it would be very useful to be able to switch different checkers
on and off, depending on the situation in which the application runs. To achieve that, we
can generate code with user events for several different checkers, and then provide a way
to efficiently ignore events used for disabled checkers. This would also eliminate nearly all
overheads when all checking is disabled.
To ignore load and store MemTracker events when checking is not used, we can set
up the PSTT to generate no exceptions and no state changes. User events can be similarly
neutralized, e.g. to turn the checker off without removing instrumentation for it. However,
state and PSTT lookups would still affect performance and consume energy. To minimize
this effect, we add an event mask register that has one bit for each type of event. If load
and/or store events are masked out, loads and stores are performed without state and PSTT
lookups. A masked-out user event instruction becomes a no-op, consuming only fetch and
decode bandwidth.
3.2.7 Support for multiple checkers
As we have seen, MemTracker is an efficient hardware mechanism that can be programmed
to implement different types of checkers. It can also be used to implement multiple check-
ers simultaneously. One way to do this is to directly merge state transition diagrams of the
individual checkers into a combined state machine [76]. The advantage of this approach
is that the total number of state bits in the combined checker can be fewer than the sum
of state bits from the original checkers. For example, the three individual checkers used in
our evaluation are HeapData, HeapChunks, and RetAddr and they use 4, 2, and 3 states,
respectively (2, 1, and 2 bits of state per word). This results in a total of 5 bits of state
per word (8 bit if only power-of-two state sizes are supported). However, when we design
a checker to combine the functionality of these checkers, the resulting checker has only 7
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states (3 bits of state per word, or 4 if only power-of-two state sizes are supported). The
total number of states is reduced because some of the states can be eliminated as redundant,
and the number of bits is further reduced because the individual checkers do not use all the
states that can be encoded with the bits they use (e.g. the RetAddr checker uses two bits
to encode only 3 states). This approach also has some disadvantages. In particular, we
need a separate state diagram for each combination of checkers which does not facilitate
using checkers as modules, requires extensive programmer effort when combining many
checkers or checkers with many states, and it is difficult to add or remove a checker at
runtime. The lack of checker modularity may also prevent simultaneous use of system and
user checkers: the system may impose some checkers on an application (e.g. for security),
and the application itself may want to use additional checkers (e.g. to detect and report
bugs). In this scenario, the application-introduced checkers should not be able to affect
(e.g. subvert) system-imposed checkers. This is difficult to achieve if a programmer must
design the combined checker: the system programmer cannot anticipate all the applica-
tion checkers that will be needed, whereas the application programmer cannot be trusted
to design the combined checker because it subsumes the functionality of system-imposed
checkers.
A more modular approach to combining checkers is to leave checkers independently de-
fined. In general, a checker is expressed as a state transition function that takes the event ID
and the current state, and returns the new state and an additional bit that indicates whether
or not to raise an exception. If we have two checkers A and B, defined through functions
FA and FB and using nA and nB state bits, respectively, the state of the combined checker
will be a concatenation of individual checker’s state bits, and the combined transition func-
tion will be a simple dispatcher function that calls FA with the first nA bits of the combined
state, calls FB for the second nB bits of the combined state, concatenates the resulting state
into a new combined state, and performs a logical OR of the individual exception bits to

















Figure 10: A dispatcher function FAB calling FA and FB to determine the output of check-
ers A and B respectively.
With this approach, individual checkers can be specified as state transition functions,
and the system can easily combine them without additional programmer involvement. Be-
cause each individual state transition function only sees its own part of the combined
state, this also eliminates the risk of checkers interfering with each other. In particular,
application-introduced checkers cannot affect the operation of system-imposed checkers.
It should be noted that the way checkers are combined affects the hardware design of
MemTracker only indirectly, by making the state size larger and thus potentially requiring
support for a larger maximum number of state bits. As far as MemTracker hardware is
concerned, only one checker is used at a time, and the two approaches to checker combining
only differ in how this one checker is constructed from component checkers.
Since the modular approach to checker combining can increase the number of state bits,
we need to consider whether the the PSTT structure is capable of handling significantly
larger numbers of states. With a maximum of four state bits (16 states), the number of
PSTT entries is 576 (16 states and 36 events) and the entire PSTT is 360 bytes in size
(576 entries, each with 4 bits of state and one exception bit). However, with the dispatcher
implementation, we need a larger maximum allowable number of state bits, e.g. 8 or even
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16 bits. With 8-bit state (256 states), the PSTT has 9216 entries and each entry is 9 bits in
size (8+1), for a total PSTT size of slightly over 10KBytes. With 16 bit state, the PSTT size
grows to nearly 5MBytes. While the original 360-byte PSTT can easily be stored on-chip
and a state lookup can be performed quickly without hurting performance, this is unlikely
to be the case with the larger PSTT needed to support more state bits.
To address this problem, we change the way the PSTT is designed. Instead of keeping
the entire PSTT on-chip, we cache a few recently used PSTT entries on-chip, and use a
software miss handler to service misses in this cache. This miss handler is effectively
the state transition function F discussed earlier in this section - given the current state
and event, it computes the new state and the exception bit and places this result in the
PSTT cache to help avoid future PSTT cache misses. This approach also facilitates checker
modularity and fast context switching - to change the current checker, the system must only
invalidate the on-chip PSTT cache and change the address of the PSTT cache miss handler,
instead of having to load the new content of the entire PSTT. This approach is similar to
the technique used in FlexiTaint [74] for its taint propagation lookups.
3.3 Implementation
In this section, we outline the issues involved in implementing MemTracker in actual hard-
ware. We first describe PSTT implementation and then show how MemTracker achieves
efficient state lookups. We illustrate how MemTracker can be integrated into a modern
out-of-order processor pipeline and also describe some features needed for multiprocessor
implementation. Finally, we show how MemTracker interacts with operating system for
setup and context switches.
3.3.1 Programmable State Transition Table (PSTT)
Different checkers that use MemTracker support need different numbers of state bits per
word, so we provide support to select the number of state bits at runtime. In particular, we
add a MemTracker Control Register (MTCR), which specifies the number of state bits per
34
word. Note that the number of state bits is determined by the checker and not by Mem-
Tracker. Hence the amount of virtual memory needed for storing state is also determined
by MTCR. In our current implementation, we only allow power-of-two numbers, to sim-
plify state lookups and updates. We also limit the maximum to 8 bits because the largest
checker used in our evaluation (the modular combined checker) only uses 5 bits. Note that
the number of supported state bits can be easily changed to 16 or even 32, at the cost of
widening the MemTracker logic and PSTT cache entries. Note that with the new PSTT
caching approach, we do not explicitly store the entire PSTT (it is expressed as a set of
software handlers) so the larger number of bits does not result in exponential growth in
storage needed to store the PSTT. In our current implementation, we use a small 256-entry
PSTT cache structure. This small PSTT-cache is direct-mapped and is addressed using a
concatenation of the event ID (6 bits to encode 36 events) and current state (8 bits in our
implementation). Each entry consists of a tag (6 bits, 14 bits minus the 8 index bits), a new
state (8 bits) and an exception bit (1 bit), for a total size of 480 bytes.
3.3.2 Finding State Information
State is stored in memory starting at the virtual address specified in the State Base Address
Register (SBAR), and address of the state of a given data address can be found quickly by
adding the SBAR with selected bits of the data address using simple indexing functions.



















Figure 11: Lookup of 2-bit state for data location 0xABCD.
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3.3.3 Caching State Information
There are three basic ways to cache state information: split caching (state blocks in a
separate cache, Figure 12(a)), shared caching (state blocks share the same cache with data,
Figure 12(b)), and interleaved caching (state bits stored with the cache line that has the
corresponding data, Figure 12(c)). Shared caching has the advantage of using existing on-
chip caches. However, in shared caching state competes with data for cache space, and
lookups and updates compete with data accesses for cache bandwidth. Split caching has
the advantage that it leaves the data cache unmodified, but adds extra cost for the separate
state cache. Also, the state is usually much smaller than data. So, multiple states can fit in
a single memory word and state accesses that exhibit good locality have higher hit rate in
the state cache. Finally, interleaved caching allows one cache access to service both a data
load and the lookup of the corresponding state; similarly, a data store and a state update
can be performed in the same cache access. Conceptually, interleaved caching seems to be
the logical choice because the state information is held as part of the same cache block2.
For multiprocessors, maintaining atomicity of state and data is easier because, the state and
data updates can be performed together. However, unlike the other two caching approaches,
interleaved caching makes each cache block larger (to hold the maximum-size state for the
block’s data) and may slow down the cache even when state is not used (Table 2).
We find that the simple and inexpensive shared caching approach works well for non-
primary caches. State is considerably smaller than the corresponding data, so the relatively
few state blocks cause insignificant interference with data caching in large caches (L2 and
beyond). Additionally, L1 caches act as excellent “filters” for the L2 cache, so state ac-
cesses add little contention to data block accesses. As a result, the choice of caching
approach mainly applies to primary (L1) caches, and all three L1 caching approaches are
2This simplifies the lookup of the cache block (one lookup for both data and state) but still results in





















Figure 12: Caching approaches for MemTracker state in the L1 cache. For L2 and below
we always use Shared.
examined in our experimental evaluation (Section 3.5). We find that shared L1 caching per-
forms poorly without expensive additional cache ports. Interleaved L1 caching performs
slightly better at an added cost of access latency and area, but it simplifies some memory
consistency issues (Section 3.3.6) and may still be good choice in chip-multiprocessors.
Finally, split caching has good performance even with a smaller and simpler state cache,
and has a good performance-cost-power trade-off.
3.3.4 Processor Modifications for MemTracker
MemTracker integration into the processor pipeline is simpler for Split and Shared L1
state caching approaches, where state lookups can be delayed until the end of the pipeline.
This allows MemTracker to be added as an in-order extension to the commit stage of the
pipeline, avoiding any significant changes to the complex out-of-order engine of the pro-
cessor (Figure 13(a)).
In a conventional processor (no MemTracker support), the commit logic of the proces-
sor checks the oldest instructions in the ROB and commits the completed ones in order
(from oldest to youngest). If an instruction is a store, its commit initiates the cache write
access. These writes are delayed until commit because cached data reflects the architectural
state of memory and should not be polluted with speculative values.
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Figure 13: Processor pipeline with MemTracker support (shaded) for different L1 state
caching approaches.
MemTracker adds two additional pipeline stages just before the commit (Figure 13(a)).
The first of these stages is the pre-commit stage (PCMT), which checks the oldest few
instructions in the ROB and lets the completed instructions to proceed in-order into the
next pipeline stage. For MemTracker events (loads, stores, and user events) pre-commit
also fetches MemTracker state from the state cache. In the event the state lookup results
in a cache miss, the pipeline is stalled until the miss is serviced. Because MemTracker
processes instructions in-order, a cache miss here will stall the commit of instructions,
which can be costly. We alleviate this problem by issuing a non-binding state prefetch
when the data address is resolved. This prefetch is dropped if no cache port is available,
to avoid contention between these prefetches and state lookups (or with data accesses in
the shared configuration). Our experiments indicate that this state prefetching is highly
effective, it eliminates nearly all state misses in the pre-commit stage without the need to
add any additional cache ports.
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In the second MemTracker pipeline stage (check stage or CHK), the state and the event
type are used to look up the corresponding PSTT cache entry. If the state is not available
(state cache miss), the resulting exception is treated as any other exception: it causes the
instruction (and all instructions fetched after it) to be squashed, the miss handler is called
(it computes the PSTT entry and updates the PSTT cache), and after the handler completes
the squashed instruction is re-executed (it now finds the PSTT entry in the PSTT cache and
completes). An exception also occurs if the PSTT indicates that an exception should be
raised: the current instruction and all younger instructions are squashed and the processor
begins to fetch instructions from the exception handler.
If there is no exception, the instruction proceeds to the commit stage. If the new state
from the PSTT is different from the current state, the state is written to the state L1 cache at
commit, at the same point when stores normally deposit their data values to the data cache.
State checks in the check stage can have dependencies on still-uncommitted state mod-
ifications, so a small state forwarding queue is used to correctly handle such dependence.
This is similar to the “conventional” store queue which forwards store values to depen-
dent loads, but our state forwarding queue is much simpler because i) it only tracks state
updates in the two stages between pre-commit and commit, so in a 4-wide processor we
need at most 8 entries, and ii) all addresses are already resolved when instructions enter this
queue, so dependencies can always be precisely identified. If multiple store instructions are
to forward the state to their dependent instructions in the same clock cyle, such forwarding
is done one at a time (potentially increasing the execution time). This is done to reduce the
complexity of the forwarding logic.
In the interleaved state caching approach, the main advantage of interleaving is to have
a single cache access read or write both data and state. As a result, state lookups are per-
formed as soon as the data (and state) address is resolved (MEM stage in Figure 13(b)).
To achieve this, MemTracker functionality is weaved into the “conventional” processor
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pipeline and there are no additional pipeline stages. State lookups and updates are per-
formed in much the same way as data loads and stores: lookups when the address is re-
solved and updates when the instruction commits. Consequently, state must be forwarded
just like data, and speculative out-of-order lookups must be squashed and replayed (such
squashes are rare , and none were observed in any of our experiments) if they read state that
is later found to be obsolete. As a result, the state lookup/update queues in this approach
are nearly identical to load/store queues in functionality and implementation, but are less
complex and power-hungry because state is much (by a factor of 4 or more) smaller than the
corresponding data. Finally, it should be noted that, if load/store queues are replaced in the
future by some other forwarding and conflict resolution mechanism(s), our state lookup/up-
date queues can be replaced by the same forwarding and conflict resolution mechanism(s).
3.3.5 Filtering of Silent State Writes
A store instruction, in addition to performing data write, now has to fetch the state and
possibly update the state. Hence every store instruction could have up to three memory
accesses. This is expensive especially for the state cache that could have two accesses (one
read and one write) every time a store is performed. Because every state update is preceded
by a state lookup, silent updates can easily be detected (the new state is the same as the
old one) and eliminated. This saves contention for cache ports and reduces extra energy
consumption by avoiding unnecessary cache accesses. In multiprocessor configurations,
the elimination of a state write also eliminates the need to enforce write atomicity (this
will be explained in Section 3.3.6. We observe in our experiments that this optimization
eliminates 98.5% of state writes on average across different benchmark suites.
3.3.6 Multiprocessor Consistency Issues
MemTracker states are treated just like any other data outside the processor and its L1
cache, so state is automatically kept coherent in a multiprocessor system. Hence, we focus
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our attention on memory consistency issues. We use the strictest consistency model (se-
quential consistency) in our implementation of MemTracker. We also briefly explain how
to support processor consistency, on which many current machines are based.
Because MemTracker stores state separately from data in memory and L2 caches, the
ordering of data accesses themselves is not affected. The ordering of state accesses can be
kept consistent using the same mechanisms that enforce data consistency. However, Mem-
Tracker introduces a new problem of ensuring that the ordering between data and state
accesses is consistent. In particular, even in a RISC processor, a single load instruction
could result in a data read, a state lookup, and a state update; similarly, a store instruction
could result in a state lookup, a data write, and a state update. In a sequentially consistent
implementation, data and state accesses from a single instruction must appear atomic. This
creates three separate issues: atomicity of state and data writes in store instructions, atom-
icity of state and data reads in load instructions, and atomicity of state reads and writes in
all event instructions.
Atomicity of state and data writes in a store instruction is easily maintained in inter-
leaved caching because the same cache access writes both data and state, hence the two
writes are actually simultaneous. In split and shared caching, we force both writes to be
performed in the same cycle. If one suffers a cache miss, the other is delayed until both are
cache hits and can be performed in the same cycle.
Atomicity of the state lookup and the data read in a load instruction is also easily main-
tained in interleaved caching, because they are again part of the same cache access. In
split and shared caching, the instruction must be replayed if the data value has (or may
have) changed before the state is read by the same instruction. For this, we can use the
processor’s existing mechanism for enforcing load-load ordering. In most processors, this
involves replaying the instruction when an invalidation for the data block is received before
the instruction commits. Other processors can have a different mechanism to trigger load-
load replay mechanism, e.g. check if the data value read at commit differs from the one
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originally loaded from the cache. If the state access triggers a page fault, it is treated as any
other page fault: the instruction is canceled, the page fault is serviced, and the execution of
the application starts by re-executing the faulting instruction.
Finally, atomicity of the state lookup and update can be maintained using the same re-
play mechanism, i.e., the instruction is replayed if the state read by the instruction changes
before the instruction commits its state change to the cache.
In consistency models that allow write buffers (e.g., processor consistency), the sim-
plest way to ensure correct behavior is to flush the write buffer when there is a state update
and do the write directly to the cache. This approach should work well when state updates
are much less frequent than data writes, as we show in Section 3.5.
Overall, MemTracker support can be correctly implemented in sequentially and processor-
consistent multiprocessors in a relatively straightforward way, by extending existing ap-
proaches that maintain data consistency. We note that any mechanism that maintains state
(e.g. fine-grain protection) separately from data would have similar issues and demand
similar solutions.
3.3.7 Setup and Context-Switching
The integrity of MemTracker-related information such as PSTT-cache or PSTT (in our orig-
inal implementation) can be compromised if adequate steps are not taken to prevent users
from corrupting the data in the transition table. We maintain PSTT-related information
as part of the process context that cannot be modified directly by the application. Initial-
izing the PSTT-cache miss handler register or the PSTT (in our prior implementation) is
performed through a system call before loading the application. The Operating System is
responsible for initializing the PSTT structures in privileged mode and keeping the PSTT
in system memory that is not mapped into the application’s address space. This prevents
the users from directly modifying the PSTT.
As we consider MemTracker-related processor state (PSTT-cache, PSTT cache miss
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handler exception address register, MTCR, event mask register) to be a part of process state,
this information is saved and restored on context switches. In our original implementation
[76], the total amount of MemTracker state to be saved/restored in this manner was nearly
300 bytes because the entire PSTT was saved and restored. In our new implementation,
the entire PSTT is not actually stored anywhere - its entries are dynamically generated
as needed. Thus, the PSTT cache can simply be invalidated on a context switch, and the
saved/restored MemTracker state consists of only the three registers listed above. Note
that per-word states need not be saved/restored on context switches. Instead, they are only
cached on-chip and move on- and off-chip as a result of cache fetch and replacement policy.
3.4 Evaluation Setup
In this section, we describe the different memory checkers and benchmarks that we use in
our evaluation and show our simulation environment.
3.4.1 Memory Problem Detectors
To demonstrate the generality of our MemTracker support and evaluate its performance
more thoroughly, we use four checkers designed to detect different memory-related prob-




















Figure 14: PSTT setup for the HeapChunks checker.
The second checker is HeapChunks, which detects heap buffer overflows from sequen-
tial accesses. For this checker, the memory allocation library is modified to surround each
allocated data block with delimiter words, whose state is changed (using event UEVT30)
to Delimit, while all other words remain in the Normal state. Any access to a Delimit word
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is an error. When the block is freed, the state of its delimiter words is changed back to
Normal (using UEVT31). Note that the standard GNU heap library implementation keeps
meta-data for each block (block length, allocation status, etc.) right before the data area
of the block. As a result, we do not need to allocate additional delimiter words, but rather
simply use these meta-data words as delimiters.
This HeapChunks checker uses one-bit state per word, and the PSTT for it is shown
in Figure 14. Note that HeapChunks is intended as an example of a very simple checker
with one-bit state, and that it does not provide full protection from heap block overflows.
For example, it would not detect out-of bounds accesses due to integer overflow or strided






























Figure 15: PSTT setup for the RetAddr checker.
The third checker is RetAddr (Figure 15), which detects when a return address on the
stack is modified. This checker detects stack smashing attacks that attempt to redirect pro-
gram control flow by overwriting a return address on the stack. This checker keeps each
word in the stack region in one of three states: NotRA, GoodRA, and BadRA. All stack
words start in the NotRA state, which indicates that no return address is stored there. When
a return address is stored in a stack location, its state changes to GoodRA. An ordinary
store changes this state to BadRA. When a return address is loaded, we check the state of
the location and trigger an exception if the location is not in the GoodRA state. Our simu-
lations use the MIPS ISA, which uses ordinary load and store instructions to save/restore
the return address of a function, which is otherwise kept in a general-purpose register. To
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expose return address activity to our checker, we insert UEVT24 (RAwr) after each valid
return address store, UEVT25 (RArd) before each valid return address load, and UEVT26
(RAfree) before the return address stack location goes out of scope (when the activation
record for the function is deallocated). All these user events target the intended location
for the return address. For our experiments, this event insertion is done by a modified GCC
code generator, but it would be relatively simple to achieve the same goal through binary
rewriting. For CISC processors (e.g. x86), return address pushes and pops are done as part
of function call/return instructions, so it is trivial to identify them. The RetAddr checker
is another example of a useful checker that can benefit from MemTracker due to frequent
state updates: each function call/return will result in at least three state updates to the return
address’ state.
The fourth checker combines all three checkers described above. We show two dif-
ferent implementations of this combined checker as discussed in Section 3.2.7. Our first
implementation uses seven different states that implements all three checkers in a single
checker, and configures MemTracker to use four-bit states. This implementation uses min-
imal number of state bits. Our second implementation uses a dispatcher to internally call the
individual checkers and uses eight state bits (two for HeapData, two for RetAddr checker
and one for HeapChunks padded with three bits to have a power-of-two number of state
bits). The dispatcher implementation of the combined checker is the most demanding of
the four checkers in terms of the number of user events that must be executed and in terms
of state memory and on-chip storage requirements, so we use it as the “default” checker in
our evaluation and use the three component checkers to evaluate the sensitivity of Mem-
Tracker’s performance to different checkers and state sizes.
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3.4.2 Benchmark Applications
We use all applications from the SPEC CPU 2000 and 24 out of 29 applications for SPEC
CPU 2006 application suite [67] benchmark suite. For each application, we use the refer-
ence input set in which we fast-forward through the first fifteen percent of instructions to
skip initialization phases and simulate the next one billion instructions in detail. We note
that our fast-forward must still model all MemTracker state updates to keep the checker’s
state correct. If we ignore allocations, initializations, and return address save/restore while
fast-forwarding, when we enter detailed simulation, our checkers would trigger numerous
exceptions due to falsely detected problems (e.g. reads from locations whose allocation we
skipped). We also evaluate Splash-2 benchmark suite [78] for our multiprocessor evalua-
tion. We run these applications from start to end.
3.4.3 Simulation Environment and Configuration
We use SESC [57], an open-source execution-driven simulator, to simulate a MIPS proces-
sor. We derive microarchitectural parameters from a modern processor (Intel Core2-like)
running at 2.93GHz. The L1 data cache we model is 32KBytes in size, eight-way set
associative, dual-ported (2 RW ports), with 64-byte blocks with a hit latency of 2 cycles
and miss latency of 1 cycle. The L2 cache is 4MByte in size, sixteen-way set associative,
single-ported, and also with 64-byte blocks. Hit latency for L2 caches is 10 cycles and miss
latency is 4 cycles. The processor-memory bus is 64 bits wide and operates at 1333MHz.
The round-trip memory latency is assumed to be 490 cycles. For multiprocessor evalua-
tion, we use a four core configuration with one L1 cache per core and a shared L2, using
the same cache parameters as in our uniprocessor simulations.
Our default MemTracker configuration (shown in black in all charts) uses split state
caching in the L1 cache (Figure 12(a)), with 16KBytes of state cache, which is four-way
set-associative, dual-ported, and with 64-byte blocks.
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3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate MemTracker. We first show the effect
of different L1 caching approaches described in Section 3.3.3. Second, we show the per-
formance overheads of different checkers that we described in Section 3.4.1. Third, we
conduct sensitivity analyses with different L1 State Cache sizes. We then compare our
technique with prior mechanisms. Finally we show latency, area and energy overheads of
MemTracker system and conduct validation experiments to verify the correctness of our
implementation.
3.5.1 Effect of L1 Caching Approaches
As described in Section 3.3.3, we examine three different approaches to caching state in
primary caches: Split, Shared, and Interleaved. Figure 16 shows execution time overheads
for a representative set of benchmarks along with averages across entire benchmark suites
on the most demanding Combined checker with 8 bits of state, relative to a system without
any checking and without MemTracker support. We observe that the Split configuration
has a performance overhead of around 2.8% average across SPEC benchmarks and 3.15%
average across SPLASH-2 benchmarks with the worst-case (around 14.5%) in art bench-
mark, with a relatively smaller 16KByte L1 state cache. The lower-cost Shared approach
exhibits consistently higher overheads on average, and its overhead also varies considerably
across benchmarks, with the worst case around 14.7% (in art). The higher overheads are
caused by contention between state and data for both L1 cache space and bandwidth. The
only advantage of the Shared approach is reduced cost due to using the existing L1 cache,
it makes little sense to add L1 ports or capacity to reduce this overhead - an additional port
would make 32KByte L1 data more power hungry and a larger L1 cache would increase
latency.
Finally, the Interleaved approach has almost similar overheads as the Split configura-






























































































































Figure 16: Effect of shared, split, and interleaved caching of state and data in L1 caches.
will exhibit the same performance overheads even when MemTracker is turned off and will
leave the cache slower and more power hungry due to additional bits. Further analysis
results are presented in Section 3.5.5.
Overall, the Split configuration has the relatively better average performance-cost trade-
off than other configurations. It is also comparatively easy to integrate into the processor
pipeline using the in-order pre-commit implementation described in Section 3.3.4. The
additional 16KByte L1 state cache in this configuration is only half the size of the L1
data cache, and adds little to the overall real-estate of a modern processor. Hence, we use
this Split configuration as the default MemTracker setup in the rest of our experiments.
However, we note that the Interleaved approach has some advantages in terms of multi-
processor implementation (Section 3.3.6) and, with additional L1 bandwidth, has similar
performance to the Split configuration. Consequently, the Interleaved approach with added
L1 cache bandwidth may also be a good choice if the goal is to simplify support for multi-
processor consistency.
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3.5.2 Performance with Different Checkers
Figure 17 shows that the overhead mostly depends on the number of state bits per word
used by a checker. The one-bit HeapChunks checker has the lowest overhead – around
0.5% on average and 2.45% worst-case in milc benchmark. Both two-bit checkers have
similar overheads of around 1% on average and 4% worst-case for HeapData and 4.15%
for RetAddr checker both in milc benchmark. We note that these checkers have differ-
ent user events – the HeapData checker uses variable-footprint user event instructions to
identify heap memory allocation and deallocation, while the RetAddr checker uses word-
sized user events to identify when the return address is saved and restored. However, after
application’s initialization phase, HeapData’s user events are not frequent, while each of
RetAddr’s more-frequent events requires little processing. As a result, in both checkers user
events contribute little to the overall execution time.
The four-bit Combined checker has an overhead of 1.5% on average and about 6.7%
worst-case (in art). This overhead is larger than in less-demanding checkers, mainly due
to larger state competing with data for L2 cache space and bus bandwidth. Still, even
the “high” 6.7% worst-case overhead is low enough to allow checking even for “live”
performance-critical runs. Also, note that the overhead of the combined checker is sig-
nificantly lower than the sum of overheads for its component checkers. This is mainly
because the combined checker does not simply do three different checks – they are com-
bined into a single check. Finally, as expected, the eight-bit Combined checker exhibits
slightly worse overheads than the more efficient four-bit combined checker. The averages
are around 2.8% for SPEC benchmarks and 3.15% for SPLASH-2 benchmarks with the
worst case of around 14.5% in art benchmark. These higher overheads are largely due to
higher contention for capacity and bandwidth for L2 cache shared by both data and state.
We use 256 entry PSTT-cache in our experiments. We did not notice any significant over-
heads due to misses in PSTT cache beyond the initial cold misses. However, we note that,
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(c) Splash-2 benchmarks
Figure 17: Overhead of different checkers in MemTracker, with Split L1 state caching
using a 16KByte L1 state cache.
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PSTT-cache entries and hence, a larger PSTT might be needed.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We performed additional experiments with 2KByte, with 4KByte, with 8KByte and with
32KByte (all with 4-way associativity and 64 byte line size) state L1 state caches in the Split
configuration in addition to our default 16KByte L1 state cache used in our experiments.
Figure 18 shows the results of these experiments for a subset of the benchmarks along with
averages across entire benchmark suites. We find that state caches larger than our default of
16KBytes bring negligible performance improvements (<0.5%) in all applications and on
average, which indicates that the 16KByte cache is large enough to capture most of the first
working set for MemTracker state. The smaller 8KByte cache still shows almost similar
overheads for all benchmarks except ocean benchmark where an 8KByte cache has higher
miss rate than the 16KByte. For smaller cache sizes namely 4KByte and 2 KByte, the
overheads progressively worsen due to higher contention for cache capacity. The reason for
this is that the smaller state cache “covers” less memory than the L1 data cache for the 8-bit
Combined checker used in these experiments, which puts a larger number of state L1 cache
misses on the critical path. Additionally, line size in the state cache is the same as in the data
cache (64 bytes in our experiments) although state is smaller than the corresponding data.
This puts smaller state caches at a disadvantage in applications with less spatial locality.
While some applications like mgrid, bwaves, sphinx3 and ocean show that performance
can be progressively improved with higher capacity state caches, certain application like
applu, art, soplex are agnostic to increasing cache sizes. On further investigation, we find
that these applications have increased contention on L2 bandwidth caused by the sharing
between data and state information. However, on an average we find that caches with
higher capacity tend to improve performance overheads across benchmarks.
We also conducted experiments in which we disable state prefetches (see Figure 13(a))
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Figure 18: Performance overhead variation due to different sizes of L1 state cache.
without state prefetching. Our state prefetching mechanism is very simple to implement,
and we believe its implementation is justified by the reduction in both average overhead
and variation of overheads across applications.
Overall, we find that the 16KByte state cache results in a good cost-performance trade-
off, and even though smaller state caches can be used to reduce cost if a wider variation in
performance overhead and slightly higher average overheads are acceptable. We also find
that state prefetching brings significant benefits at very little cost.
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Figure 19: Effect of state changes in software handlers.
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To estimate the advantages of our MemTracker support, we compare its performance
with checking based on an approximation of Mondrian Memory Protection [77] and with
an approximation of checking based on software-only instrumentation. It should be noted
that Mondrian was not intended to be a general purpose tagging scheme and our exper-
iments do not show how Mondrian performs poorly for its intended purpose (fine grain
protection). Instead, we use Mondrian to show that fine-grain memory protection cannot
be efficiently used to emulate MemTracker. We do not actually implement these schemes,
but rather make optimistic estimates of the cost for key checking activities. As a result,
these estimates are likely to underestimate the actual advantages of MemTracker over prior
schemes, but even so they serve to highlight the key benefits of our mechanism.
In a Mondrian-based implementation of the Combined checker, Mondrian’s fine-grain
permissions must be set to only allow accesses that are known to be free of exceptions
and state changes. Examples of such accesses are load/store to already initialized data,
load/store to non-return-address stack locations, and loads from unmodified return address
locations. We assume zero overhead for these accesses, which makes Mondrian permission
fetches and checks “free”. For permissions changes on allocation, deallocation, or return
address load/stores, we model only a penalty of 30 cycles for raising an exception. We note
that this penalty is optimistic, because it subsumes a pipeline flush for the exception, the
jump to the exception handler, the actual execution of the exception handler (which must
update Mondrian’s permissions trie structure), and the return to the exception site.
For software-only checking, we only model a five-cycle penalty for each check that
must be performed for a load/store. This check must read the state for the target mem-
ory location, determine if a state change is needed or if an error is indicated, and finally
update the state. The 5-cycle penalty is added to the execution time of the unmodified
application, so the penalty includes all effects of instrumentation, including any misses in
the instruction cache, misses in the data cache when looking up state, conditional branches
when checking the state, and actual execution of instrumentation instructions. We note that
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this 5-cycle penalty is very optimistic; for example, in HeapMon [62] the actual reported
average duration of a (highly optimized) load or store check is 18 to 480 cycles, depending
on the application.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 19. For MemTracker, we use a
Split L1 caching configuration with a 16KBytes L1 state cache. We find that our Mem-
Tracker mechanism (with all overheads accounted for) outperforms both Mondrian-based
checking and software-only checking. The average slowdown for software-only checking
is 1.6× (times) on average across SPEC-2006 benchmarks, 1.3× across SPEC-2000 bench-
marks and 4.3× for SPLASH-2 applications, with a worst-case of 9.6× for barnes. Due to
our optimistic assumptions for software-only checking, this overhead is lower than previ-
ously reported numbers [50, 73] for such checkers, but it is still too high to allow always-on
checking in production runs.
The average overhead for Mondrian-based checking is 29% average across SPEC-2006
applications, 6% average across SPEC-2000 benchmarks and 63% across SPLASH-2 appli-
cations. Many applications in the Mondrian-based scheme behave similar to MemTracker
as the number of state changes in these applications are relatively few. However, certain ap-
plications like fma3d, lucas, barnes, cholesky and radix have much higher overheads due to
higher frequency of state changes. Since MemTracker can perform such state changes au-
tomatically in hardware while a Mondrian-based scheme need to invoke a software handler
(assumed to have a 30-cycle penalty), they result in large overheads for some benchmarks.
We note that Mondrian requires complex hardware to look up and manage its trie per-
missions structures and uses several kinds of on-chip caching to speed up its permissions
checks. As a result, Mondrian implementation is unlikely to be less complex than Mem-
Tracker, so MemTracker’s higher performance and lower performance variation across ap-
plications is a definite advantage. It should also be noted that we fully model all overheads
for MemTracker-based checking, whereas the real overheads of Mondrian-based checking
could be considerably higher than our optimistic estimate.
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Table 2: Latency, area, and power overheads, expressed as a fraction of the latency, area,
and power of the unmodified 32 KByte L1 cache.
Latency Area Power
Split 0.0% 56.9 % 21.9%
Shared 0.0% 0.0% 101.5%
Interleaved 21.4% 25.1% 43.0%
3.5.5 Latency, area and power overheads
We perform experiments to determine the latency, area and power overheads due to differ-
ent caching configurations namely Split, Shared and Interleaved. We use Cacti 4.2 [37],
an integrated access time, area and dynamic power model to model overheads due to our
different caches. The results are shown in Table 2.
The Split configuration stores the state information in a separate but smaller cache.
This allows the latency of accessing the state to be hidden by the longer latency of the
L1 data cache, but the additional state cache occupies area equal to approximately 57%
of the size of the existing L1 data cache. In modern processors, it is estimated that only
about 2.9% of total on-chip area dedicated to L1 Data cache [45], so the contribution of the
state L1 cache to the overall chip area is small (approximately 1.7%). The Shared cache
configuration does not add latency or area to the L1 data cache; however, every memory
access involves an extra access for state information (which doubles the energy cost) and
a small percentage of memory access have a third access to the data cache to update the
state information. This requires additional L1 ports and more than doubles the energy of
accessing the L1 cache. For Interleaved caching configuration, the cache lines are extended
to accommodate the 8 bit states corresponding to each memory word. This increases the
L1 cache access latency by 21.4% even when MemTracker is turned off. Also, the area
of an L1 data cache increases by a quarter of its original size. While all loads will fetch
the state information along with data, stores have to perform state checks before actually
performing writes to memory. Additionally, there will be a small percentage of time when
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a state update is needed. Hence the dynamic power costs grows by almost 43% for the
interleaved configuation.
3.5.6 Validation of Access Checking Functionality
We tested our checking functionality by injecting bugs and attacks into several applications
as they are running with our Combined checker. All instructions of the applications are
simulated from the start of execution until either a bug/attack is detected, or until they
complete execution, in which case we check the program’s results for correctness.
To test the return address protection, we choose 15 different function calls in each of
the following applications: crafty, parser, and twolf. After the return address is saved to
the stack, we inject a single dynamic instance of a store instruction that overwrites it. Our
checker detects all such attacks, raising an exception before the modified return address is
actually used to re-direct control flow of the application.
To test the heap chunk protection, we randomly choose an allocated heap block and
sequentially overwrite the block past its end. We performed a total of 60 such attacks
in crafty, gzip, mcf, and mesa, and our checker always detects the write that exceeds the
allocated space.
To test our detection of reads from uninitialized heap locations, we randomly choose a
dynamic instance of a calloc call and omit the initialization of the first or the last word
of the block. We injected a total of 122 such errors in crafty, gzip, mcf, and mesa, and in
all but one injection, reads from the uninitialized location were detected. The remaining
one injection (in gzip) was not detected because the application never read the word whose
initialization we omitted.
Finally, to test our detection of accesses to unallocated heap data, we intercept a randomly-
chosen dynamic instance of a malloc call and reduce the size of the request by 4 bytes
(one word). We performed a total of 183 such injections in crafty, gzip, mcf, and mesa. In
149 of these injections our checker finds a read or a write to the unallocated location. In
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the remaining 34 injections the last word of the allocated block is never actually accessed,
so the injected error is not manifested (the application completes correctly).
Although our checkers are very effective in finding the errors and attacks they target,
we note that the checkers themselves are not the focus of our work. They are only used to
demonstrate and test our MemTracker mechanism, and problem detection abilities of these
checkers are similar to other implementations of similar checkers.
3.6 Related Work
The most generic of the previously proposed hardware mechanisms is DISE [15] (Dynamic
Instruction Stream Editing), which pattern-matches decoded instructions against templates
and can replace these instructions with parameterized code. For memory access check-
ing, DISE provides efficient interception that allows instrumentation to be injected into
the processor’s instruction stream. In contrast to DISE, MemTracker does not modify the
performance-critical front-end of the pipeline, and it performs load/store checks without
adding dynamic instructions to execution.
Horizon [40] widens each memory location by six bits, two with hard-wired function-
ality and four trap bits that can intercept different flavors of memory accesses. Mondrian
Memory Protection [77] has per-word permissions that can intercept read, write, or all ac-
cesses. iWatcher [82] provides enhanced watchpoint support for multiple regions of mem-
ory and can intercept read, write, or all accesses to such a region. HeapMon [62] intercepts
accesses to a region of memory and uses word-granularity filter bits to specify locations
whose accesses should be ignored, with the checker implemented as a helper thread. All
four schemes only provide interception and state checking in hardware. Each state up-
date requires software intervention to change trap, permission, watchpoint, or filter bits
(in Horizon, Mondrian, iWatcher, and HeapMon, respectively). This software intervention
can take the form of instrumentation at the point where the change is needed. Alterna-
tively, accesses that require state change can result in an exception, allowing the exception
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handler to change the state. For example, consider a state that indicates whether a loca-
tion is initialized. Initialized locations can have their trap, permission, watchpoint, or filter
bits set to indicate that both reads and writes are allowed without generating exceptions.
Uninitialized locations should have indicate that both reads and writes require exceptions,
reads to indicate an error (read from uninitialized location is detected) and writes to allow
the exception handler to change the state to “initialized”. In contrast to these schemes,
MemTracker can be programmed to handle state changes in hardware, without software
intervention. This is an important difference because, as will be shown in Section 3.5.4, in
some useful checkers, state changes are numerous enough to cause significant overheads.
To avoid hard-wiring the number of bits for each state, but still provide efficient checks
and updates, MemTracker uses a flat (array) state structure in memory. In contrast, Mon-
drian [77] uses a sophisticated trie structure to minimize state storage overheads for coarse-
grain state, at the cost of more complex fine-grain state updates. iWatcher [82] keeps track
of ranges of data locations with the same state, which also complicates fine-grain updates.
Horizon [40] simplifies state lookups by keeping state in six extra bits added to each mem-
ory location, which requires non-standard memory modules and adds a state storage cost
even when no checks are actually needed. In contrast, MemTracker keeps state information
separately in ordinary memory, and uses only as much state as needed. In particular, when
checking is not used, there is no memory allocated for MemTracker state.
Hardbound [20] adopts decoupling data and state storage used by MemTracker. Hard-
Bound is hard-wired for a particular scheme that provides spatial safety guarantees by stor-
ing bounds information for pointers separately and keeping it transparent to the underlying
hardware. Since the meta-data is stored in the pointer itself, it is difficult to find accesses
that use stale or dangling pointers. In contrast, MemTracker associates state with memory
words themselves. After memory is freed, the state associated with those memory words
would reflect that the memory is “free” and an access to that memory through a dangling
pointer can be detected correctly.
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Nethercote et al. [49] have done detailed studies for shadow memory management
needed by software memory checkers such as Valgrind. Their design allocates a byte of
meta-data for every byte in memory and proposes techniques for optimizing the memory
overhead. We expect the number of state bits for every memory word to be typically small
(maximum of 8 or 16 state bits per word) as evidenced in our evaluation (See Section 3.5).
Hence, we do not anticipate the amount of virtual memory needed for state to be be a
limiting problem especially for larger address spaces as we move from 32-bit to 64-bit ad-
dresses. Also, the optimizations such as compression employed by [49] can be adopted
by MemTracker to support more sophisticated checkers that require larger percentage of
virtual memory space.
Other related work includes AccMon [81], Dynamic information flow tracking [68],
Minos [17], Memory centric security [65], LIFT [56], WIT [1], LBA [9] and SafeMem [55].
AccMon uses “golden” (correct) runs to learn which instructions should access which lo-
cations, then checks this at runtime using Bloom filters to avoid unnecessary invocations of
checker code; Dynamic information flow tracking and Minos add one integrity bit to each
location to track whether the location’s value is from an untrusted source; SafeMem scram-
bles existing ECC bits to trigger exceptions when un-allocated locations are accessed and
to help garbage-collection. LIFT does dynamic software instrumentation and relies heavily
on optimized code to be inserted for checks. WIT uses points-to analysis at compile time
and inserts guards around objects to detect buffer overflow attacks. Memory Centric archi-
tecture associates security attributes to memory instead of individual user process. Most of
the above mechanisms are designed with specific checks in mind: in AccMon, much of the
hardware is specific to its heuristic-based checking scheme; in Dynamic information flow
tracking and Minos, the extra bit tracks only the integrity status of the location; SafeMem
cannot track per-word state and can only intercept accesses to blocks with no useful values
– a block with useful values needs a valid ECC to protect its values from errors. LBA
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adopts some of the key contributions of MemTracker such as hardware support for accel-
erating memory checkers and programmability to suport multiple checkers. Additionally,
it proposes sophisticated (and more complex) address translation mechanisms for state.
MemTracker relies on simple indexing functions for state lookups to avoid performance
loss. Also, LBA implements variable state granularity (e.g., per-byte, per-word etc.) and
supports state semantics (e.g., encoding lock-set information for memory words).
Overall, MemTracker is unique in that, it can efficiently support different memory
checkers, even those that require simple but frequent state updates automatically without
software intervention. It should be noted, however, that MemTracker can only automati-
cally handle state checks and updates that can be expressed as a state transition table, and
other checks and state updates would still require software intervention. However, many
useful memory checkers can be expressed in terms of state transitions, and we expect that
in other checkers MemTracker’s state machine can be used as a sophisticated filter to min-
imize the number of software interventions.
3.7 Summary
This chapter describes MemTracker, a new hardware support mechanism that can be set
up to perform different kinds of memory access monitoring tasks. MemTracker associates
each word of data in memory with a few bits of state, and uses a programmable state tran-
sition table to react to different events that can affect this state. The number of state bits
per word, the events to react to, and the transition table are all fully programmable by soft-
ware. The MemTracker state is kept in main memory and cached on the processor chip,
and is looked up and updated by the MemTracker hardware. Any state-event pair can be
programmed to trigger execution of a software handler, which is used to report a problem
or to handle sophisticated checks or recovery. The rich set of states, events, and transitions
supported by MemTracker allows bug checks to proceed with minimal performance over-
heads. To evaluate our MemTracker support, we map three different checkers onto it, as
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well as two different implementations of a checker that combines all three. Even for the
most demanding combined checker that maintains 8 bits of state for every memory word,
we observe performance overheads of around 3% on average and 14.5% worst-case across
SPEC and SPLASH-2 applications.
We examine several approaches to caching MemTracker state on-chip, and find that it
is possible to implement MemTracker without significant changes to most of the processor
pipeline and L1 caches, by adding two in-order stages to the back-end of the processor
pipeline and by using a smaller dedicated L1 state cache. In the L2 cache and memory,
MemTracker state is stored just like any other data, without any extra support. With its
low performance overhead, simple implementation and improved programmability, we see
that MemTracker is well in line with our thesis statement, showing that hardware mech-




FLEXITAINT: TAINT PROPAGATION ACCELERATOR
4.1 Motivation
Tainting is a popular technique to track the flow of data values through the program.
Since users demand different taint propagation policies depending on their needs, a pro-
grammable hardware capable of implementing these different policies would be a valuable
addition to the user community. This chapter introduces FlexiTaint, a programmable ac-
celerator for taint propagation. Instead of directly implementing a specific set of tainting
policies, FlexiTaint is programmed at runtime to efficiently follow a desired tainting policy.
This allows a FlexiTaint-equipped system to implement radically different taint propagation
policies for different applications, to upgrade its taint propagation policies as new attacks
are devised to circumvent existing policies, and even to use tainting for uses other than
attack detection/avoidance. As an accelerator, FlexiTaint is not a comprehensive security
solution by itself, but rather a proof-of-concept hardware substrate that can speed up an
important class of security solutions, namely taint propagation.
One of the main advantages of taking the programmability approach for taint propa-
gation is reduced risk of obsolescence. Whereas a software tool can quickly be upgraded
to guard against new attacks, hardware based tools can only be upgraded by replacing the
processor or the entire system. This problem is exacerbated by the need to maintain back-
ward compatibility with existing software – once a hardware mechanism is implemented in
a processor, new processors must continue to support that functionality. As a result, a hard-
ware scheme can continue to increase the cost and complexity of systems for years, long
after attackers have discovered how to circumvent it. This concern makes it very risky to
directly implement any specific taint propagation policy or set of policies in a commodity
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processor. Our programmable accelerator approach allows taint propagation policies to be
changed by software as new attacks are devised, reducing the risk of hardware becoming
obsolete.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents an overview of
our FlexiTaint mechanism, Section 4.3 presents some hardware implementation details,
Section 4.4 presents the setup for our experimental evaluation, Section 4.5 presents our
experimental results, Section 4.6 discusses related work, and Section 4.7 summarizes our
findings.
4.2 Overview
In this section, we first describe the taint storage mechanism adopted by FlexiTaint. We
then present how FlexiTaint performs taint propagation in hardware along with optimiza-
tions that minimize the performance impact caused by propagation of taint information.
4.2.1 Storing Taint Information
Taint information must be associated with every word in memory. Previously proposed
hardware support for taint propagation stores the taint along with the corresponding data,
effectively widening the memory word [18]. This approach has a number of drawbacks.
First, it requires non-standard memory modules to keep the extra taint bits with each word.
Second, these taint bits are wasted when no tainting is needed. Finally, special hardware
and instructions are needed to access these taint bits, which makes bulk-manipulation (e.g.,
initialization) of taints difficult.
Previous hardware support for tainting also widens each cache block to accommodate
the taint bits. Such widening makes the cache larger, more power-hungry, and possibly
slower even when tainting is not used. Ho et al. [32] have used page-level tainting to
intercept CPU accesses that load data from tainted pages and use emulation to perform
taint propagation at byte-level granularity. This reduces hardware complexity but incurs
performance slowdown of 26.6× (average) in emulation mode.
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The taint storage approach of FlexiTaint parallels the approach used in MemTracker [76]
and HeapMon [62] for their memory state (Chapter 3). In particular, taints for data in an ad-
dress space are kept as a packed array in a protected area within that address space. Given
the address of a memory location, the corresponding taint can be found by simply index-
ing into this array. This organization allows us to use existing standard memory modules,
buses, and caches. Taints can be kept protected from ordinary load/store accesses using ex-
isting page access permissions, but the system and library software can temporarily change
these permissions to directly access taints for bulk-manipulation (e.g. to initialize them).
The only dedicated storage for taints in FlexiTaint is a separate small (4KBytes in our
experiments) L1 cache. This cache provides bandwidth for taint accesses. The alternative
would be to store taints in the existing L1 cache and add ports to it. However, this would
make the L1 cache significantly larger and slower, affecting its hit latency (even when
tainting is not needed).
Seemingly, a drawback of our taint storage approach is that taints now compete with
data for space in secondary caches and below. This is similar to state competing with data
for space in lower-level caches in MemTracker 3. However, our results (Section 4.5) show
that this causes low performance overheads relative to a system with no tainting. If extra
area is available, we believe it is better spent increasing the total capacity of the cache (to
improve performance with or without tainting), instead of widening each cache block to
provide dedicated taint bits.
A final advantage of decoupled taint storage is low-cost support for larger taints. In
existing approaches, memory widening must accommodate the largest allowed taint, and
those extra bits prove unnecessary if fewer taint bits are actually needed. With FlexiTaint,
the packed taint array occupies only as much memory space as needed.
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4.2.2 Processing Taint Information
Figure 20 shows how taint processing is integrated into the processor’s pipeline in previ-
ously proposed schemes where taint information (dotted lines) must flow along with and
be processed simultaneously with the data (full lines). Shaded areas in the figure indicate
structures that are added or significantly changed to support tainting.








Figure 20: Previous tainting support
Much of the processor’s logic and wire complexity involves moving, manipulating, or
storing data values. To accommodate the taint along with the data, all these structures
must be modified. These ubiquitous changes to the processor core require a tremendous
re-design effort and make nearly every part of the core larger with a higher latency. It
is unlikely that processor manufacturers will undertake such re-design solely to provide
efficient tainting support.
In light of these considerations, we follow a different approach and implement the en-
tire FlexiTaint taint processing accelerator as an in-order addition to the back end of the
pipeline, as shown in Figure 21. This strategy has already been used for runtime verifi-
cation [27], memory checking [76] and speculative memory scheduling [7, 58], and has
the advantage of keeping the performance-critical out-of-order dataflow engine largely un-
modified. The added taint processing engine is easily turned off and bypassed when it is
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Figure 22: Taint propagation in FlexiTaint
We change the commit stage of the processor to pass instructions on to the FlexiTaint
engine. We call this additional stage pre-commit. The first FlexiTaint stage reads the taints
of the register operands from the Taint Register File (TRF) (Figure 22). For load and
store instructions, the taint of the memory operand is loaded from the TL1 cache. The
next stage looks up the Filter Taint Propagation Table (Filter TPT) to determine if the taint
propagation can be done using simple rules. If needed, the taint propagation rule is looked
up in a special cache that store such information (Section 4.2.3). Next, the register result
taint is written back to the TRF. After a possible TRF update, the instruction is ready to
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Figure 23: Taint propagation for stores
The commit for store instructions (Figure 23) involves the normal write to the data
cache, and a write to the taint cache to update the taint of the destination memory location.
There are several advantages and efficiencies with this new approach to hardware taint
propagation. First, the short in-order taint processing pipeline greatly simplifies the taint
forwarding logic for both register and memory taints. Second, there is no register renam-
ing, so the TRF only needs to store the taints for architectural registers. Third, support for
multiple taint bits only affects the taint processing engine, where the TRF and the forward-
ing logic are much simpler and smaller than in the main processor core. Store-load taint
forwarding uses the same mechanisms as state forwarding in MemTracker (Chapter 3).
This approach also has several possible disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that
the latency of misses in the TL1 cache is fully exposed because they stall the in-order
taint processing pipeline. Fortunately, taint addresses can easily be computed from data
addresses, so we issue a taint prefetch as soon as the data address is available. Because the
taint access pattern is a more compact version of the data access pattern, a TL1 prefetch
miss is often overlapped and its latency hidden by a DL1 miss. As a result, when a load
instruction comes to the pre-commit stage and requests its taint from the TL1 cache, the
taint prefetch is usually already complete and the access is a TL1 hit.
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The second disadvantage of our back-end taint processing approach is that it could
delay instruction commit by several cycles, increasing the pressure on the ROB, physical
registers, and other processor resources. However, with the use of structures like TPC and
a Filter TPT, we find that this delay is short and in our experiments it has a modest effect
on performance.
A third disadvantage of our scheme is that the decoupled approach to data and taint stor-
age can result in consistency problems in multiprocessors. More specifically, a data write
and its corresponding taint write must happen atomically to prevent a read from getting the
new data with the old taint or vice versa. Similarly, a data read and a taint read must also
happen atomically. We found that read atomicity can be provided by leveraging existing
load-load replay mechanisms. We also find that most taint writes are silent writes [41] that
can easily be eliminated. For non-silent taint writes, we ensure atomicity by making sure
that both writes (taint and data) are L1 cache hits before allowing either of them to modify
its cache block.
Finally, a fourth potential issue in our FlexiTaint engine is that dependences between
instructions may cause in-order stalls and create a performance bottleneck. Fortunately,
our FlexiTaint engine has two major advantages over ordinary in-order processors. First,
in-order processors suffer stalls when they encounter an instruction that depends on a long-
latency instruction. In FlexiTaint, all instructions have similar short-latency taint lookups,
and cache misses are largely eliminated by prefetching. The second advantage is that most
taint propagation operations are simply copying input taints to the destination, which allows
us to eliminate most dependences between same-cycle taint propagation operations (see
Section 4.2.5).
4.2.3 Programmable Taint Propagation
Because it is an accelerator that should be able to implement many different tainting poli-
cies, FlexiTaint allows software to compute the resulting taint for a given combination of
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the instruction opcode and input taints. However, software intervention for every instruc-
tion would introduce huge overheads. To avoid these overheads, FlexiTaint uses a Taint
Propagation Cache (TPC) to memoize resulting taints for recently seen combinations of
opcode and input taints.
The TPC is indexed by concatenating the opcode (or opcode class) and the taints of
all source operands (Figure 22). Each entry in the TPC contains the resulting taint, and
also a bit that indicates whether an exception should be raised when this combination of
opcode and input taints is encountered. If the TPC lookup results in a TPC miss, a software
handler is invoked to compute the resulting taint for that combination of opcode and input
taints. This is then inserted into the TPC similar to how TLB entries are filled by software
TLB miss handlers. This approach allows us to specify a taint propagation policy simply
by writing a TPC miss handler. The address of this handler is kept in a special CPU control
register (TPC Handler Register).
In our experiments, we use a small (128-entry) on-chip TPC, which is directly mapped
to allow single-cycle lookups. To avoid caching stale TPC entries, the TPC is flash-cleared
whenever the TPC Handler Register is changed. This allows us to change the taint prop-
agation policy (e.g. on a context switch) by just writing a new handler’s address into the
TPC Handler Register. Note that tainting is often used to detect attacks, so attackers must
not be allowed to change the TPC Handler Register or the code of the handler itself. For
this reason, the TPC Handler Register can only be modified in kernel mode.
4.2.4 Taint Manipulation Instructions
In most taint propagation schemes, there are high-level events that affect taint propaga-
tion but are not readily recognizable at the hardware level. For example, an input taint-
ing scheme typically untaints data that has been range-checked to avoids false alarms for
jump-table implementations. However, in most ISAs a range-check involves a sequence of
instructions that are difficult to recognize by the hardware as a range-check.
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To allow high-level events to be conveyed to our FlexiTaint hardware, we add a small
number of new taintr and taintm opcodes. These instructions are treated as no-ops
in the main processor pipeline, but are processed in the FlexiTaint engine. A taintr
instruction has a register-to-register format, and based on the opcode and the the input taint
values, FlexiTaint performs a TPC lookup to determine the new taint of the destination
register. This instruction allows us to change the taint associated with a register value,
without changing the value itself. Similarly, a taintm instruction has the format of a store
operation, but only affects the taint of the memory location. The system software can use
these taintr and taintm instructions to mark high-level events and set the propagation
rules for these instructions to achieve the needed taint propagation actions. For example,
a taintm instruction can be added to the message receive code to taint the input data,
and taintr can be used to, for example, untaint a value that has been range-checked.
Note that the mapping between high-level events and these new opcodes is determined by
the programmer or the system, not by the ISA or hardware itself. To indicate a specific
high-level event, we choose an unused opcode, put it in the code to signal the event, and
change the TPC miss handler to perform correct tainting for the event when that opcode is
encountered.
Instead of using new opcodes, high-level events could be indicated by trapping into
the system, which can then directly read/write the taint array in memory to implement the
needed tainting behavior. However, such traps may add significant overheads when high-
level of interest are frequent.
Finally, we note that any hardware taint propagation scheme requires changes to the
system and libraries to indicate high-level events that cannot be identified by hardware
alone. Our implementation of FlexiTaint differs only in that it provides a generic set of ISA
extensions for this purpose. This is consistent with FlexiTaint’s role as an accelerator for
taint propagation - it speeds up the time-consuming activity of instruction-to-instruction
taint propagation, and relies on existing taint propagation schemes for system-level support
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and for specific sets of rules it is programmed with.
4.2.5 Fast Common-Case Taint Propagation
Although the TPC is small, if it is accessed for every instruction it would need to be multi-
ported to keep up with the throughput of the multiple-issue processor core. However, multi-
porting could slow the TPC down, make it power-hungry, and make future enhancements
or upgrades to larger TPCs costly.
To reduce the number of TPC accesses, we rely on two key observations that hold
for most (but not all) types of instructions in the schemes we studied. First, if inputs are
untainted (zero-taint), the output is also untainted. Second, if only one of the operands has
a non-zero taint, the result taint is simply a copy of the non-zero input taint. This filters
most of the TPC lookups and enables the use of single-ported TPC.
To exploit these observations, we use a programmable Filter Taint Propagation Table
(Filter TPT) to selectively enable these optimizations for opcodes to which they are ap-
plicable according to the current set of taint propagation rules. The Filter TPT is indexed
only by opcode, and each entry has only two bits that tell us which common-case optimiza-
tions can be used (Table 3). With 256 opcodes, the Filter TPT is a simple 512-bit table
(no tag checks). Although it has multiple read ports to support separate lookups for each
instruction issued in a cycle, this small table uses little on-chip area and is fast enough for
single-cycle lookups.
We note that these optimizations are based on observations that were made in our two
example taint propagation schemes (Section 4.4). It is possible to devise a set of taint
propagation rules for which TPC lookups are always needed (all Filter TPT entries are 00).
Fortunately, now and in the foreseeable future the most common use of taint propagation
is tainting of input-derived data to detect security violations. These schemes are similar to
the first example tainting schemes used in our experiments, so we expect such schemes to
show similar benefit from the Filter TPT.
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Table 3: Meaning of Filter TPT entries
Value Meaning
00 Use Taint Propagation Cache (TPC)
for this opcode.
01 If all source taints are zeros, destina-
tion taint is zero. Otherwise, like 00
(use TPC).
10 If only one non-zero source taint,
copy it to destination taint. Other-
wise, like 01.
Another benefit of using our Filter TPT is that its optimizations also allow us to elim-
inate most of the dependences between same-cycle instructions. If the TPC lookup is not
needed, note that the resulting taint is either zero or equal to the taint of one of the operands.
In such cases, the “computation” of the taint is trivial because the taint propagation is sim-
ply “do nothing” or “copy input taint to output”. Also, back-end pipeline stages are in-
order, hence, the forwarding logic required for taint propagation is far simpler that the one
required for data. A similar idea (but with a different implementation) was used for elim-
ination of move instructions in RENO [54]. In FlexiTaint, we have the added advantage
that most of the taint propagation operations are taint moves, even when the corresponding
data operation for the same instruction is not a move. In cases when such optimizations
cannot be used and taint forwarding is needed between same-cycle dependent instructions,
such dependent instructions are delayed until the next cycle. This may result in delaying
retirement of later instructions and an increasing the execution time, but our experiments
show such delays to be rare (Section 4.5). So, we choose to simplify FlexiTaint hardware.
4.3 Implementation
With FlexiTaint, the front-end and the out-of-order dataflow engine of the processor core
are largely unmodified. The most significant modification to these parts of the processor is
that load and store instructions also compute the taint address and issue a non-binding taint
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prefetch into the TL1.
The main FlexiTaint pipeline (Figure 21) begins when the instruction is otherwise ready
to commit. As a result, FlexiTaint receives instructions in-order, does not receive any
wrong-path or otherwise speculative instructions, and gets already-decoded instructions.
This greatly simplifies the implementation of our FlexiTaint engine.
FlexiTaint starts off by fetching source taints, (in parallel) looking up the Filter TPT,
and (also in parallel) checking dependences. The next step is to check which source taints
are zero and whether the value found in the Filter TPT allows us to use a common-case
optimization. If one of these optimizations can be used, the taint propagation is trivial - the
resulting taint is either zero (if all source taints are zero and the Filter TPT entry has a value
other than 00) or equal to the non-zero source taint (if there is only one non-zero source
taint and the Filter TPT entry is 10). If the Filter TPT and the source taints are such that a
TPC lookup is needed, the next step is to look up the TPC entry using the opcode and the
source taints as an index and tag. In this case, a same-cycle dependent instruction (and all
subsequent instructions) is stalled until the next cycle. If no TPC lookup is needed, same-
cycle forwarding of the original source taint (see Section 4.2.5) is used to avoid in-order
stalls. Note that multiple back-to-back forwardings may be needed in the same cycle. We
limit such forwarding to one per cycle to reduce the complexity of forwarding logic because
our experiments do not show any actual instances where multiple dependent instructions in
a single cycle need TPC lookups and forwarding.
After the resulting taint is determined, it is written to the Taint Register File (TRF) if
the instruction’s destination is a register. Note that TRF could need multiple ports in a
superscalar architecture. In order reduce cost and power, we keep it single-ported and our
experiments do not show any significant slowdown because of using a single port. After the
TRF write, the instruction is ready to commit. In our current implementation, the FlexiTaint
pipeline has a total of four stages in addition to the regular pipeline, two to look up the Filter
TPT, TL1, and register taints, one stage for actual taint propagation (TPC lookup or trivial
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propagation with same-cycle forwarding), and one to finally commit.
Another consideration is handling of TPC misses. A TPC miss is an exception that
triggers execution of a software handler. We find that such exceptions are very rare in our
experiments due to a combination of several factors. First, most dynamic instructions are
amenable to common-case optimizations and do not access the TPC at all. Second, for in-
structions that do access the TPC, there is significant locality in the values of source taints
and opcodes. Some opcodes such as add, sub which frequently have special taint prop-
agation rules in several commonly used policies [50, 68], are used much more frequently
than others and some taint values are much more common than others.
4.3.1 Multiprocessor Consistency Issues
Outside the processor and L1 caches, FlexiTaint memory taint values are stored like any
other data, so they are automatically kept coherent in a multiprocessor system. However,
FlexiTaint does raise a few issues with respect to consistency. In particular, sequential
consistency and several other consistency models assume that a load or a store instruction
appears to execute atomically.
The main problem is that FlexiTaint stores taints in memory separately from the corre-
sponding data. As a result, a load (which reads the data and its taint) on one processor and
a store (which writes both data and its taint) on another processor may be executed such
that, for example, the load obtains the new data but the old taint.
To prevent this inconsistency, data and the taint must be read atomically in a load and
written atomically in a store. Load (read) atomicity must ensure that the data value is not
changed between the time data is read in the main processor core and the time the taint is
read in the FlexiTaint pipeline. Existing replay traps can be leveraged to accomplish this
by treating data loads as “vulnerable” to invalidation-caused replay until the corresponding
taint is read. We implemented this behavior, and in our experiments we observe practically
no performance impact due to such replays because they are exceedingly rare.
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Write atomicity for a store instruction is more challenging. To prevent speculative
writes to the L1 cache, modern processors delay cache writes until the instruction can com-
mit. When FlexiTaint is active, we also delay the taint write until the instruction commits.
As a result, both writes (taint and data) need to be performed atomically at commit time.
To simplify the implementation, we change the commit logic to only perform both writes
if both are hits - if either data or the taint write is a miss, we do not allow the other to
modify its cache. To accomplish this, we check the hit status of both accesses after tag
checks, and suppress the actual write in one cache if the other indicates a miss. Once the
miss is serviced, both writes are re-tried. There are several factors that prevent this from
having a significant effect on performance. First, a TL1 access is nearly always a hit (due to
prefetches), so DL1 write hits are rarely delayed by TL1 misses. Second, a tag check in the
small TL1 are completed well before the DL1 tag check, so the propagation of the TL1 hit
signal does not delay a DL1 hit. Finally, many taint writes are silent writes [41]. Because
FlexiTaint already reads the memory location’s taint for store instructions (Figure 23), we
compare the new taint with the old one and only write the new taint if it differs from the old
one. This optimization allows most store instructions to write only data, and also reduces
the coherence traffic on memory blocks that store taints because they become dirty less
often.
4.3.2 Initialization and OS Interaction
With FlexiTaint, the processor context of a process is extended to include the TPC Handler
Register (TPCHR), the FlexiTaint Configuration Register (FTCR), the Memory Taint Base
Register (MTBR), and the Filter TPT content. The TPCHR contains the address of the
TPC miss handler, and is discussed in Section 4.2.3. The FTCR contains the taint size,
which can be from zero to sixteen bits in our current implementation. Taint size of zero
bits indicates that tainting is not used, and it turns off taint propagation circuitry and the
TL1 cache. The MTBR contains the virtual address of the packed array that stores taints of
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memory locations. The Filter TPT is already discussed in Section 4.2.5.
To initialize FlexiTaint, we allocate the memory taint array, initialize it, and protect it
from ordinary user-level accesses so only FlexiTaint-initiated accesses can modify these
taints. Next, we load the address of the TPC miss handler into the TPC Handler Register.
We then load the filtering rules into the Filter TPT and the address of the memory taint
array into the Memory Taint Base Register. Finally, we write the number of taint bits to the
FlexiTaint configuration register, which enables the FlexiTaint mechanism.
For context switching, we simply save/restore the three registers (TPC Handler, Mem-
ory Taint Base, and FlexiTaint Configuration) and the Filter TPT content to/from the con-
text of the process. This save/restore is very fast: only three additional registers are
saved/restored, and the Filter TPT is very small. In our implementation, it is only 64 bytes
(512 bits) in size.
As our memory taints have their own virtual and physical addresses, they are also fully
compatible with OS mechanisms such as copy-on-write optimizations on process forking,
paging and virtual memory, disk swapping, etc.
4.4 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate our FlexiTaint accelerator, we use two example taint propagation schemes. The
first is input tainting similar to dynamic information flow tracking [68]. This scheme is in-
tended to be representative of tainting schemes that look for security violations by tainting
input-derived data and detecting when such data is used in insecure ways (e.g. as data
pointers, or jump addresses). The second example scheme “taints” values that are valid
heap pointers. This can be used to speed up pointer identification for memory leak detec-
tion. This scheme’s propagation rules are very different from those of input-tainting, so it
also illustrates how easily FlexiTaint can be used with different taint propagation policies.
We note that this evaluation is not intended to show that FlexiTaint can detect a specific
attack or a class of attacks. FlexiTaint can be programmed to follow a wide variety of taint
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Table 4: External Input Tracking.
Instruction Input-taint propagation rule
ALU-Op R1,R2,R3 Taint(R1) = Taint(R2) OR Taint(R3).
(add, sub, etc.)
mov R1,R2 Taint(R1)=Taint(R2).
ld R1,offset(R2) Taint(R1)= Taint(R2) OR Taint(Mem[R2+offset]).
st offset(R1),R2 Taint(Mem[R1+offset])= Taint(R1) OR Taint(R2).
taintm0 offset(R1) Taint(Mem[R1+offset])= INPUT-TAINT.
Jump R1 If Taint(R1)= INPUT-TAINT, raise exception.
(branch, jump, etc.)
propagation schemes, and the attack detection comes from these schemes. Consequently,
we do not claim taint propagation schemes in Tables 4 and 5 as our contributions. They
are merely example schemes to show how FlexiTaint can be used and to evaluate its impact
on performance.
4.4.1 Taint Propagation Schemes
Table 4 shows the rules we use for input tainting. In this table, taintm0 is the first of our
taintm opcodes, which we added to input/output libraries to indicate memory into which
external inputs were just received in read and similar input functions.
These rules can easily be converted into TPC and Filter TPT entries. For example,
according to the table, the TPC entry for a store instruction with both the address register
and value register tainted would be to raise no exception and to taint the target memory
location. Also, the same rule allows us to set the Filter TPT entry for store to ”10”,
avoiding TPC lookups for a store with input taint combinations other than the one just
described.
Our simulator uses the MIPS instruction set, where R0 is hard-wired to the value of
zero and add rX,rY,R0 is used to move values from rY to rX. In keeping with this,
we also hard-wire the taint for register R0 to zero (no taint), so no separate rule for mov
is needed. Alternatively, uses of add as mov, zero-out uses of xor and and, etc. can be
decoded as separate opcodes that have their own taint propagation rules.
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Table 5: Heap Pointer Tracking.
Instruction Pointer-taint propagation rule
add R1,R2,R3 Taint(R1)=Taint(R2) OR Taint(R3).
Exception if Taint(R1) AND Taint(R2)
sub R1,R2,R3 Taint(R1)=Taint(R2) XOR Taint(R3).
mov R1,R2 Taint(R1)=Taint(R2).
ld R1,offs(R2) Taint(R1)= Taint(Mem[R2+offs]).
st offs(R1),R2 Taint(Mem[R1+offs])= Taint(R2).
taintr0 R1 Taint(R1)=POINTER-TAINT.
For heap pointer tracking, we use rules shown in Table 5. The taintr0 is the first
of our taintr opcode, which we added to memory allocation libraries to indicate return
values of heap allocation functions such as malloc.
Note that these propagation rules are different from those in Table 4. For example, the
store instruction only propagates the pointer-taint of the value register, but ignores the
heap-pointerness of the address register. As a result, we can only set the Filter TPT entry
for store to “01” (see Table 3).
For propagating both taints, we use a two-bit taint where the first bit is propagated
according to Table 4 (input tainting) and second bit is propagated according to Table 5
(pointer tainting). For example, the TPC entry for a store instruction with the address
register taint of “01” (heap pointer) and value register taint of “10” (input-derived value),
the exception bit would not be set and the taint for the result (memory location) would be
“10” because the input taint of the value register is propagated but the pointer taint of the
address register is not. Note that the Filter TPT entry for store can only be set to “01” to
eliminate TPC lookups when both source registers are untainted.
4.4.2 Benchmark Applications
We use all applications from the SPEC CPU 2000 [67] benchmark suite. For each appli-
cation, we use the reference input set in which we fast-forward through the first 10% of
the execution to skip initialization, and then simulate the next one billion instructions in
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detail. We note that our fast-forwarding must still model all taint creation and propagation
to provide correct taint state for the simulation. In order to evaluate the multi-threaded
workloads, we simulate benchmarks from the Splash2 [78] suite (no fast-forwarding).
4.4.3 Simulator and Configuration
We use SESC [57], an open-source execution-driven simulator, to simulate an 8-core sys-
tem with Core2-like, four-issue out-of-order superscalar cores running at 2.93GHz. Data
L1 caches are 32KBytes in size, 8-way set-associative, dual-ported, with 64-byte blocks.
L1 caches have 2 cycle hit latency and 1 cycle miss penalty. The shared on-chip L2 cache
is 4MBytes in size, 16-way set-associative, single-ported, with 64-byte blocks. L2 caches
have 10 cycle hit latency and 4 cycle miss penalty. The processor-memory bus is 64 bits
wide and operating at 1333 MHz. Round-trip memory latency is 490 cycles. In FlexiTaint
configurations, taint L1 caches are 4KBytes in size, 4-way set-associative, dual-ported, and
also with 64-byte blocks.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate our FlexiTaint hardware with different taint propagation
policies described in Section 4.4.1. Second, we show the effect of some common-case
optimizations that we presented in Section 4.2.5 and silent writes that happen on taint
information. Third, we perform sensitivity analyses for different L1 Taint Caches with
varying capacity and cache block size. We then compare FlexiTaint with prior mechanisms
and finally, conduct validation experiments to verify the correctness of our implementation.
4.5.1 Performance with different taint propagation policies
We conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of FlexiTaint when it is programmed
to implement input tainting, pointer tainting, and also when it is programmed to simul-
taneously implement both schemes. Figure 24 shows the execution time overhead for all























































































































































































Figure 24: Performance overhead of taint propagation with FlexiTaint.
of 8.4% (in mcf) and average overheads of about 1%, even for the combined taint prop-
agation scheme. In benchmarks with above-average performance overheads, most of the
overhead is caused by increased L2 miss rates and increased L2 port contention because
the L2 cache is used for both data and taints. The L2 capacity problem is also dominant in
most applications, which explains the small differences in overheads between one-bit and
two-bit schemes. In swim, the overhead in the combined two-bit scheme is slightly lower
than for one-bit schemes. As different memory locations are accessed for taints when taint
sizes are different, the overlap of cache misses with other operations in these executions is
also different. In swim, the combined scheme suffers more cache misses (as expected), but
in single-bit schemes there is less overlap and, as a result, they suffer more overhead.
For Splash-2 benchmarks, we observe modest performance overheads - about 3.7% on
average and 8.7% worst-case (in ocean). Both input and pointer taint propagation schemes
show similar overheads for all benchmarks except radiosity where the input scheme has
slightly higher overhead than the pointer scheme. This is due to increased number of taints
propagated between memory and registers in the input tainting compared to the pointer
scheme.
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4.5.2 Effect of common-case optimizations
Figure 25 shows a breakdown of dynamic instructions according to which Filter TPT op-
timizations are applied (data shown is for the 2-bit combined tainting scheme). Dynamic
instructions that could not benefit from Filter TPT common-case optimizations are further
classified into those that hit and those that miss in the TPC. Note that the instructions shown
as “No Taint” are not all the instructions whose operands carry no taint. Instead, these are
instructions whose operands carry no taint and the Filter TPT allows that opcode to use the
“no taint yields no taint” common-case optimization without accessing the TPC. Similarly,
“One Source Taint” instructions in Figure 25 are those that have one operand tainted with a
non-zero taint and the Filter TPT allows the instruction’s opcode to use the common-case
optimization of copying the non-zero source taint to the destination taint without using the
TPC. We find that most of the instructions processed by the FlexiTaint engine can be han-
dled by one of these common-case rules. Instructions that access the Taint Propagation
Cache (TPC) are infrequent enough, and represent only up to 1.9% (in mcf) of all dynamic













































































Figure 25: Use of FlexiTaint optimizations.
These results indicate that our combination of TPC handlers for programmability, TPC
for memoization of frequently used rules, and Filter TPT for common-case optimizations
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can achieve a very high level of programmability with low performance overheads. Also,
the TPC can indeed be small and does not need to be multi-ported because most instructions
do not actually access it. However, in all of the applications the TPC is accessed a non-
trivial number of times, which indicates that the TPC and its software miss handler are still
needed to support less common taint propagation cases that are specific to each set of taint
propagation rules.






















































































Figure 26: Non-silent taint writes.
Figure 26 shows the number of non-silent memory taint writes as a fraction of the
number of dynamic instances of store instructions processed by the FlexiTaint engine. We
only show a subset of applications to illustrate the range of the fraction. The averages for
SPEC2000 and Splash-2 shown in the figure cover all of the applications. Because every
store instruction produces a resulting taint, without detection of silent taint writes, all store
instructions would cause FlexiTaint to write the resulting taint to the TL1 cache. From this
figure, we observe that in many benchmarks nearly 80% of store instructions do not change
the taint of the target memory location. On the other hand, in benchmarks like gcc nearly
99% of stores have non-silent taint writes.
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4.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The TL1 cache is the largest on-chip structure we added to support FlexiTaint, and we used
4KByte TL1 caches in our experiments. However, we performed additional experiments
with 2KByte and 8KByte TL1 caches to determine how the size of the TL1 affect the
performance of FlexiTaint. These experiments indicate that a larger 8KB TL1 results in
no noticeable performance improvement over our default 4KB TL1 cache. For the smaller
2KByte TL1 cache, we find that the performance overhead increases to 2.8% on average
and nearly 14% worst-case (in mcf). We conclude that our default 4KByte cache is well-
chosen for one- and two-bit taints, but a scheme that uses four-bit taints may need a larger
(e.g. 8KByte) cache to avoid some increase in overheads due to TL1 contention.
Our results in Figure 24 show that multi-threaded (Splash-2) applications have higher
overheads than single-threaded (SPEC) ones. This is largely due to false sharing of taint
blocks. A single taint block corresponds to numerous data blocks: with 2-bit taints, a
single taint block corresponds to 16 data blocks. When two processors access different









































































Figure 27: Effect of TL1 line size in Splash-2.
There are several well-known ways to reduce false sharing. One would be to pad and
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align data structures. Several Splash-2 applications already use padding to reduce false
sharing on data blocks, but the granularity of this padding is insufficient for taint blocks. If
the L2 cache is shared, false sharing of taints can be reduced using a smaller block size in
the L1 taint cache. Figure 27 compares performance of FlexiTaint with 64-byte and 32-byte
blocks in the taint cache (DL1 and L2 use 64-byte blocks in both configurations. We ob-
serve performance improvements with smaller taint block sizes, and in several applications
this improvement is dramatic. This confirms that false sharing is indeed present, and also
shows that it can be reduced without affecting the design of existing DL1 and L2 caches.
With private L2 caches, coherence actions occur between L2 caches. Even if the block
size in the TL1 cache is smaller, a TL1 miss still results in a coherence request for an entire
larger L2 block. A possible solution would be to use a sectored L2 cache. A data L1 miss
would then fetch an entire block into the L2 cache, but a taint L1 miss would only fetch a
particular sub-block (sector).
4.5.5 Effect of limited programmability
To demonstrate the benefits of FlexiTaint’s full programmability, we artificially limit its
programmability to only handle propagation rules that can also be handled by previously
proposed hardware support, then use the resulting accelerator on the heap-pointer track-
ing scheme. Most of the rules for heap-pointer tracking (Table 5) can be handled by this
limited scheme. However, rules for add and sub cannot. In all input tainting schemes,
both of these opcodes simply perform a logical OR of input taints to produce the propa-
gate the output taint, without raising any exceptions. In heap-pointer tracking, addition or
subtraction of two heap pointers produces a non-pointer, and addition of two pointers is
meaningless and indicates a probable bug. As a result, the heap-pointer tracking rule for
add is to propagate the taint if only one source operand is pointer-tainted, but to raise an
exception (invoking a software handler to record a possible bug) when both operands are
pointer-tainted. The heap-pointer tracking rule for sub is to propagate the taint if only
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one source operand is tainted, but produce an untainted result if both source operands are
tainted. Effectively, the taint propagation rule for sub is a logical XOR of input taints. A
limited-programmability scheme must raise an exception for each add and sub instruction
and implement correct taint propagation for these instructions in an exception handler. In
our evaluation, we do not actually implement this exception handler. Instead, we model


































































Figure 28: Effect of limited programmability.
The result of this evaluation is shown in Figure 28, which shows execution times with
a limited-programmability scheme and with our full FlexiTaint mechanism. Execution
times are normalized to a baseline that does no taint propagation. These results indicate
that limited-programmability hardware support incurs large performance overheads when
it is used on schemes that are not sufficiently amenable to the particular programmability
limitations.
Note that we do not claim that other hardware schemes cannot be extended to support
the particular taint propagation rules needed to support add and sub for heap-pointer
tracking. For example, the original description of Raksha [18] includes no support for
XOR-in input taints, but such support can easily be added.
We argue that the needs of future taint propagation schemes are difficult to predict at
85
hardware design time, and we claim that by providing more programmability we run far
less risk of being unable to efficiently handle those future schemes. In other words, any
existing hardware mechanism can be extended with a setting that allows it to support a
particular tainting rule it currently does not support, but this obsoletes systems that have
the previous iteration of the hardware support. Our approach is to avoid this by designing
our FlexiTaint accelerator to be highly programmable to begin with.
4.5.6 Validation
As mentioned previously, input-tainting itself is not our contribution, and we use heap-
pointer tracking mostly as an example of a scheme with propagation rules different from
those in input tainting. Our FlexiTaint accelerator is intended to provide a programmable,
low-cost, and implementable substrate that allows implementation of various taint propa-
gation schemes with low performance overheads. As a result, our evaluation focuses on
performance. However, we do verify that our implementation of input tainting and pointer
tracking correctly tracks input-derived and pointer values throughout the program. We also
validate heap pointer tracking by verifying that tainted variables are indeed heap pointers
and that non-pointers remain untainted. We verify input tainting by injecting buffer over-
flows and verifying that they are indeed detected. Interestingly, some benchmarks (twolf
and gcc) have a number of dynamic instructions that produce values tainted with both the
pointer taint and the input taint. For such occurrences, we examine the source code of the
application to confirm the correct behavior of our scheme.
4.6 Related Work
Static taint analysis was proposed to find format string vulnerabilities in C programs [61]
or to identify potentially sensitive data [5]. Taint propagation is also similar to runtime
type checking, where each object is “tainted” with its type and operations are checked for
type-safe behavior in languages such as Java or CCured [48].
Perl [53] taints external data, and its taint propagation is compiled into the code by the
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just-in-time compiler or performed by the interpreter. Newsome et al. [50] use runtime
binary rewriting to taint external inputs and propagate taints. Xu et al. [79] tag each byte
of data, with elaborate policies to track these tags for security.
Hardware support has been proposed to improve performance of tainting and to accom-
modate self-modifying code and multithreading. Suh et al. [68] propose a low-overhead
architectural mechanism that protects programs by tainting data from untrusted I/O and
then propagating this taint. It provides some flexibility for particular taint propagation
rules. Chen et al. [10] use the notion of pointer taintedness to raise alarms whenever a
tainted pointer is dereferenced by the program. Minos [17] extends the microarchitec-
ture with integrity bits and propagation logic that prevents control flow hijacking. Taint-
Bochs [12] taints sensitive data and propagates this taint across system, language, and
application boundaries. TaintBochs provides limited configurability to support different
tradeoffs between security and the number of false alarms. The RIFLE architecture [72]
supports runtime information flow tracking, and allows to enforce their own policies on
their programs.
Ho et al. [32] explore hardware support for taint based protection by switching to emu-
lation mode when tainted data is being processed by the CPU. Their scheme is targeted at
detecting software attacks that are based on injecting malicious code into the target from
the external network. In order to detect such attacks, there are two levels of taint - every
byte that is received from the external network is tainted and a page-level tainting bit is set
to detect when CPU is reading data from tainted pages into registers.
To our knowledge, Raksha [18] is the most configurable hardware taint propagation
mechanism proposed to date. It supports multi-bit taints and has taint propagation registers
that can be programmed to implement up to four different policies. Raksha also provides
some flexibility in how the taints are propagated for each type of instructions. However, this
flexibility is limited mainly to selecting whether or not a given input operand’s taint should
or shouldn’t be propagated to the result, and to selecting whether the taint operands should
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be OR-ed or AND-ed. This is sufficient to efficiently implement most variants of existing
tainting policies. In contrast, FlexiTaint can be used with any set of propagation rules in
which the taint of the result depends only on the opcode and the taints of the operands.
Another important consideration for taint propagation schemes is how taints are stored
and manipulated. Existing hardware tainting mechanisms tightly couple the data value
and its taint: memory locations are extended with extra bits for the taint, and buses and
caches are similarly affected. Unlike prior hardware support for taint propagation, Flexi-
Taint stores and processes taints separately from data. For storage of memory taints, Flex-
iTaint uses the approach used to store memory state (tags) in MemTracker [76]. Taints
are stored as a packed array in virtual memory, allowing use of standard memory modules
and existing OS memory management mechanisms. Taint processing in FlexiTaint is im-
plemented as an in-order addition to the back-end of the processor pipeline to minimize
impact on the already complex out-of-order core.
4.7 Summary
This chapter proposes and evaluates FlexiTaint, a programmable hardware accelerator for
taint propagation. FlexiTaint is implemented without modifying the system bus or main
memory, and without extensive modifications to the performance-critical front-end pipeline
of the processor or to its out-of-order dataflow engine. FlexiTaint stores memory taints as
a packed array in virtual memory, and its taint processing engine is implemented as an in-
order addition to the back end of the CPU pipeline. FlexiTaint is also fully programmable,
using a Taint Propagation Cache (TPC) backed by a software miss handler to determine
the taint of an instruction’s resulting data value, using as inputs the type of operation (its
opcode) and the taints of the operands. A Filter TPT is also used to reduce the number of
accesses to the TPC for common-case optimizations.
Our results indicate that FlexiTaint incurs very low performance overheads, even when
using a two-bit taint that simultanously tracks two very different properties with different
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taint propagation rules. We also evaluate FlexiTaint on Splash-2 benchmarks and demon-
strate that it operates correctly and with low overheads even in a multi-core system. With its
low performance overhead, simple implementation and improved programmability, we see
that FlexiTaint supports our thesis statement that architects should build hardware mech-
anisms to implement taint propagation mechanisms that address security and debugging
challenges faced by programmers.
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CHAPTER V
CACHEDOC: COMPREHENSIVE CACHE MISS CLASSIFIER
5.1 Motivation
Modern processors have several levels of caches to facilitate speedy access to data that are
accessed multiple times within short time intervals (temporal locality) as well as data that
are accessed within relatively close regions (spatial locality). Memory accesses that do not
have data in caches (also known as cache misses) lead to poor application performance and
it is necessary to understand their behaviors to minimize their effects.
The infrastructure most commonly used by application writers to diagnose performance
issues, for both serial and parallel applications, are performance counters. These are hard-
ware counters that enable collecting statistics from a production environment using real
inputs. Today’s processors support counting a large number of events with performance
counters, making them a powerful and general tool [36]. Hardware support for more so-
phisticated performance counters [59], attribution of events to instructions [19], and on-
the-fly processing of profiling data [46, 47, 84] are active research topics. However, perfor-
mance counters and other profiling infrastructure currently only monitor hardware events
that are relatively simple to detect and classify (e.g., branch mispredictions, retired in-
structions, cache misses, etc.). While this basic information is sufficient to diagnose some
performance limiters such as the saturation of external memory bandwidth, it is not suffi-
cient to diagnose limiters resulting from more complex behavior (e.g., it does not point to
a particular type of cache miss in a specific region of code as a performance limiter).
In this chapter, we present CacheDoc, a comprehensive Cache Miss Classifier and ex-
plore several designs that classify cache misses into specific categories. We start with
ideal/off-line cache miss classification techniques and explore several practical designs that
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offer a spectrum of cost-accuracy tradeoffs. We present these cost-accuracy trade-offs and
explain our results. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes
our mechanism to classify replacement misses into conflict and capacity misses, Section 5.3
describes our mechanism for identifying and classifying coherence misses, Section 5.4
presents results showing CacheDoc performing comprehensive cache miss classification,
Section 5.5 discusses related work, and Section 5.6 summarizes our findings.
5.2 Classification of Replacement Misses
In this section, we first describe an ideal (off-line) scheme to identify conflict misses. We
then present the disadvantages in implementing the ideal scheme and describe our practi-
cal conflict miss detector and its implementation. Our scheme can be used in any cache,
regardless of its level in the memory hierarchy and whether it is private or shared.
5.2.1 Ideal Conflict Miss Detector (I-CMD)
Replacement misses fall into two categories: capacity and conflict. A capacity miss oc-
curs when the requested block was replaced from the cache because the cache did not have
enough capacity to accommodate incoming cache blocks. Minimizing capacity misses in-
volves a redesign of the algorithms used in an application (e.g., loop blocking) or upgrading
to a processor with larger caches.
In contrast, a conflict miss happens when several blocks map into the same set in the
cache and replace each other even when there is enough capacity left in the cache. When
the number of these blocks exceeds the cache associativity, a block, A, will be evicted
even though better candidates for eviction may exist in the cache in other sets. If A is
accessed again before those better candidates are replaced, that access is a conflict miss.
That is, a fully associative cache of the same capacity would have kept A in the cache and
not incurred the miss. Minimizing conflict misses involves rearranging data so that blocks
frequently accessed together map to different sets. This can be done through padding or








Figure 29: LRU stack (used by I-CMD) and CMD generational stack. The shading shows
how recently a block was accessed. In the LRU stack, there is a total ordering among the
blocks in the stack. In the CMD stack, no ordering information is maintained within a
generation.
For caches that use a least recently used (LRU) replacement policy, the standard off-line
technique to detect conflict misses is to maintain an LRU stack with N entries that tracks the
blocks that would be present in a fully associative N-block cache. On each access, the block
being accessed is placed on the top of the stack. If this block was already present in the
stack, it is also deleted from its prior location in the stack. A miss is classified as a conflict
miss if, prior to the stack update, the block is found on this N-entry stack. An LRU stack is
usually used for off-line analysis of memory accesses [30, 44]. However, implementing this
off-line algorithm in hardware for on-the-fly classification would be prohibitively expensive
in terms of performance overhead, area cost and power budget.
5.2.2 Practical Conflict Miss Detector
To keep cost low, we propose a new, less complex Conflict Miss Detection scheme that
approximates the access-recency information provided by an LRU stack used by I-CMD.
In particular, we use a scheme that maintains a number of generations that are ordered by
age. Each generation consists of a set of blocks, and all blocks in a younger generation
have been accessed more recently than any block in an older generation. This means that
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the blocks in the youngest generation are the blocks that would be at the top of the LRU
stack, the next (older) generation corresponds to the next group on the LRU stack, etc.
Figure 29 shows an example using four generations.
Unlike an LRU stack, our generational scheme does not track the recency of access
ordering within a generation. For example, if we miss on a block that is found in the
youngest generation, and if that youngest generation currently contains 8 blocks, we only
know that the requested block is among the 8 most recently accessed blocks. In contrast, an
LRU stack would provide precise information—if the block is found in the second position
counting from the top of the stack, then that is the second most recently accessed block.
In our scheme, we start with an empty youngest generation and add cache blocks to
it as they are accessed until the number of blocks in this generation reaches a threshold
number T. After this, we begin a new youngest generation, aging the previous youngest
generation and all generations older than it. Because the state used to track generation
membership is finite, we only maintain up to K generations. Once we have created the
first K generations, the oldest generation is erased and its resources reused to create the
new youngest generation. This corresponds to the removal of the bottom entry on the LRU
stack when a new entry is added at the top and all other entries are pushed down one place.
However, in our generational scheme we remove an entire generation at a time, which
results in imprecise classification at the boundary between capacity and conflict misses.
5.2.3 Implementation
Figure 30 shows the hardware components added to a cache in our proposed implementa-
tion of CMD and Figure 31 shows how these components are used to detect conflict misses.
First, we need to keep track of the current youngest generation since the generations are
reused similar to circular buffers. For instance, in Figure 30, the ordering of the generations
is 2 (youngest), 1, 0, and 3 (oldest). Second, we maintain an array of counters that tracks
the size of each generation. These counters and the youngest generation register contribute
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Figure 30: Shaded areas show the hardware added to implement our Conflict Miss Detector
(CMD). A 4-generation CMD is shown, at a time when Gen 2 is currently the youngest one.
little to the overall cost of the scheme. Finally, the membership of a generation is split
between two structures. Blocks that are present in the cache are tracked using generation
bits. Blocks that are not present in the cache are tracked using a Bloom filter [4] for each
generation.
Generation bits are added to each cache entry. Each bit corresponds to one generation.
To put the block into the youngest generation, we simply set the corresponding bit. To
determine which generation the block currently belongs to, we determine the first bit that
is set (in order of generation age). To clear the state of the oldest generation, we flash-clear
all bits that correspond to that generation (and all bits in the corresponding Bloom filter).
When the number of generations is relatively large (8 or more), an in-cache represen-
tation that is more compact than generation bits may be preferable. One approach is to
record the actual generation number (GN) for each cache block. To put the block into the
youngest generation, the current generation number is written into the block’s GN. Gen-
eration membership of the block can easily be determined by reading its GN. However,
to clear a generation we must find all blocks in that generation and change their GNs to
a special “no-generation” number. To represent the “no-generation” number, we can add
a Generation Valid (GV) bit, which is set only for blocks that belong to some generation.
When a new generation is created, we must clear the GV bits for blocks whose genera-
tion number matches the new current number. To avoid sweeping through the cache for
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Figure 31: CMD implementation flowchart.
this purpose, we use a sliding window scheme that adds another bit to the GN field itself.
When the current generation number changes, if the most significant bit (MSB) changes,
all blocks whose GN’s MSB matches it have their GV cleared. In other words, when the
MSB flips, the oldest generation numbers are changed to “no-generation”.
Note that this generation-number scheme uses 2 + log2(K) bits per in-cache block,
while the more straightforward generation-bits scheme uses K bits per in-cache block.
This means that the generation-bits scheme is preferable when K ≤ 4.
Each generation uses a Bloom filter to keep track of the blocks that belong to that
generation but are not present in the cache. With an N-line cache and K generations, there
are K Bloom filters. Each is a three-hash Bloom filter with 4*N/K bits of state, which
allows each filter to track all the blocks in its generation with a very low false-positive
rate [4]. It is interesting to note that the total size of all the Bloom filters for a given cache
is independent of the number of generations (K filters, each has 4*N/K bits). Also, our
Bloom filters only need to keep track of replaced blocks in a generation, not the entire
generation. As a result, we could use considerably fewer than 4N bits and still maintain
excellent accuracy [28]. Finally, it should be noted that these Bloom filters are accessed
only on cache misses, so they do not affect hit times, can be single-ported, and can be
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implemented with cheaper and slower circuitry than the corresponding cache.
Individual entries cannot be deleted from Bloom filters. However, in CMD, an entry
in a Bloom filter should ideally be deleted from an older generation’s Bloom filter when it
is “stolen” by the youngest generation. Instead, we note that older generations are always
deleted before younger generations, so it is safe to leave deleted entries in the Bloom filters.
The actual generation of a block is now the youngest generation in which that block can be
found.
When a cache block is evicted, its generation membership is recorded in the corre-
sponding Bloom filter. When a block is brought into the cache, it will be tracked by the
generation bits even if it was already in a Bloom filter. As a result, for in-cache blocks we
only need to check and update generation bits, and Bloom filters are only checked on cache
misses and updated on cache replacements.
Our CMD scheme should have little effect on the cache hit or miss latency. For a cache
hit, the generation bits can be read while the tags are being checked. If the youngest-
generation bit is not set already, it needs to be set. This can be accomplished using the
same approach used to change the state of the block from clean to dirty on a write. The
update of generation size counters, if it is needed, is not on the critical path of the cache
access and can be performed in the next cycle.
On a cache miss, the Bloom filter lookup and the CMD classification of the miss can be-
gin as soon as the cache miss is detected, and can easily be completed before the requested
data arrives from memory or a lower-level cache.
A final consideration is how to attribute capacity and conflict misses to the instructions
that trigger them. Performance debugging in existing processors is typically supported by
including several performance counter registers. Each of these registers is typically asso-
ciated with a control register that determines which event will be counted (e.g., committed
instructions, cache accesses, L1 cache misses, etc.). To attribute events to a particular in-
struction, the counter is typically initialized to some value, and counts down each time
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the event occurs. The hardware raises an exception when the count reaches zero, and the
program counter value is recorded by a software tool. This sampling approach allows the
software tool to provide a programmer an approximation of which instructions triggered the
most events of interest, while incurring little execution time overhead. We rely on this con-
ventional mechanism for capacity and conflict miss attribution. However, our scheme can
be even more beneficial with more advanced profiling mechanisms such as ProfileMe [19]
and stratified sampling [59].
5.2.4 Evaluation
We evaluate our practical generational CMD against off-line I-CMD. We use SESC [57], a
cycle-accurate, execution driven simulator. We model 64-core chip multiprocessor. Each
core is a 2.93GHz, four-issue, out-of-order processor with a 32KB, 4-way set-associative
private L1 cache (2 cycle hit and 1 cycle miss latencies), 512KB, 16-way set-associative
private L2 cache (10 cycle hit and 4 cycle miss latencies). All cores share an 8MB, 32-
way L3 cache, and the MESI protocol is used to keep L1 caches coherent. The block
size is 64 bytes in all caches. Since, conflict misses are more likely in caches with lower
associativity [29], we use L1 caches to evaluate effectiveness of our CMD mechanism.
New entries are only added to the youngest generation. So the size of a generation will
never be more than the threshold T. A seemingly obvious choice is to set T to N/K, where
N is the number of blocks in the cache. We conduct two sets of experiments with L1 caches
implementing two different cache block replacement policies – Least Recent Used (LRU)
and a slightly modified version of Clock-based Not-Recently-Used (NRU) algorithm used
in SUN UltraSparc V2 [69]. LRU replacement policy maintains age information for every
cache block that tracks the recency of access for that block. LRU chooses the least recently
used block (or the block with maximum age) to be replaced with the incoming block. In
the Clock-based algorithm, each cache block maintains a ‘used’ bit that gets set when
the block is accessed or initially fetched from the memory. In addition, each block also
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has ‘allocate’ bit, which gets set when allocated and is cleared when the block is filled
with data. Each cache set has a rotating replacement pointer, which is the starting point
to find the way to replace. On a miss, the algorithm looks for the first cache block that
has both ‘used’ and ‘allocate’ bit clear, starting with the way pointed by the replacement
pointer. If all block have ‘used’ and ‘allocate’ bits clear, all ‘used’ bits are cleared and
the scan is repeated. The replacement pointer is then rotated forward one way. Both LRU
and Clock-based algorithms are used to contrast how well our practical scheme captures
























































































Figure 32: Percentage of inaccuracy for generational CMD on caches with LRU and
Clock-based Replacement policies.
In our experiments, we measure the percentage of replacement misses that are not cor-
rectly classified by the practical CMD scheme. We call this as percentage of inaccuracy.
Figure 32 shows the results of our experiments with number of generations, K = 4. Each
benchmark has two bars which show the percentage of inaccuracy for LRU and Clock-
based replacement policies. For LRU replacement policy, all benchmarks except barnes,
radiosity and swaptions have inaccuracy less than 20%. On further analysis, we find that in
these benchmarks, a significant portion of the conflict misses occur near the bottom of LRU
stack in I-CMD scheme. Such misses are incorrectly classified as capacity misses by our
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scheme due to loss of information when the older generations are cleared. Even for bench-
marks with significant (>30%) inaccuracy, our attribution experiments show that the static
instructions that are identified as top ten offenders in I-CMD scheme mostly match with the
top ten offenders in the practical scheme. For performance debugging efforts, this infor-
mation is useful to help programmers fix their code that are hot-spots for conflict misses.
Inaccuracy in practical CMD for clock-based replacement policy differs from LRU because
of additional “randomness” while choosing blocks for replacement in comparison to LRU.
The set of blocks that suffer replacement misses are quite different from LRU. Therefore,
the percentage of inaccuracy depends on whether the classification of replacement misses
for the blocks chosen by Clock-based policy concur in I-CMD and our practical scheme.
In some benchmarks such as barnes and radiosity, there is significantly higher inaccuracy
(compared to LRU replacement). In others, the percentage of inaccuracy for both replace-
ment policies differ from each other by <5%. Our attribution experiments show that static
instructions that are top offenders in the I-CMD and practical scheme largely match (except
for a few cases in barnes and radiosity) and thus, our practical generational CMD scheme










































































Figure 33: Correlation coefficient between conflict misses suffered by all static instructions
in caches with LRU and Clock Replacement policies.
We note that LRU and Clock-based algorithm are two separate replacement policies.
As a result, the set of static instructions that suffer replacement misses in a cache with LRU
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replacement policy will not be the same as those observed in a cache with Clock-based re-
placement. By using the LRU stack (I-CMD), we identify all the program counters (static
instructions) that suffer conflict misses in both policies and measure the correlation coeffi-
cient (also known as Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient [14]) between the cor-
responding sets of conflicts. This is done to study how closely the Clock-based algorithm
approximates the LRU replacement policy in causing conflict misses in caches. A corre-
lation coefficient of +1 means strong correlation and that the conflict-based replacements
that happen in both policies are similar or proportional to each other (equivalent modulo
scaling). On the other hand, a correlation coefficient of 0 means that they are uncorrelated
(independent of each other). Figure 33 shows the result of our experiments. We find that,
in certain benchmarks like barnes, lu, radix, water-sp, blackscholes and fluidanimate, we
observe a correlation coefficient of 0.95 or above. In other benchmarks, the correlation is
not very strong (less than 0.9). From these results, we infer that programmers’ intuitive
understanding of conflict misses (defined by Hill et al. [30]) is already somewhat blurred
by pseudo-LRU replacement policies such as Clock-based algorithm. With this in mind,
we believe that our scheme can serve as a good tool for performance debugging purposes
even though it is not as precise as I-CMD, because it can still identify static instructions
responsible for the majority of conflict misses.
One of the main sources of inaccuracy in our practical CMD scheme stems from the
threshold T = N/K being sometimes too small; when an entry being added to the youngest
generation is already present in an older generation, it is effectively deleted from that older
generation. As a result, older generations become smaller over time due to this “stealing”
by the youngest generation. Therefore, the number of blocks in all K generations combined
could be considerably less than N. This results in numerous conflict misses (to blocks that
would be in the lower part of an LRU stack) being misclassified as capacity misses. We
call such conflict misses as “near-capacity” misses because these misses would be capacity
misses in a slightly smaller cache. Near-capacity conflict misses by their very nature occur
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on blocks that stay in the cache for some time; in contrast, conflict misses on very recently
accessed blocks occur after a short time and tend to be a result of thrashing. Thus, near-














































































Figure 34: Breakdown of replacement misses. Each benchmark has two bars- the left
bar shows the classification according to I-CMD and right bar shows the classification
according to our practical CMD.
Figure 34 shows the breakdown of replacement misses. For each benchmark, there are
two bars – the first bar shows the breakdown in I-CMD scheme and the second bar shows
the breakdown in the practical scheme. Conflict misses in I-CMD are broken down as near-
capacity and conflict, that is, misses on blocks that are in the top (most recent) 75% of the
LRU stack are still shown as “conflict,” but misses on blocks that are in the bottom (least
recent) 25% of the LRU stack are shown as “Near-Capacity.” We see that our practical
generational CMD scheme performs very close to the I-CMD (offline LRU scheme) for
more-recent conflict misses, but misclassifies Near-Capacity conflict misses.
Unfortunately, our lack of knowledge about ordering within a generation prevents us
from re-balancing generations by moving the oldest block in a younger generation into
the next older generation. This means that the only way of controlling generation sizes
is the threshold T that determines the final size of the youngest generation. However,
if the threshold is chosen to be significantly larger than N/K, insufficient “stealing” by the
youngest generation may result in more than N blocks being represented and, consequently,
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some capacity misses (to blocks that would be just below the N-th place in the LRU stack)




















































































Figure 35: Percentage of inaccuracy in our practical CMD when thresholds in generations
are non-adaptive and adaptive.
To manage the trade-off between these misclassifications, there are two possible solu-
tions – i) adaptive threshold, and ii) increasing the number of generations. The adaptive
threshold scheme determines the threshold T based on the number of distinct accesses
tracked by all generations. Whenever we are about to create a new generation, we deter-
mine the total number of blocks represented in all generations. If this number is less than
N, the threshold is increased to enlarge future generations. Conversely, if all generations
together have more than N blocks, the threshold is lowered to shrink future generations.
Finally, we avoid misclassifications of capacity misses by ignoring old generations which
are not entirely above the Nth position on an LRU stack. In other words, if the sum of
generation sizes for the L youngest generations is larger than N, then generation L and
older are ignored because a miss that finds its block in one of those generations may be a
capacity miss.
Figure 35 shows the result of our experiments. For each benchmark, the percentage of
inaccuracy is studied for both non-adaptive (where T is fixed at N/K) and adaptive schemes.
We find that through adaptive threshold, we significantly reduce the percentage of inaccu-
racy to <10% in all benchmarks (maximum of 9.7% in swaptions). The adaptive scheme
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is conservative in that it never misclassifies capacity misses as conflict misses; however,
it may still misclassify some ”near-capacity” conflict misses to blocks near the end of the
(conceptual) LRU stack. Also, near-capacity misses that remain even with adaptive thresh-
olds are less amenable to being avoided through padding and alignment—such fixes may
simply convert these misses into true capacity misses. Therefore, we consider misclassifi-
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Figure 36: Accuracy of classification for 4, 8 and 16 generations.
A second solution to minimizing inaccuracy is to increase the number of generations
used to track conflict misses. When each generation holds N/K entries, with larger K, lesser
number of entries (information about certain cache block accesses) are lost when erasing
the oldest generation. Figure 36 shows the results of our experiments using 4, 8 and 16
generations. Across all benchmarks, the percentage of inaccuracy drop gradually as we
increase the number of generations. However, even with 16 generations, the inaccuracy is
still >30% in certain benchmarks like barnes and radiosity. This is because, a significant
portion of conflict misses occur near the very bottom of LRU stack in the I-CMD scheme
which are misclassified in the practical scheme.
Table 6 shows the latency, area, and per-access energy overheads of both the offline
I-CMD and our practical CMD schemes. The ideal scheme must update the LRU stack on
every access. Since it is essentially a tag array for a fully associative cache, it has an access
latency that is more than twice that of the baseline cache and requires up to 3x extra energy
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Table 6: Latency, area, and energy overheads.
Private 32KB L1
L1 Access Time Total L1 Area L1 Power
Ideal-CMD 18.48% 111.65% 86.46%
Practical CMD 1.48% 3.89% 0.70%
Private 512KB L2
L2 Access Time Total L2 Area L2 Power
Ideal-CMD 101.87% 75.37% 310.28%
Practical CMD 1.58% 2.98% 1.01%
per access in larger L2 caches. Our proposed CMD mechanism with K = 4 generations
uses 4 Bloom filters, each with 4∗N bits where N is the number of cache lines. It also uses
4 generation bits per line in the cache’s meta-data array. The Bloom filters are used only
on cache misses, so they do not affect cache latency and have minimal impact (which we
account for) on power. The extra bits in the cache’s meta-data array affect cache latency
slightly, but this 1.5% increase in latency is unlikely to result in requiring an extra cycle for
a cache hit. The overall energy impact of our CMD mechanism is minimal—it increases
per-access energy by about 1%. Finally, our CMD mechanism uses less than 4% extra area
in total, relative to the original area of the cache.
5.3 Classification of Coherence Misses
As we transition to multi-core processors, there is another category of misses called coher-
ence misses. These misses occur as a result of coherence actions between private caches of
various cores.
Figure 37 shows the breakdown of cache misses into coherence and non-coherence
misses as we increase the number of cores from 8 to 64 for benchmarks with the most
data sharing. With more cores, coherence misses represent an increasing percentage of
all cache misses. As a result, performance issues related to true and false sharing become
worse when more cores are used, and often become a scaling limiter. It is important to


















































Figure 37: Breakdown of all cache misses for 8 and 64 cores.
distinguish between the two types, and identify their sources.
In this section, we first describe the relatively simple mechanism for distinguishing co-
herence misses from non-coherence misses, then discuss an Ideal False Sharing Detector
(I-FSD) mechanism that further classifies coherence misses into those caused by false shar-
ing and those caused by true sharing. We then contrast I-FSD with the algorithm proposed
by Dubois et al. [23] and show the key differences between the two schemes. We show why
I-FSD is impractical to implement in real hardware and explore several practical hardware
designs for coherence miss classification.
5.3.1 Identification of Coherence Misses
Coherence misses can be distinguished from other (cold, coherence, or conflict) misses by
checking if the cache block is already present in the cache. For non-coherence misses, the
block either never was in the cache (cold miss) or was replaced by another block (capacity
or conflict miss). In contrast, a coherence miss occurs when the block was invalidated or
downgraded to allow another core to cache and access that block. Coherence misses are
easily detected with a minor modification to the existing cache lookup procedure. A cache
miss is detected as a coherence miss if a block does have a matching tag but does not have a
valid state. Conversely, if no block with a matching tag is found, we have a non-coherence
miss.
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5.3.2 Ideal False Sharing Detector (I-FSD)
We use the programmer-centric definition of false sharing described in Chapter 2. Basi-
cally, a coherence miss is a false sharing miss if none of the memory accesses (starting with
the memory access causing the miss up until the block is invalidated or downgraded or re-
placed) happen on data that were accessed by other cores. Coherence misses are classified
into false sharing misses and true sharing misses by our I-FSD algorithm [75] shown in
Figure 38.
Coherence miss classification involves two distinct phases namely:
• Access Tracking (AcT): From the time, a cache block is invalidated or downgraded
in a core’s cache, until the time when coherence miss happens, we need information
about which words were read from or written to by other cores.
• Overlap Detection (OD): From the time of coherence miss until when the block is
invalidated/downgraded/replaced, we need to determine whether an access to any
word in the block overlaps with an access by another core. True sharing access
happens when a memory word is either i) written and read by two different cores or
ii) written by two different cores. If we do not detect any true sharing access, then the
coherence miss is a false sharing miss. Note that read by two different cores do not
cause invalidation or downgrade, hence coherence misses don’t occur in these cases.
The two phases, namely AcT and OD, are temporally disjoint phases for coherence
miss classification. AcT phase occurs between the time a cache block is invalidated or
downgraded from a cache and when the coherence miss happens (that is, when the cache
block is accessed again by the core). OD phase occurs between the time of coherence miss
and when the cache block is invalidated or downgraded or replaced.
In order to track these phases accurately, I-FSD maintains the following data structures
namely:
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I n p u t : P= t o t a l number o f c o r e s , W=number o f words i n a cache b l o c k
A= c u r r e n t d a t a a d d r e s s , B= cache b l o c k h o l d i n g a d d r e s s A
c= c u r r e n t c o r e
Global_Writer_ID Global_Reader_vector
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IF ( Coherence Miss t o B)
WAIT ON c u r r e n t s h a r e r s t o u p d a t e G l o b a l W r i t e r I D and G l o b a l R e a d e r v e c t o r
IF ( Wr i t e a c c e s s t o A)
L o c a l v e c t o r w r i t e [A] = 1 ;
L o c a l v e c t o r r e a d [A] = 0 ;
IF ( Read a c c e s s t o A)
L o c a l v e c t o r r e a d [A] = 1 ;
IF ( I n v a l i d a t i o n / Downgrade / Replacement r e q u e s t f o r B)
FOR( each word a d d r e s s K i n B) DO
IF ( L o c a l v e c t o r w r i t e [K]==1)
G l o b a l W r i t e r I D =c ;
G l o b a l R e a d e r v e c t o r ={0} ;
IF ( L o c a l v e c t o r r e a d [K]==1)
G l o b a l R e a d e r v e c t o r [ c ] = 1 ;
DONE
ALGORITHM OVERLAP DETECTION
IF ( Coherence Miss t o B)
C o h e r e n c e M i s s f l a g = t r u e ;
F a l s e S h a r i n g f l a g = t r u e ; / / R e s e t on s e e i n g f i r s t t r u e s h a r i n g on t h e b l o c k
Miss PC=PC ;
O t h e r s v e c t o r w r i t e = O t h e r s v e c t o r r e a d ={0} ;
FOR( each word a d d r e s s K i n B) DO
IF ( G l o b a l W r i t e r I D != c AND G l o b a l R e a d e r v e c t o r [ c ] ! = 1 )
O t h e r s v e c t o r w r i t e [K] = 1 ;
IF ( a b i t o t h e r t h a n c i s s e t i n G l o b a l R e a d e r v e c t o r )
O t h e r s v e c t o r r e a d [K] = 1 ;
DONE
IF ( Wr i t e a c c e s s t o A)
IF ( O t h e r s v e c t o r w r i t e [A]==1 OR O t h e r s v e c t o r r e a d [A]==1)
F a l s e S h a r i n g F l a g = f a l s e ;
IF ( Read a c c e s s t o A)
IF ( O t h e r s v e c t o r w r i t e [A]==1)
F a l s e S h a r i n g F l a g = f a l s e ;
IF ( I n v a l i d a t i o n / Downgrade / Replacement r e q u e s t f o r B)
IF ( C o h e r e n c e M i s s f l a g == t r u e )
/ / Ou tpu t Miss PC and F a l s e S h a r i n g f l a g t o P r o f i l e r
Figure 38: I-FSD Algorithm
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• AcT state which has the following information: i) per-word1 Global State that
tracks last writer core and subsequent readers until the next write. ii) Two bit vec-
tors for every private cache block that track read and write accesses by the local core
during OD to update the Global State at the time of cache block invalidation/down-
grade/replacement. This is needed for other cores to perform their AcT correctly.
• OD state which has the following information: i) Two bit vectors for every private
cache block which records reads and writes performed by other cores to the cache
block prior to the time of coherence miss. ii) Program Counter at the time of coher-
ence miss for attribution to the program code that caused the miss. iii) Two flags,
one to track whether the cache block suffered coherence miss and the other to track
whether the all the accesses to the cache block are false sharing accesses.
PROC ACCESS TRACKING implements the AcT phase. Information regarding every
read and write access by a core is accumulated in Local Vectors and at the time of cache
block eviction, the information is transmitted to update the Global State.
PROC OVERLAP DETECTION implements the OD phase. At the time of coherence
miss, the information from Global State is captured into Others vectors. On every read and
write, this information is used to determine if the current memory access results in true
sharing. A read access is a true sharing access if the word’s last write was not done by this
core and if this core has not already read the word since it was last written. A write access
is a true sharing access if the word’s last write was not done by this core or if it was read by
another core since it was last written. A coherence miss is classified as a true sharing miss
if any access, starting with the one that causes the miss and ending with the subsequent
replacement or invalidation of the block, is a true-sharing access. Conversely, the miss is
categorized as a false sharing miss if no true sharing access occurs in this interval.
1Granularity is a matter of cost-performance trade-off. We didn’t observe significant coherence activity
on sub-word accesses. Hence we chose word-granularity for our work. We note that byte-granularity can be
achieved with the same algorithm with relatively straightforward modifications.
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Table 7: Program Counters and the corresponding number of false sharing misses reported
in Facesim Benchmark.








We present an example case study for Facesim benchmark from Parsec-1.0 suite [3] to
show how our I-FSD algorithm correctly captures false sharing misses. Since the existing
version has already been tested and fine-tuned for performance before release, we introduce
false sharing explicitly. This is done to backtrack the original efforts by programmers to
identify false sharing except that they did not have access to our tool during development.
We present our results to examine the effectiveness of our tool in identifying the regions of
code where false sharing misses occur.
Inside the One Newton Step Toward Steady State CG Helper II() function, we iden-
tify a tight loop where there are two accumulator variables rho new and supernorm whose
values are computed and updated in every iteration using the input elements. Since, each
thread privately owns the accumulators and are stored in a shared array, all coherence
misses that result from accessing them are false sharing misses. This limits scalability
to 4x on a 8-core machine.
When we run Facesim through our I-FSD tool, we obtain the results shown in Table 7.
Clearly, the static instructions at addresses 4cc084 and 4cc074 are responsible for 94%
of false sharing coherence misses in the program and approximately 24.5% of all cache
misses. Using the addr2line utility from GCC toolchain [25], we identify the part of the
program where these addresses are located and find that they point to lines inside the loop
where the accumulators rho new and supernorm are being updated (Figure 39). We change
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void O n e N e w t o n S t e p T o w a r d S t e a d y S t a t e C G H e l p e r I I ( . . . )
{
. . .
f o r ( i n t i =1 ; i <=dX .m; i ++)
{
dX ( i )+= a l p h a ∗S ( i ) ;
R( i )+= a l p h a ∗ n e g a t i v e Q ( i ) ;
double s2=R( i ) . Magn i tude Squa red ( ) ;
rho new += s2 ;
supnorm=max ( supnorm , s2 ) ;
}
/ / F a l s e S h a r i n g Fix
/ / L o c a l l y a c c u m u l a t e t h e c o u n t e r s and up da t e l a t e r
/ / f o r ( i n t i =1; i<=dX .m; i ++)
/ / {
/ / dX ( i )+= alpha∗S ( i ) ;
/ / R ( i )+= alpha∗ n e g a t i v e Q ( i ) ;
/ / do ub l e s2=R ( i ) . Magn i tude Squared ( ) ;
/ / l o c a l r h o n e w+=s2 ;
/ / l o c a l s u p n o r m=max ( l o c a l s u p n o r m , s2 ) ;
/ / }
/ / rho new=l o c a l r h o n e w ;
/ / supnorm=l o c a l s u p n o r m ;
. . .
}
Figure 39: False Sharing Misses in Facesim benchmark.
the loop to accumulate the results locally into local new rho and local supernorm and up-
date shared variables new rho and supernorm after the loop is complete. This avoids the
false sharing coherence misses on these accumulators and results in near-linear (near-8x)
speedup on an 8-core machine.
5.3.3 Comparison with Dubois’ scheme
To our knowledge, Dubois et al. [23] was the first proposal to classify coherence misses as
essential (true sharing) and non-essential (false sharing). They propose separate algorithms
for different types of cache coherence protocols. We use the invalidate-based protocol
(MESI) implementation described in [23] for our comparison. This implementation main-
tains a stale bit for every cache word. When a write happens on a word, the caches that
currently have the word clear the stale bit to indicate that a new value is produced. A sub-
sequent read of this word denotes consumption of ”fresh value” produced by a write and is








(hit, True sharing in Dubois’,
False sharing in I-FSD)
Core A Core B
Wr Z
Replaced (no longer in any cache)
Rd Z
X, Y, Z in same cache block
Figure 40: Accurate classification requires us to keep access information even for blocks
that are no longer in any cache.
intervening write) will only consume a stale value.
There are two key differences between I-FSD and Dubois scheme. First, writers (pro-
ducers) never classify coherence misses and all write misses are assumed to be non-essential
misses. Hence, a portion of true sharing misses that can classified on the producer’s side
are classified as non-essential misses in Dubois’ scheme. Whereas, I-FSD classifies co-
herence misses both on the producer and consumer sides. In a single producer-multiple
consumer pattern (See Gauss-Siedel example in Section 2.4.2) and multiple producer-
multiple consumer pattern (See histogram example in Section 2.4.2), coherence misses are
highly likely to happen in multiple cores (producer and the respective consumers). Dubois’
scheme could underestimate the effect of false sharing in such situations and the program-
mer might consequently ignore or oversee the lines of code involved in such patterns be-
cause of lack of understanding of its impact.
Second, on every cache block replacement, the stale bits are cleared. This is because,
the staleness of values tracked by the consumers are no longer relevant by virtue of being
replaced by another cache block. This results in loss of history about the ”staleness of
values” (information that a consumer had already read the value from the cache word).
When the cache word is subsequently read by the core, the stale bit is zero and hence, it is
treated as true sharing by Dubois’ scheme. Figure 40 shows an example where the cache






































































Figure 41: Comparison between I-FSD and Dubois’ scheme. Each bar has three portions-
bottom portion shows the percentage of times there is agreement between two schemes,
middle portion shows percentage times Dubois’ scheme misclassifies as false sharing (non-
essential) on the producer side and the top portion shows the percentage times Dubois’
scheme misclassifies as true sharing because of loss of history regarding staleness of values.
suffers a coherence miss, Dubois’ scheme classifies ”Read Z” as true sharing access. This
is because, the information regarding the ”staleness” of value Z has been lost during cache
block replacement. However I-FSD remembers that the value of Z had already been read
by core A and would correctly classify the access as false sharing.
Figure 41 shows the results of our experiments. Each benchmark has three portions.
The bottom portion of each bar shows the percentage of coherence miss classifications
that both Dubois’ and I-FSD schemes agree. In many benchmarks, the two schemes agree
atleast 75% of the time except fft, ocean, raytrace and blackscholes. The middle portion
of each bar shows the percentage of times the writer classifies coherence misses as non-
essential (false sharing) in Dubois’ scheme whereas I-FSD detects true sharing on the writer
side. A large portion of such misclassifications occur in benchmarks such as ocean (62%),
blackscholes (45%), raytrace (28%) and fluidanimate (21%). The top portion of each bar
shows the percentage of times Dubois’ scheme detects essential (true sharing) whereas I-
FSD detects false sharing. Such cases occur when stale bits are cleared on cache block
replacement. This results in loss of history information regarding ”staleness” of values
that are already being read. Such misclassifications are frequent in a few benchmarks such
as fft(29%), volrend(14%) and bodytrack (14%). I-FSD correctly detects false sharing
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because it maintains the access history information in global state (similar to a central
repository).
5.3.4 Suitability of I-FSD for On-Line Miss Classification
There are a number of problems that make the Ideal False Sharing Detector unsuitable for
on-line implementation needed to drive hardware performance counters or other hardware
performance debugging and attribution mechanisms. The most significant of these prob-
lems are:
1. The I-FSD has a high implementation cost which does not scale well. The per-word
Global State for the I-FSD structure shown in Figure 38 is P + log2P where P is the
number of cores. With 4 cores and 32-bit words this state represents a 19% storage
overhead, and with 32 cores the storage overhead is already 116%.
2. The state needed for the I-FSD can be very large (requires keeping state for all words
ever touched). It may be tempting to not keep track state for a word that is no longer
present in any core’s cache. However, information about currently evicted blocks
might be relevant for classifying future coherence misses to these blocks (See exam-
ple in Figure 40).
3. Changes are needed to the underlying cache coherence protocol and extra network
traffic is required to update the I-FSD state and/or propagate it to the cores that need
it to classify their coherence misses. In particular, Global State information for a
memory word should be kept in a central repository (could also be stored in the last
level shared cache or memory). As seen in Figure 38, the coherence protocol needs to
be modified to trigger reads and writes of the global state information at appropriate
times. To enforce that, the central repository needs to ensure updates sent by the
cores replacing/invalidating/downgrading the cache block are reflected in the Global
State before the core suffering the coherence miss reads the information from the
central repository and updates its local state to perform OD.
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4. A coherence miss may be classified as a true or false sharing miss many cycles af-
ter the instruction causing the miss has retired from the core’s pipeline. This delay
in classification makes it more difficult and costly to attribute false and true sharing
misses to particular instructions, especially if performance counters support precise
exceptions for events, such as PEBS (Precise Event Based Sampling) mechanism
available in recent Intel processors [2]. For accurate attribution, the PC of the instruc-
tion that caused a coherence miss must be kept until the miss is eventually classified.
This increases the cost of the classification mechanism, and also makes it more diffi-
cult for profilers to extract other information about the miss (e.g., what was the data
address or value) [2].
To provide a realistically implementable scheme for on-line classification of coherence
misses, we need to overcome some (preferably all) of the above problems, while sacrificing
as little classification accuracy as possible. When choosing which aspects of classification
accuracy to sacrifice, we keep in mind the primary purpose of our classification mechanism:
giving the programmer an idea of how much performance is affected by true and false
sharing cache misses, and pinpointing the instructions (and from there, lines of code) that
suffer most of these misses. Armed with this, the programmer should be able to make an
informed decision about how best to reduce the performance impact of these misses.
5.3.5 Practical False Sharing Detectors
We propose and explore a range of design choices that trade-off accuracy for lower hard-
ware costs. Section 5.3.4 enumerated a number of issues that limit I-FSD from being
implemented in real machines. The key to overcoming these problems is to reduce the
amounts of both global and local state. To achieve this, we make use of the fact that
there are two distinct phases in Coherence miss classification namely AcT and OD (Sec-
tion 5.3.2). The data structures needed by these two phases are independent and hence
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Figure 42: Design Space for coherence miss classification mechanisms. Gradations of
AcT state is on the vertical axis and OD state is on the horizontal axis. Hardware costs
increase as we move up or towards the right. Design points marked ‘x’ are examined in our
evaluations.
mechanisms as practical FSD.
As shown in Figure 38, the Global State along with local access vectors (that track reads
and writes by the local core to eventually update the global state) are needed to implement
the Access Tracking phase correctly. We call this AcT state. Rest of the local state
(namely Read and Write vectors of others, flags and the program counter at coherence miss)
are used to implement the Overlap Detection phase. We call this OD state. Figure 42
shows the design space of coherence miss classification mechanisms defined by how much
state is kept for each of these two phases.
5.3.6 Design Choices for Access Tracking
The most expensive AcT scheme (top row) maintains the AcT state for the entire memory
throughout the program execution. We call this Total AcT State. As described in Section
5.3.4, the amount of global state grows proportional to the number of cores and the memory
overhead increases at a super-linear rate with the number of cores. Hence this solution is
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impractical in real hardware.
The next most aggressive AcT implementation (second from top) maintains AcT state
only for cache blocks in the on-die caches. We call this Near-Total AcT state. This scheme
can only lead to misclassification of coherence misses to blocks that are evicted from all of
the on-die caches between an invalidation/downgrade and the subsequent coherence miss.
Evictions of such lines are highly likely to be a small fraction of the evictions, and thus this
event should be quite uncommon. The state can be kept with the lowest level shared cache,
for systems that have one. For chips with only private caches, and a separate mechanism
for maintaining coherence such as a directory, the AcT state can be kept along with the
coherence state for the core.
The third most aggressive AcT implementation (third from top) maintains Global State
only for a limited number of cache blocks in the on-die caches. We call this Partial AcT
state. This scheme can lead to misclassification of coherence misses if the cache block cur-
rently suffering coherence miss is not tracked globally. In order to select the subset of cache
blocks for tracking global state, as a first order approximation, we could choose only blocks
that currently occupy the last level private caches that are kept coherent. Furthermore, not
all blocks in coherent caches are involved in sharing. Hence, we have opportunities to fur-
ther restrict the number of entries to be tracked. To implement Partial State, we maintain a
global pool where entries are allocated on demand to track select cache blocks. An entry
is created when a cache block in any of the coherent caches is either invalidated or down-
graded as they are likely to suffer from coherence misses. Subsequent accesses by various
cores to the block are tracked and updated as described in I-FSD algorithm. Since the global
pool holds a limited number of entries, it needs a policy to replace existing entries to make
room for incoming blocks. We pick a modified version of pseudo-LRU replacement policy
called NkMRU(Not ’k’ Most Recently Used) replacement policy. Basically, it chooses a
random entry for replacement that is not among the ’k’ most-recently-used cache blocks. It
should be noted that not all invalidated or downgraded cache blocks will eventually suffer
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coherence misses. Hence promoting every incoming block into the k most-recently-used
set could result in losing valuable information about blocks that frequently suffer from
coherence misses. To prevent this effect, we promote a cache block entry into the k most-
recently-used set only when the cache block actually suffers a coherence miss in one of the
caches.
The final and least aggressive AcT implementation (bottom row) does not maintain any
AcT state and infers false and true sharing locally by comparing the stale value of the cache
block with the incoming values. This technique of detecting false sharing through data
comparison was used by Coherence Decoupling [33] to save cache access latency due to
false sharing misses. If the data value has changed, then true sharing is detected, otherwise,
the coherence miss is attributed to false sharing. We call this Zero AcT state. This scheme
could misclassify in two situations: i) Silent stores [41] do not change the data value and
hence, it is impossible to detect true sharing in such situations. However, classifying silent
stores itself is a murky area. Whether they contribute to true or false sharing depends on
specific situations. For example, lock variables have an initial value of zero. A core grabs
a lock by setting it to one. Later when the lock is freed, it deposits a value of zero back.
An external core does not see change in lock value and effectively sees a value of zero
before and after the core operated on the lock. Even though lock sharing is a form of
true sharing, detecting false sharing through data comparison would miss this effect. At
the same time, other silent writes that simply do not communicate any new value can be
eliminated through algorithmic changes, ii) While readers would be able to detect change
in data value due to an external write, writers do not detect true sharing as readers do not
modify data. As long as coherence misses are classified on the consumer side correctly, the
programmer would still get an accurate picture of false sharing effects in the program. Note
that, there is no AcT state and therefore, to enable OD, external writes inferred through data
comparison should be recorded. This scheme basically needs a bit vector where bits get set
to indicate change in data values. Other structures used in I-FSD such as flags to indicate
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coherence miss and false sharing as well as program counter counter that caused the miss
are still needed to correctly perform OD.
5.3.7 Design Choices for Overlap Detection
We explore various design choices for OD shown in Figure 42. The most aggressive OD
implementation (right column) maintains local state for all blocks in the coherent private
caches. We call this Total OD state. As a result, it yields highest accuracy by capturing
all local state needed to accurately perform OD. However, it is expensive to maintain local
state bits for every cache block.
The next most aggressive OD implementation (second column) maintains local pool
to track local state of a limited number of cache blocks that suffer coherence misses. We
call this Partial OD state. This implementation does not contribute to any misclassification
of coherence misses. However, a coherence miss may not be tracked when there are not
enough entries in the local pool. The local pool entry is freed from the local pool after
classifying the coherence miss. Since, at any given time, not all cache blocks are involved
in sharing, a local pool (similar to global pool) works well for tracking local state in private
caches. If the AcT involves maintaining partial state, then an entry is created in the local
pool only if the global pool tracks the corresponding cache block.
The least aggressive OD implementation (left column) does not maintain local state
corresponding to OD for any cache block. We call this Zero OD state. At the time of
coherence miss, it simply observes whether the data address causing the miss suffers true
or false sharing and classifies the miss at this point. This has the potential to overestimate
false sharing misses in a program because early classification would ignore true sharing
access on a block that might happen much after the point of coherence miss.
5.3.8 Non-primary Private Caches
Local state is relatively easy to update and check in a primary (L1) cache where all memory
accesses are visible to the cache controller. In lower-level caches, only cache line addresses
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are visible. As a result, in systems where multiple levels of cache may be involved in co-
herence (e.g., with private L2 caches), information from a private non-primary (L2) cache
should be passed to the primary cache (L1) when it suffers a cache miss. The L1 cache
then keeps track of the flags that track coherence miss and false sharing for the L2 cache
and forwards the value of these flags back to L2 when the block is replaced from the L1
cache. Although in this scenario we have caches directly communicating access related
information, it only happens between different levels of private caches for the same core,
and only on a coherence miss or eviction.
5.3.9 Other issues
The relatively simple mechanism to detect coherence misses described in Section 5.3.1
can err in two ways. First, on power-up or after a page fault, the state of a block’s state
is set to invalid, but the tag need not be initialized. This could sometimes result in a tag
accidentally matching to that of a requested block. However, this would be quite rare and
random enough that they do not attribute in significant numbers to any particular piece of
code. Second, cache replacement policy could prioritize replacement of invalidated blocks,
which can destroy the evidence of a coherence miss. For highly contended blocks involved
in sharing patterns, there is little time for the block to be replaced between the invalidation
and the subsequent miss, so replacement priority is unlikely to obscure enough coherence
misses to hide a scalability problem. It should also be noted that the inaccuracy caused by
replacement priority is very costly to avoid: it requires the cache to track the tags of blocks
that would be in the cache were it not for replacement priority, e.g. using a duplicate set of
tags.
For machines with shared bus interconnect and a shared last-level cache, the AcT state
can easily be maintained in the shared cache. However, with the growing popularity of
technologies such as HyperTransport [34], the interconnect could be high-speed, point-to-
point communication links between the cores. In these cases, we maintain the global AcT
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state for a block in its home node or tile, along with existing coherence state that is already
part of the directory. For all dirty block (cache blocks that had write accesses from the
local core) replacements, the AcT state can be easily updated by piggybacking on existing
writeback messages. However, for clean block (cache blocks that had read accesses only)
replacements, the reader information is sent to the home node to update the AcT state using
an extra message.
5.3.10 Evaluation
In our experiments, we use the same configuration used in Section 5.2.2 and measure
coherence misses in large L2 private caches to maximize the number of coherence misses
and hence study our approximate schemes. To examine how the approximations in practical
schemes affect their accuracy, we measure the percentage of coherence misses that are
not correctly classified by the particular scheme. We identify two aspects of inaccuracy
namely– a) the practical scheme can disagree with the I-FSD scheme, that is, practical
scheme reports false sharing while I-FSD detects true sharing and vice versa and b) the
practical scheme may not be able to classify true or false sharing due to lack of information
from the AcT state or OD state. This results from maintaining partial state for AcT and
OD.
Figures 43(a) and 43(b) show the accuracy results for a range of practical schemes that
maintain total OD State and varying amounts of AcT state. Each benchmark is evaluated
for six different schemes (from left to right) namely Near-Total AcT state (where AcT state
is maintained for every cache block with a total of 256k entries), Partial AcT state with four
different configurations where the global pool maintains has 16384(16k), 4096(4k), 1024
(1k), 64 entries respectively and finally Zero AcT state, where false and true sharing are
inferred locally through data comparison.
Near-Total AcT state achieves perfect accuracy in all of our benchmarks expect ocean
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Near-Total Partial Partial Partial Partial Zero AcT
(16k) (4k) (1k) (64)
4.36% 1.8% 1.79% 1.65% 1.57% 0.00%
(c) Area Overhead of AcT state as a percentage of on-die cache area. Total
OD state adds 7.35% area overhead to on-die caches.
Figure 43: Accuracy versus cost trade-offs for practical schemes having total OD state and
varying amounts of AcT state. For each benchmark, the six bars (from left to right labeled
1 through 6) represent Near-Total AcT state, Partial AcT state with 16k, 4k, 1k, 64 entries
and Zero AcT state.
This inaccuracy results out of loss of AcT state that happens over very long time intervals.
Partial AcT states with 16k and 4k entries capture enough accuracy with <10% of coher-
ence misses being misclassified in almost all benchmarks except fmm and water-sp. Partial
AcT states with 1k and 64 entries do not have not enough entries to accommodate all the
blocks involved in sharing. From the attribution information, we find that a relatively few
static instructions are involved in a large number of coherence misses. For instructions that
infrequently suffer coherence misses, information about cache blocks they use are replaced
from the global pool and hence introduce inaccuracy in these benchmarks. Our experiments
show that a small percentage (<5%) inaccuracy results from loss of state on certain reads
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and writes performed by certain cores. Even when the Partial AcT state has information
for the cache block, an intervening replacement in the global pool might result in loss of
access history about reads and writes performed by cores on that block. On the other hand,
there are situations where inaccuracy results from unavailability of Partial AcT state. For
such situations, there are two possible solutions– 1) For static instructions of interest (those
that suffer coherence misses frequently), state about cache blocks they use can be tracked
by better sampling techniques 2) Use Zero AcT (data comparison) technique as a fall-back
mechanism to detect false sharing. Finally, Zero AcT with Total OD state incurs inaccuracy
in the range of 4.5%(radix) to 33.5%(barnes). We find that the writer cores being unable
to detect reads by other cores is a significant source of misclassification. The other major
causes are silent writes in dynamic scheduling code used by many PARSEC benchmarks
as well Radiosity in Splash-2 benchmark suites. From attribution experiments, we find that
top ten offending static instructions still match in many benchmarks, although they have
differences in reporting the numbers of false and true sharing misses to those offenders.
Figure 43(c) shows the area cost of our practical schemes with different AcT state as a
percentage of total on-die cache area. The most aggressive Near-Total AcT scheme keeps
the global AcT state for all words and maintains local OD state for the entire cache. As a
result, it incurs upto 11.7% (4.36% for global state) area overhead compared to total area
of the on-die caches used in our experiments. For all of the Partial AcT state schemes,
the local state kept in each private cache dominates the cost. Thus reducing the amount of
AcT state has little impact on area overhead. The least expensive Zero AcT scheme incurs
7.35% area overhead on on-die caches just to maintain the local OD state.
Overall, from the above experiments, we find that accuracy of partial AcT schemes is
sensitive to the amount of AcT state, but area overhead is not very sensitive to the amount
of AcT state, except for Zero AcT. As a result, a good design of a partial AcT scheme is
one that maximizes accuracy by providing enough entries (eg. 4k or more entries).











































































16K 4K 1K 64 Zero
Figure 44: Correlation coefficient between number of false sharing misses suffered by
static instructions in Partial AcT, Zero AcT schemes against Near-total AcT. Samples of
static instructions are chosen by Partial AcT schemes.
The design points that perform Partial AcT classify coherence misses for cache blocks
whose information is available in global state. Effectively, they sample a subset of co-
herence misses that are actually classified by Near-Total AcT. We study the correlation
coefficient between the number of false sharing misses for the static instructions that are
chosen as samples by the Partial AcT schemes. A correlation of +1 means that false sharing
misses reported by Partial AcT are similar or proportional (equivalent modulo scaling) to
the false sharing misses reported by Near-Total AcT for the chosen samples. A correlation
of 0 means that they are uncorrelated (or independent of each other). Figure 44 shows
the results of our experiments. We see that all benchmarks except barnes, fmm and ocean
show high correlation (>0.99) even for 64 entries. This shows that even though the Partial
AcT schemes perform classification only on a subset of static instructions causing coher-
ence misses, we still get a very good accuracy from Partial AcT states. Zero AcT exhibits
poor correlation against Near-total AcT with correlation coefficient as low as 0.45 in barnes
benchmark.
We conduct experiments to study the differences between Near-Total AcT and Zero
AcT and hence, verify our implementation. As first step, we modify Near-Total AcT to












































































Near-Total Near-Total-2 Near-Total-3 Zero
Figure 45: Percentage of inaccuracy for Zero AcT and different implementations of Near-
Total AcT. For each benchmark, there are four bars- Near-Total, Near-Total-2 (does not
consider reader information on the writer side), Near-Total-3 (does not consider silent
writes and ignores reader information on the writer side) and Zero AcT.
detect reads on the writer side to declare true sharing. We call this implementation as Near-
Total-2. We then modify Near-Total-2 to ignore silent writes. This is also similar to Zero
AcT not being able to detect writes that do not change values of memory locations. We
call this implementation as Near-Total-3. Figure 45 shows the result of our experiments
where we measure the percentage of inaccuracy for Near-Total AcT, modified implemen-
tations of Near-Total AcT and Zero AcT. In all benchmarks (except blackscholes), there
is a noticeable increase in percentage of inaccuracy once we ignore reader information on
the writer side for coherence miss classification (Near-Total-2). As we further ignore silent
writes from consideration (Near-Total-3), the percentage of inaccuracy almost equals to
Zero AcT in all benchmarks except barnes, fmm and blackscholes. On further investiga-
tion, we find that these benchmarks have a small percentage of idempotent writes (writes
that change values and deposit the old values back between coherence misses). In these
cases, Near-Total AcT would classify as true sharing while Zero AcT would detect false
sharing because it does not detect change of data values.
Figures 46(a) and 46(b) show the accuracy results for a range of practical FSD schemes
that maintain Near-total AcT state and varying amounts of OD state. We evaluate for four
different schemes for each benchmark (from left to right) – Total OD state (where OD state
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Total OD Partial(1k) Partial(256) Zero OD
7.35% 3.81% 3.66% 0.0%
(c) Area Overhead of OD state as a percentage of on-die cache area. Total
global AcT state adds 4.36% area overhead to on-die caches.
Figure 46: Accuracy versus cost trade-offs for practical schemes having Near-Total AcT
state and varying amounts of OD state. For each benchmark, the four bars (left to right
labeled 1 through 4) represent Total OD state, Partial OD state with 1k, 256 entries and
Zero OD state.
OD state with two different configurations where the local pool maintains has 1024(1k) or
256 entries and finally Zero OD state (where false and true sharing are declared at the time
of coherence miss).
Total OD state achieves the highest accuracy. However, Partial OD states exhibit
slightly different behavior than Partial AcT states. From the figures, it should be noted
that Partial OD states predominantly suffer from one type of inaccuracy with respect to
I-FSD: inability to classify coherence misses when the local pool has too few entries. Our
attribution experiments show that cache blocks that frequently suffer coherence misses are
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still accurately captured by Partial OD state configurations, even those with reduced num-
ber of entries. Finally, Zero OD with Near-Total AcT state incurs inaccuracy in the range of
7.5%(ocean) to 45%(radiosity). Early classification of coherence misses results in missing
true sharing accesses that occur after the time of coherence miss (Section 2.4.1). Hence
this scheme yields little value (accuracy) for the amount of global state maintained for each
word. In contrast, at the opposite end of the design space, (Total OD state, Zero AcT state)
yields higher accuracy at lower cost than this scheme (Section 5.3.6). This indicates that
Zero OD schemes only make sense for extremely low cost designs i.e, only for combina-
tions with Zero AcT.
Figure 46(c) shows the area cost incurred by practical schemes with different OD states
as a percentage of total on-die cache area. Maintaining partial OD state for 1k entries
incurs about 3.8% area overhead to on-die caches and for 256 entries, it costs about 3.66%
additional cache area. For the Zero OD state, the area overhead of 4.36% is needed to keep
global AcT state.
Overall, from the above experiments, accuracy drops marginally when moving from
Total OD state to Partial OD states while we lose accuracy sharply when moving from
Partial OD states to Zero OD states. Because the associated area overheads are similar for
Zero OD and Partial OD, configurations with partial OD are preferable over Total OD ones
(nearly similar accuracy for less cost).
Partial OD states sample a subset of coherence misses and classify them because of
limited history information maintained by them. Effectively, these design points perform
sampling and determine true and false sharing. We conduct experiments to study the cor-
relation between the number of false sharing misses reported in both the Total OD and
the corresponding Partial OD state for the static instructions that are chosen as samples by
the Partial OD schemes. Figure 47 shows the results of our experiments. We see that all
benchmarks except fmm show high correlation (>0.99) even for 256 entries. This shows














































































Figure 47: Correlation coefficient between number of false sharing misses suffered by
static instructions in Partial OD, Zero OD schemes against Total OD. Samples of static
instructions are chosen by Partial OD schemes.
instructions causing coherence misses, we still get a very good accuracy for those samples
from Partial OD states. Zero OD shows poor correlation against Total OD with correlation
coefficient as low as 0.52 in barnes benchmark.
Even though, the preceding discussion appears to categorize the two phases of coher-
ence miss classification namely Access Tracking and Overlap Detection into discrete design
points, in reality, we get a continuous spectrum of design points along both the two axes.
Partial State along both directions provides a continuum between maintaining zero state
and full state. There are a wide range of possibilities in this design space. The configura-
tion that is most appropriate for a user is to identify the region in the partial state that helps
capture the entire picture for the programmer that would otherwise be obtained through
maintaining total global and local states.
Figures 48(a) and 48(b) show the accuracy results for a range of FSD schemes that
are relatively low cost and can be supported in real hardware. For each benchmark, we
show three different schemes (from left to right) – i) (Partial(1k) OD, Partial (16k) AcT),
ii) (Partial(256) OD, Partial(4k) AcT) and iii) (Zero OD, Zero AcT).
From prior experiments, we have seen that partial states offer reasonable accuracy while
achieving lower costs. We pick partial AcT states that preserve relatively high accuracy



























































































































Partial(1k) OD Partial(256) OD Zero OD
Partial(16k) AcT Partial(4k) AcT Zero AcT
5.61% 5.45% 0.0%
(c) Area Overhead of OD and AcT states as a percentage of on-die cache area.
Figure 48: Accuracy versus cost tradeoffs for certain low-cost practical FSD schemes. For
each benchmark, the three bars (left to right labeled 1 through 3) represent (Partial (1k) OD,
Partial (16k) AcT), (Partial(256) OD, Partial(4k) AcT) and (Zero OD, Zero AcT) points in
the design space.
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OD state that has 1k and 256 entries in the local pool respectively. Our experiments show
that this combination has similar accuracy to the Partial AcT states with 16k and 4k entries
respectively in combination with Total OD. Benchmarks such as fmm, ocean and water-n2,
which suffer additional inaccuracy from reduced number of OD entries. Finally the (Zero
OD, Zero AcT) design point is the least accurate but is almost free in terms of cost. We
find that this scheme has a highest misclassification percentage in many benchmarks with a
maximum upto 65%(radiosity). This design point was used in Coherence Decoupling [33]
to perform value speculation and hide cache miss latency due to false sharing. Although
this design point is sufficient for speculation (where there are recovery mechanisms), it
might produce misleading results for the programmer during performance debugging.
Figure 48(c) shows the area cost incurred by FSD schemes as a percentage of total on-
die cache area. Partial schemes incur relatively modest area overheads of about 5.5% , a
major portion (about 70%) of which is incurred by maintaining local pools for every private
cache in our 64-core configuration. The (Zero OD, Zero AcT) scheme can be implemented
with minimum hardware modification such as changing the cache controller to perform
data comparison on a coherence miss. Hence, this scheme has near-zero cost. Overall,











































































(Partial (1k) OD, Partial (16k) AcT)
(Partial (256) OD, Partial (4k) OD)
(Zero OD, Zero AcT)
Figure 49: Correlation coefficient between number of false sharing misses suffered by
static instructions in various schemes against (Total OD, Near-Total AcT). Samples of static
instructions are chosen by Partial state schemes.
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Schemes with partial OD and AcT state sample a subset of coherence misses and clas-
sify them because of limited history maintained both globally and locally. Effectively,
these design points perform sampling and determine true and false sharing. We conduct
experiments to study the correlation between the number of false sharing misses reported
in both the (Total OD, Near-Total AcT) and the corresponding Partial state scheme for the
static instructions that are chosen as samples by the Partial state schemes. Figure 49 shows
the results of our experiments. We see that all benchmarks except barnes and fmm show
high correlation (>0.99) even for 256 entries. This shows that even though the Partial state
schemes perform classification only on a subset of static instructions causing coherence
misses, we still get a very good accuracy for those samples from Partial states. (Zero OD,
Zero AcT) shows poor correlation against (Total OD, Near-Total AcT) with correlation
coefficient as low as 0.468 in barnes and 0.51 in facesim benchmarks.
5.4 Comprehensive classification
In this section, we perform comprehensive classification of cache misses using ideal and
practical schemes described in Section 5.2 and 5.3. We use I-CMD and I-FSD schemes
to show how ideal off-line schemes would classify cache misses and compare them against
practical schemes with reasonable cost-accuracy trade-offs. We use practical CMD with 4
generations for classifying replacement misses and (Zero AcT, Total OD) for classifying
coherence misses.
We perform experiments to study the cache miss classification both in 32 KB, 4-way
private L1 caches (results shown in Figure 50(a)) and 512 KB, 16-way private L2 caches
(results shown in Figure 50(b)). Each benchmark has two bars, the first bar shows the
cache miss breakdown according to ideal offline schemes and the second bar shows the
breakdown of cache misses in the practical schemes. In L1 caches, coherence misses form
a negligible (<1%) fraction of the overall cache misses. Among the replacement misses,































































































































































(b) private L2 cache
Figure 50: Cache miss classification for smaller (32 KB) L1 and larger (256 KB) L2
caches.
misses (See Section 5.2.2). In L2 caches, coherence misses form a significant portion in
certain benchmarks like barnes (8%), ocean (52%) and fluidanimate (25%). Conflict misses
represent less than 10% of overall cache misses except in a few benchmarks like radiosity,
blackscholes, bodytrack, fluidanimate and swaptions. This phenomenon is largely because
of increased associativity in L2 compared to L1 caches [29]. Finally, cold misses represent
negligible (<0.1%) of cache misses in both L1 and L2 caches.
Figure 51 shows the effect of different types of cache misses on pipeline stalls. When a
load or store instruction occupies the head of Re-Order Buffer (ROB) and is unable to retire
because of a cache miss, we attribute the pipeline stall to that cache miss. Our experiments
show that capacity misses incur the highest average with 8.5 stall cycles per miss and true
sharing misses have the least average with 7.14 cycles per miss. However, we note that all
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Figure 51: Average per-miss pipeline stall cycles incurred by different types of cache
misses.
intuition that the symptoms of cache misses are often similar, whereas the fixes needed to
address them can be very different, and often, depend on the type of the cache miss.
5.5 Related Work
The classification of uniprocessor cache misses into compulsory (cold), capacity, and con-
flict was first defined by Hill [30], and the stack algorithm for simulating a fully-associative
cache is first described by Mattson et al. [44]. True and false sharing misses have been de-
fined by Torrellas et al. [71], Eggers et al. [24], and Dubois et al. [23]. Each of them also
describe an off-line classification algorithm. In contrast to these schemes and definitions,
the mechanisms we describe are designed to be implemented in real hardware for integra-
tion with existing on-line performance debugging infrastructures.
Coherence Decoupling [33] speculatively reads data values from invalid cache lines
to hide the latency of a cache miss caused by false sharing. It then uses the incoming
(coherent) data values to verify successful value speculation. If the values differ, recovery
action is triggered. The primary aim of this work was to hide latency of load instructions
that read unchanged values. One of our design points (Zero OD, Zero AcT) in Figure 42 to
classify coherence misses is similar to this implementation.
Numerous research proposals have been made for improving the performance counter
infrastructure [59], attribution of performance-related events to particular instructions [19],
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and for sampling and processing of profiling data [2, 46, 47, 84]. Our cache miss classifi-
cation mechanisms are synergistic with improvements in performance counters, sampling,
and profiling infrastructure. Our mechanisms provide on-line identification of specific
types of cache misses, and this identification can be used to drive performance counters, at-
tributed to particular instructions, and processed further to gain more insight into program
behavior and performance. The better the profiling infrastructure, the more beneficial the
results of our classification are to the programmer. Conversely, our scheme enhances the
value of a profiling infrastructure by providing additional event types that can be profiled.
Our CMD scheme relies on an approximation of the LRU stack algorithm. A similar
generational approach has been used by Kim et al. [38] to perform efficient cache simu-
lations and, more recently, by Zhou et al. [80] to dynamically track working set sizes in
order to help allocate pages of physical memory. Our generational scheme is designed for
conflict miss detection in caches, so its state is updated and looked up much more often that
the working set mechanism in [80]. Because of this consideration, we use Bloom filters and
in-cache generation numbers to track members of each generation, rather than hardware-
maintained link-lists. We believe that our Bloom-filter based approach could be used to
simplify and speed up the implementation of Zhou et al.’s working set scheme.
Collins et al. [13] propose a hardware scheme, the CMT, that identifies conflict misses
by storing the tag of the last evicted block from each set. On a cache miss, if the miss
is to the most recent victim for the corresponding set, the miss is classified as a conflict
miss. We expect this scheme to be less accurate than ours for at least two reasons. First,
since the CMT only remembers the last evicted block from a set, when a large number
of lines compete for a set, many of these misses will be incorrectly identified as capacity
misses. Also, since the CMT does not track recency information across different sets, in-
frequently accessed sets may suffer capacity misses that are classified as conflict misses. It
should be noted that the CMT is primarily directed towards helping prefetchers and victim
caches, where performance improvement can be achieved with moderately accurate miss
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classification. In contrast, our CMD scheme provides cache miss classification to drive
performance counters and hardware-assisted profiling, where misclassification of capacity
misses as conflict misses can mislead the programmer into fruitless data-padding optimiza-
tions.
5.6 Summary
Performance debugging of parallel applications is extremely challenging, but achieving
good parallel performance is critical to justify the additional expense of parallel architec-
tures. One particularly challenging performance debugging problem is determining the
causes and sources of cache misses. This is especially true for parallel applications since
they potentially suffer misses from sources not present for uniprocessor applications (e.g.,
false sharing and destructive sharing).
We propose schemes to perform on-the-fly classification of cache misses in hardware.
Our scheme includes two primary mechanisms: a Conflict Miss Detector (CMD) that clas-
sifies replacement misses into capacity and conflict misses, and a False Sharing Detector
(FSD) that classifies coherence misses into false and true sharing misses. We evaluate our
scheme on SPLASH-2 and Parsec-1.0 benchmarks and find that it is provides a similar pic-
ture of cache miss-related performance problems to previously proposed off-line schemes.
Combined with existing performance counter mechanisms or with more advanced profiling
mechanisms, our scheme also pinpoints the code responsible for each type of cache misses
in the application. Our work is inline with the thesis statement that low-cost and efficient




A successful software product should ensure both correctness and performance in order to
satisfy end-users. Often times, programmers address correctness at the cost of degrading
the program performance or break program correctness while trying to improve perfor-
mance. Hence, ensuring both of these aspects successfully in a program is a great challenge
facing software developers.
In this dissertation, we describe three innovative hardware solutions that are aimed
at improving certain correctness and performance problems, namely, memory debugging,
taint propagation and detection/classification of cache misses. Memory bugs are a frequent
cause of program crashes and even security threats. MemTracker provides low-cost, effi-
cient and programmable hardware support for memory access monitoring and debugging.
Tainting is a popular dynamic information flow tracking mechanism frequently used in
detecting malicious uses of values derived from “ unsafe” inputs. FlexiTaint is our pro-
grammable hardware accelerator solution for dynamic taint propagation. With the growing
popularity of multi-core machines, performance is becoming increasingly important and
cache misses are notoriously known for being common performance bottlenecks. Cache-
Doc is a comprehensive cache miss classification tool implemented in hardware. It classi-
fies replacement misses into capacity and conflict misses, and coherence misses into false
and true sharing misses.
We adopt two common goals for all of our proposed solutions: i) Low cost, and ii)
efficiency. Both of these goals are targeted at improving productivity of programmers and
reducing software development costs. We also incorporate programmability as a key design
choice in order to improve flexibility of hardware to implement checkers of users’ choice
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and also, to adapt to changing needs of programmers as new type of bugs are discovered.
Experiments show that our proposed tools incur low performance impact which enables
their usage in live (production) runs. This is achieved by making minimal changes to the
performance-critical parts of the processor pipeline. Implementation cost is kept low (in
fact, negligible for some of our implementations for cache miss classification) by mini-
mizing the amount of changes that are made to already existing processor hardware. We
consider this dissertation as a step that would take us closer toward enhancing program-
mer’s experience with low cost hardware designs.
Over the past years, innovations in process technology and architecture have paved the
way to a host of high performance machines in the market. Better performance debugging
tools are needed to effectively harness the potential unleashed by such powerful machines.
Even our correctness debugging mechanisms are designed to take multi-core processors
into consideration. While architects invest time and resources into designing high end ar-
chitectures, we believe that it is equally important to incorporate useful debugging features
into these processors in order to enhance the ease of use for programmers.
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APPENDIX A
ATTRIBUTION OF CACHE MISSES
This appendix presents attribution results from experiments described in Chapter 5. To
facilitate performance debugging efforts, it is important for programmers to know which set
of static instructions (and from there, lines of source code in the program) suffer different
types of cache misses. We measure the number of cache misses that are suffered by each
static instruction. This helps capture the instructions that are involved in a large number of
cache misses and software developers can then decide which code needs to be changed and
what changes are needed.
Attribution results are shown for four different schemes, two for replacement miss
classification and two for coherence miss classification. For classification of replacement
misses (Tables 8–11), we show the top ten static instructions that suffer capacity and con-
flict misses in the off-line LRU stack and in the generational scheme with four generations
for a 32 KB, 4-way private L1 cache. For coherence miss classification (Tables 12–15), we
show top ten static instructions that suffer true and false sharing misses in the ideal I-FSD
and in the (Partial(1k) OD, Partial(16k) AcT) configuration from Figure 42 for a 512 KB,
16-way private L2 cache. For each benchmark, we show the Program Counters (PCs) in
the program that suffer the most misses and the percentage of replacement or coherence
misses suffered by that PC.
Our results show that both the LRU stack and the generational scheme present identical
results except for a few cases. In the barnes benchmark (Table 8), we observe that the static
instruction at program counter 40677c suffers a higher percentage of conflict misses than
capacity misses according to the off-line I-CMD classification. However, our generational
scheme reports a higher percentage of capacity misses than conflict misses on the same
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instruction. On further investigation, we find that about 8% of replacement misses suffered
by this static instruction occur in the bottom 25% of LRU stack (also referred to as ”near-
capacity” misses). These misses are misclassifed by our generational scheme due to loss
of history when information about entire generation is erased. Another observation seen
in many benchmarks is the minor shuffle in ranking of static instructions. In all these
cases, we find that these static instructions are responsible for a similar (<1% difference)
percentage of misses, so the programmer would still get the big picture (similar number of
misses) even though the rank order is different.
For coherence miss classification, we find that the I-FSD and the (Partial(1k) OD, Par-
tial(16k) AcT) show identical order for top five offending instructions except in a very few
benchmarks. In cases where there is slight difference in ordering, we find that the corre-
sponding instructions contribute <2% of all coherence misses. Overall, we find that partial
state schemes capture very good accuracy and the ordering of offending instructions for all
cases that contribute significantly (>2%) to coherence misses.
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Table 8: Attribution of Replacement Misses. Capacity and conflict misses are shown as
percentage of replacement misses.
LRU Stack Generational CMD
Capacity Misses Conflict Misses Capacity Misses Conflict Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
barnes
40677c 13.52 40677c 22.38 40677c 21.69 40677c 14.74
4065dc 7.47 4067b8 11.65 4067b8 11.19 4067b8 11.43
4067b8 6.51 406698 6.20 406698 6.35 406698 5.84
406698 6.35 4068f0 5.15 4068f0 4.93 4068f0 5.10
4065ec 2.96 406660 1.10 4065dc 1.47 406660 1.12
4068f0 2.92 406814 0.92 406660 1.15 406814 0.95
4067dc 1.88 4067dc 0.88 4067dc 0.98 4067dc 0.90
403e84 1.86 4065dc 0.78 406814 0.92 4065dc 0.79
403eec 1.78 4065ec 0.44 4065ec 0.70 418da0 0.73
406824 1.76 418da0 0.25 406824 0.32 418db8 0.61
cholesk
40bd34 21.55 40ae68 11.77 40bd34 20.91 40ae68 9.62
40ae68 6.02 402ff4 8.15 40ae68 6.44 402ff4 5.73
406270 3.60 402fe8 5.45 402ff4 3.78 405d9c 4.01
402ff4 3.39 402ef4 3.27 406270 3.49 402ef4 3.46
405d9c 3.37 405d9c 2.76 405d9c 3.28 402fe8 3.28
402fe8 2.53 40ae58 2.06 402fe8 2.83 41ff20 2.30
40a7fc 2.34 40aec0 1.63 40a7fc 2.28 40ae58 1.69
40b5a0 2.24 41ff20 1.57 40b5a0 2.18 403068 1.55
40a7e8 2.00 40e848 1.43 40a7e8 1.96 40aec0 1.49
40a218 1.72 4028a0 1.39 40a218 1.67 41ff38 1.38
fft
40084c 5.54 4138f0 6.63 40084c 5.54 4138f0 6.75
400738 5.54 413908 5.91 400738 5.54 413908 6.00
400854 5.51 413904 4.07 400854 5.50 413904 4.16
400740 5.50 40bde0 3.35 400740 5.49 40bde0 3.42
4028ec 3.76 401154 1.33 4028ec 3.75 401154 0.55
402bc0 3.75 4011f8 0.54 402bc0 3.75 4011f8 0.55
4014d8 3.74 401150 0.41 4014d8 3.74 40d4a8 0.42
413908 1.88 40d4a8 0.41 413908 1.90 410134 0.19
4011f8 1.80 410134 0.20 4011f8 1.80 435854 0.18
4138f0 1.52 435854 0.19 4138f0 1.53 410138 0.17
fmm
40c688 16.98 40c688 12.89 40c688 17.73 40c688 10.02
40b328 9.70 40c744 9.08 40b328 9.92 40c744 9.96
40b330 4.73 40b328 6.33 40b330 4.87 40b328 4.71
40c744 2.40 40c7e0 3.92 40c744 3.47 420920 4.21
40b32c 2.34 420920 3.42 40b32c 2.39 40c7e0 4.20
40be1c 2.25 40b330 3.29 420938 1.95 420938 2.59
40b868 2.24 420938 2.12 40be1c 1.91 40b330 2.51
40b8e8 2.22 40c784 1.97 40b868 1.83 40c784 2.34
40b754 2.18 40b32c 1.76 40b8e8 1.82 402ef0 2.03
40c320 2.13 402ef0 1.51 40b754 1.81 402f88 1.87
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Table 9: Attribution of Replacement Misses. Capacity and conflict misses are shown as
percentage of replacement misses.
LRU Stack Generational CMD
Capacity Misses Conflict Misses Capacity Misses Conflict Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
lu
401784 15.30 40ef10 13.49 401784 14.78 40ef10 14.06
401764 9.14 40ef28 11.61 401764 8.55 40ef28 10.81
401780 9.01 40ef24 6.09 401780 8.35 40ef24 6.32
40ef28 3.29 407400 5.73 40ef28 4.45 407400 5.64
400ea8 2.70 401764 2.93 400ea8 2.48 401764 3.06
401008 2.65 401784 2.40 401008 2.44 401780 1.79
40ef10 1.75 401780 1.69 40ef10 2.34 401784 1.57
407400 0.93 40b728 0.28 407400 1.37 40b728 0.30
401b0c 0.60 40eb9c 0.19 40ef24 0.82 4073f0 0.18
40ef24 0.52 4073f0 0.19 401b0c 0.63 407c3c 0.18
ocean
404d3c 9.72 426488 20.54 426488 12.27 426470 20.46
404cfc 7.87 426470 19.99 426470 7.88 426488 19.93
426488 5.28 41e960 6.85 404d3c 6.44 41e960 7.25
405b7c 4.61 405d44 0.41 404cfc 5.19 4264f0 0.34
405c48 4.60 405000 0.33 405b7c 3.33 426074 0.29
405d44 3.64 405b7c 0.32 405c48 3.28 405d44 0.26
405000 3.44 4264f0 0.32 41e960 3.04 422cb8 0.25
405b74 3.39 405c48 0.28 405d44 2.77 405000 0.23
405d3c 3.16 405b74 0.27 405000 2.53 41e950 0.23
405d34 3.11 426074 0.26 405b74 2.49 426424 0.22
radiosity
40af68 20.08 430d1c 17.11 40af68 19.80 430d1c 17.19
407598 5.37 430cf4 12.16 407598 5.33 430cf4 11.95
430cf4 4.85 42a068 2.57 430cf4 5.14 42a068 2.41
40960c 3.35 41991c 2.29 40960c 3.30 41991c 2.10
41777c 2.74 41b504 1.57 41777c 2.70 41b504 1.60
407660 2.50 41b770 1.34 407660 2.49 41b770 1.36
42c4d8 2.34 41ce8c 1.11 42c4d8 2.33 41ce8c 1.10
418120 1.71 42c4d8 1.08 418120 1.69 42c4d8 1.06
419a4c 1.65 40ad24 0.92 419a4c 1.65 40ad24 0.93
407668 1.22 41cedc 0.91 430d1c 1.43 41cedc 0.91
radix
4019a4 17.21 4019a4 10.57 4019a4 17.53 4019a4 9.79
401970 4.09 40ab40 5.77 401970 4.23 40ab40 5.68
40159c 4.00 401970 3.54 40159c 3.96 401970 3.36
400d10 3.20 40ab58 2.60 4010d8 3.12 401470 1.87
4010d8 3.12 403030 2.09 400d10 3.06 40ab58 1.86
40ab58 2.39 401470 1.88 40ab58 2.77 403030 1.27
401204 1.60 401854 1.46 401204 1.53 401854 0.95
401068 1.59 4012c8 0.91 401068 1.53 401990 0.83
401514 1.56 401990 0.88 401514 1.50 4012c8 0.81
401214 1.52 4012d0 0.55 403030 1.46 4012d0 0.50
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Table 10: Attribution of Replacement Misses.Capacity and conflict misses are shown as
percentage of replacement misses.
LRU Stack Generational CMD
Capacity Misses Conflict Misses Capacity Misses Conflict Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
raytrace
405504 7.91 42d178 23.03 405504 6.90 42d178 23.44
4056c8 6.98 42d160 21.76 42d178 6.59 42d160 22.28
402b0c 6.21 40abf8 0.85 4056c8 6.11 42d174 0.57
40abf8 5.52 40bc10 0.64 42d160 5.57 40abf8 0.53
40550c 3.98 402b0c 0.59 402b0c 5.51 40bc10 0.44
405518 3.97 4056c8 0.50 40abf8 5.04 402b0c 0.38
402ba8 3.88 405504 0.48 40550c 3.46 4056c8 0.32
40a92c 3.61 42d174 0.47 405518 3.45 40a92c 0.32
402b74 3.60 40a92c 0.44 402ba8 3.45 402ba8 0.30
4056d0 3.52 402ba8 0.43 40a92c 3.23 42805c 0.29
water-sp
402ad4 7.36 4200c0 9.45 402ad4 7.31 4200c0 9.60
402ab4 6.34 4200d8 6.60 402ab4 6.26 4200d8 6.68
4039dc 4.74 413c38 5.06 4039dc 4.67 413c38 4.75
4200d8 4.67 413c34 4.21 4200d8 4.63 413c34 3.98
413c38 4.03 4185b0 3.68 413c38 4.31 4185b0 3.73
413c34 2.78 402ad4 3.32 413c34 2.99 402ad4 3.31
40362c 2.66 4200d4 1.61 40362c 2.63 4200d4 1.63
4200c0 2.04 402ae8 0.85 4200c0 2.02 402ae8 0.85
40708c 1.92 402af4 0.75 40708c 1.89 402ab4 0.76
4185b0 1.40 402ab4 0.75 4185b0 1.39 402af4 0.75
water-n2
401a44 15.19 420010 12.40 401a44 15.11 420010 13.13
401a24 7.03 420028 7.15 401a24 6.98 420028 7.53
40318c 6.95 418500 4.41 40318c 6.91 418500 4.66
402fd0 5.71 401a44 3.27 402fd0 5.68 401a44 3.22
413b88 3.01 413b88 3.21 413b88 3.17 413b88 1.92
402fc4 2.94 413b84 2.38 402fc4 2.92 413b84 1.46
4376b4 2.32 402ae0 0.32 413b84 2.39 419bc8 0.33
413b84 2.28 419bc8 0.31 4376b4 2.31 401a24 0.30
406348 1.58 402a88 0.30 406348 1.57 402ae0 0.28
420028 0.96 401a24 0.29 420028 0.95 402a88 0.26
blkscholes
402608 16.18 40cdb0 14.88 402608 15.98 40cdb0 14.83
400840 6.34 40cdc8 14.24 400840 6.26 40cdc8 13.70
400740 6.23 40cdc4 6.15 400740 6.16 40cdc4 6.31
40077c 5.76 4052a0 3.66 40077c 5.69 4052a0 3.79
407cac 3.09 4035ac 1.27 40cdc8 3.26 4035ac 0.97
40cdc8 2.80 407cac 0.59 407cac 3.08 407cac 0.56
40069c 1.92 40ca60 0.31 40069c 1.90 40ca60 0.29
400694 1.88 40c9b4 0.26 400694 1.86 40c9b4 0.26
4008a4 1.75 40ce3c 0.21 4008a4 1.73 400840 0.22
400ac0 1.37 400840 0.21 40cdb0 1.44 40ce3c 0.22
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Table 11: Attribution of Replacement Misses. Capacity and conflict misses are shown as
percentage of replacement misses.
LRU Stack Generational CMD
Capacity Misses Conflict Misses Capacity Misses Conflict Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
bodytrack
400b20 9.55 400b64 5.48 400b20 9.42 400b64 5.86
42f104 8.71 41b8a8 5.41 42f104 8.57 41b8a4 5.74
400b64 5.73 41b8a4 5.37 400b64 5.64 4037cc 5.16
400688 5.39 4037cc 5.34 400688 5.29 41b8a8 4.77
400820 4.36 41b890 4.43 400820 4.28 400b20 4.14
41b8a8 3.39 400b20 4.02 41b8a8 3.65 41b890 4.14
402318 2.69 4037ac 3.73 41b890 2.79 4037ac 3.64
41b890 2.65 4010ec 3.60 4037ac 2.71 4010ec 3.45
4037ac 2.64 413d80 2.51 402318 2.67 413d80 2.10
40242c 2.11 4004d4 1.53 40242c 2.25 4004d4 1.66
facesim
401a34 22.55 40c190 14.21 401a34 22.21 40c190 14.36
401538 12.17 40c1a8 14.19 401538 12.03 40c1a8 14.28
40708c 2.45 40c1a4 6.38 40708c 2.50 40c1a4 6.46
401418 2.32 404680 2.59 401418 2.40 404680 2.54
40c1a8 1.54 401418 1.19 40c1a8 1.73 401418 1.00
4013c8 1.30 40708c 1.00 4013c8 1.33 40708c 0.87
40c190 0.97 4013c8 0.92 40c190 1.15 4013c8 0.85
406cc0 0.96 401538 0.38 406cc0 0.94 401538 0.31
40be40 0.70 40298c 0.34 40be40 0.72 40be40 0.29
40153c 0.61 40be40 0.34 40153c 0.61 40c21c 0.27
fluidnanim
404390 5.76 40fac8 17.65 40fac8 6.23 40fac8 17.03
404414 5.74 40fab0 16.29 404390 5.48 40fab0 16.18
40452c 5.72 40fac4 6.79 404414 5.45 40fac4 7.31
404420 5.16 404680 2.49 40452c 5.44 404680 2.65
404648 4.97 4062ac 2.36 404420 4.91 4062ac 1.55
40fac8 4.77 407fa0 0.85 404648 4.75 407fa0 0.87
40446c 4.52 40a9ac 0.58 40fab0 4.40 404648 0.61
4043b0 4.52 404648 0.55 40446c 4.29 40fb3c 0.61
404470 4.52 40fb3c 0.50 404470 4.29 40f6b4 0.54
404680 3.84 40f6b4 0.42 4043b0 4.29 40a9ac 0.50
swaptions
400e52 21.01 400c24 13.56 400e52 21.01 400c24 13.42
400c24 21.01 400e52 13.35 400c24 21.01 400e52 13.27
400c3c 1.52 409170 8.32 400024 1.52 409170 8.49
400024 1.51 400d28 1.23 400c3c 1.52 400b4c 1.21
400c30 1.40 400b4c 1.22 400c30 1.40 400d28 1.21
403800 1.39 400bac 0.91 400082 1.39 400bac 0.90
409188 0.72 400d88 0.90 409188 0.72 400d88 0.88
4008a8 0.67 409188 0.59 4008a8 0.67 409188 0.61
401660 0.32 400b70 0.56 401660 0.32 400b70 0.52
409170 0.18 400d44 0.54 409170 0.18 400d44 0.49
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Table 12: Attribution of Coherence Misses. True and False Sharing misses are shown as
percentage of coherence misses.
I-FSD (Partial(1k) OD, Partial(16k) AcT)
TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
Barnes
4141cc 9.65 413c9c 11.96 4141cc 9.50 413c9c 12.22
418b34 4.51 4141cc 1.90 418b34 4.44 4141cc 1.94
418a50 3.06 4065ec 1.31 4065dc 3.07 408464 1.28
4065dc 3.00 408464 1.26 418a50 3.02 4065ec 1.27
406698 2.63 406698 1.14 406698 3.01 4065dc 0.74
418d10 2.45 4065dc 0.95 418d10 2.63 408708 0.67
418d20 1.48 408708 0.66 418d20 1.46 40848c 0.55
4065ec 1.19 40848c 0.55 4065ec 1.18 406698 0.52
413c9c 1.12 418d10 0.33 413c9c 1.10 408634 0.28
418a2c 0.97 408634 0.28 418a2c 0.96 418b34 0.23
cholesky
41fbd0 7.33 40c2fc 29.97 41fbd0 4.88 40c2fc 30.48
40c2f0 2.64 41ae1c 19.15 40c2d4 3.55 41ae1c 19.32
40c530 2.16 40bdfc 8.34 40c2f0 1.82 40bdfc 8.52
40c2d4 1.99 40c29c 5.01 40c530 1.44 40c29c 5.11
41fea0 1.73 40c2e4 3.87 41fea0 1.15 40c2e4 3.95
41ae1c 1.31 40c2d4 3.50 41ae1c 1.03 40aa7c 2.69
40c2fc 1.08 40aa7c 2.66 40c2fc 0.81 41b34c 2.14
40c494 0.93 41b34c 2.11 40c494 0.62 40bc24 0.39
40aa7c 0.66 40bc24 0.39 40aa7c 0.46 40adf0 0.34
40c39c 0.65 40c2f0 0.36 40c39c 0.43 40c39c 0.33
fft
40ed1c 19.96 40d1a8 33.93 40ed1c 19.92 40d1a8 35.19
40e7ec 15.61 40e7ec 9.52 40e7ec 15.58 40e7ec 9.88
4135a0 9.19 40be50 1.79 4135a0 9.17 40fc80 0.62
413224 1.88 40bd78 1.19 413224 1.87 40beb0 0.62
42a87c 0.79 40fc80 0.60 42a87c 0.79 40d498 0.62
413684 0.59 40beb0 0.60 413684 0.59 41309c 0.62
41320c 0.49 40d498 0.60 40be50 0.59 40cd20 0.62
41321c 0.49 41309c 0.60 41320c 0.49 413908 0.62
42a60c 0.49 40cd20 0.60 41321c 0.49 4109a4 0.62
40c618 0.49 413908 0.60 42a60c 0.49 40bdc8 0.62
fmm
4205d0 10.55 41b81c 14.34 4205d0 10.84 41b81c 14.67
41bd4c 10.04 40c5d4 7.38 41bd4c 10.30 40c5d4 7.41
4206b4 6.27 41bd4c 3.29 4206b4 6.44 41bd4c 3.37
4205ac 3.17 40c93c 2.93 4205ac 3.25 40c93c 3.00
4208a0 3.03 4206c0 1.48 4208a0 3.11 4206c0 1.43
409c7c 2.56 418e84 1.26 409c7c 2.62 418ecc 1.01
40c064 2.54 418ecc 1.10 4206c8 1.96 41a1d8 0.88
4206c8 1.91 41a1d8 0.86 420524 1.62 418ee0 0.72
420524 1.58 418ee0 0.78 40c014 1.38 40ba7c 0.72
40c5d4 1.43 40ba7c 0.70 42059c 1.37 40bdd0 0.52
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Table 13: Attribution of Coherence Misses. True and False Sharing misses are shown as
percentage of coherence misses.
I-FSD (Partial(1k) OD, Partial(16k) AcT)
TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses
TrueSh Misses FalseSh Misses TrueSh Misses FalseSh Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
lu
40ebc0 18.25 40ecb0 21.30 40ebc0 17.82 40ecb0 22.32
40a33c 11.38 409e0c 9.71 40a33c 11.11 409e0c 10.34
40ecb0 5.54 407470 2.45 40ecb0 5.56 402194 0.80
40e83c 3.20 402194 0.75 40e83c 3.12 4087c8 0.79
40eb14 1.30 4087c8 0.74 407470 1.52 40ef28 0.63
40eca4 1.23 40ef28 0.59 40eb14 1.26 4074bc 0.41
40eb9c 0.95 4074bc 0.38 40eca4 1.20 40a33c 0.27
409e0c 0.76 407398 0.37 40eb9c 0.92 4074d0 0.25
40ee90 0.61 4074d0 0.25 409e0c 0.74 409268 0.10
407c38 0.47 40a33c 0.25 40ee90 0.60 40ebc0 0.04
ocean
426120 6.49 42136c 9.94 426120 6.51 42136c 11.87
42189c 6.32 406ca4 9.80 42189c 6.33 406ca4 9.87
4073b4 6.19 406c48 5.55 4073b4 6.14 406c48 5.85
407600 5.85 41e9d0 3.70 407600 5.81 4075f4 1.45
40727c 5.24 41e8f8 2.98 40727c 5.19 407340 1.06
407350 4.60 4075f4 1.24 407350 4.56 42189c 0.98
407598 3.94 407340 0.91 407598 3.92 407268 0.97
4074c4 3.11 41ea34 0.88 4074c4 3.10 426488 0.88
426204 2.97 42189c 0.82 406ca4 2.99 4074ac 0.68
406ca4 2.81 407268 0.81 426204 2.98 407588 0.42
radiosity
418c04 10.85 42c4d8 11.34 418c04 10.95 42c4d8 11.52
41991c 6.89 4190f8 10.15 41991c 6.86 4190f8 9.95
40ac78 4.59 40a024 7.51 40ac78 4.57 40a024 7.50
4309b0 4.00 41e634 1.41 4309b0 3.99 41e634 1.40
42c4d8 2.87 41913c 1.29 42c4d8 2.85 41913c 1.18
418a1c 2.75 40ae40 0.85 418a1c 2.78 40ae40 0.86
430a84 1.74 41991c 0.76 430a84 1.74 41991c 0.77
430c44 1.31 42c944 0.68 430c44 1.31 42c944 0.70
40ae34 1.23 418c04 0.63 40ae34 1.23 407598 0.55
42c944 1.20 407598 0.55 42c944 1.19 40aa98 0.51
radix
4019a4 42.95 405a3c 4.96 4019a4 47.92 405a3c 5.07
40a7f0 1.71 400ddc 2.26 40a7f0 5.32 400ddc 2.31
40a8d4 1.33 4019a4 2.14 40a8d4 4.16 4019a4 2.12
4099b4 0.23 403100 1.04 4099b4 0.71 403100 0.83
4010d8 0.15 40113c 0.63 4030a0 0.57 40113c 0.57
405378 0.14 4030a0 0.59 4010d8 0.49 4099b4 0.38
4030a0 0.14 4030ec 0.52 405378 0.43 4030ec 0.30
40a744 0.13 4099b4 0.37 40a744 0.41 405f6c 0.23
40a464 0.12 4011f8 0.30 403100 0.40 4011f8 0.19
40aac0 0.12 405f6c 0.22 40a464 0.39 403020 0.15
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Table 14: Attribution of Coherence Misses. True and False Sharing misses are shown as
percentage of coherence misses.
I-FSD (Partial(1k) OD, Partial(16k) AcT)
TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
raytrace
42858c 12.14 40ab8c 22.00 42858c 32.14 40ab8c 22.01
40ff6c 7.24 42805c 4.16 40ff6c 27.24 42805c 4.16
42d0d0 5.31 42858c 2.62 42d0d0 25.32 42858c 2.61
42cd64 3.52 40a894 1.97 42cd64 23.52 40a894 1.97
42ce10 3.08 40e794 0.59 42ce10 23.08 40e794 0.59
41057c 2.03 41145c 0.29 41057c 22.03 41145c 0.29
410100 1.90 411420 0.18 410100 21.90 411420 0.18
42d0e0 1.84 40c880 0.11 42d0e0 21.83 40c880 0.11
42cef4 1.33 426a18 0.10 42cef4 21.33 426a18 0.10
42d174 1.24 40d0bc 0.08 42d174 21.24 40d0bc 0.08
water-sp
41fd70 10.61 41afbc 6.56 41fd70 10.58 41afbc 6.77
41b4ec 6.36 41b4ec 4.39 41b4ec 6.34 41b4ec 4.53
402ad4 5.77 418620 1.64 402ad4 5.76 400f58 1.66
402ab4 4.49 400f58 1.61 402ab4 4.48 41fe60 1.50
41fe54 3.77 41fe60 1.52 41fe54 3.76 418500 1.15
4039dc 2.55 418500 1.11 4039dc 2.54 404de4 0.86
40362c 2.04 404de4 0.84 40362c 2.03 419978 0.73
41fcc4 1.30 419978 0.71 41fcc4 1.30 41866c 0.38
41fe68 1.02 41866c 0.37 418620 1.09 4200d8 0.26
41f9f4 0.95 418548 0.31 41fe68 1.03 418680 0.22
water-n2
41fcc0 15.20 41b43c 25.18 41fcc0 14.92 41b43c 25.82
41ff90 5.87 41af0c 5.04 41ff90 5.75 41af0c 5.16
41b43c 4.39 418570 1.04 41b43c 4.30 40e003 0.83
41ff78 2.50 40e003 0.81 41ff78 2.44 4198c8 0.75
41fda4 1.61 4198c8 0.73 41fda4 1.58 41a368 0.10
41fc14 1.44 418498 0.28 418570 1.56 4185bc 0.08
41af0c 0.82 41a368 0.10 41fc14 1.41 418450 0.08
41f92c 0.80 4185bc 0.08 41af0c 0.80 420028 0.08
418570 0.57 4185d0 0.08 41f92c 0.78 4185d0 0.07
41fdb8 0.51 418450 0.08 41fdb8 0.50 4184f0 0.02
blkscholes
4008ac 10.43 400668 6.97 4008ac 10.67 400668 6.30
400658 6.55 400658 4.46 4035ac 6.58 400658 4.12
4035ac 6.46 40075c 2.65 400658 6.03 40075c 2.69
40ca60 3.67 4009f8 1.96 40ca60 3.75 407cac 1.91
4035fc 2.23 407cac 1.81 4035fc 2.29 4009f8 1.90
400a58 2.09 40cb50 1.72 400a58 2.03 40cb50 1.80
4009f8 1.99 400aa0 1.44 4009f8 1.84 400aa0 1.29
40075c 1.90 40085c 1.27 40075c 1.81 40085c 1.19
4081dc 1.42 4081dc 0.95 4081dc 1.44 4081dc 1.00
403678 1.39 400598 0.88 403678 1.42 40171c 0.55
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Table 15: Attribution of Coherence Misses. True and False Sharing misses are shown as
percentage of coherence misses.
I-FSD (Partial(1k) OD, Partial(16k) AcT)
TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses TrueSharing Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
bodytrack
400be4 15.79 400b64 19.73 400be4 15.80 400b64 19.82
400b20 7.19 400b20 10.79 400b20 5.98 400b20 10.77
402318 4.41 400b88 5.23 402318 4.71 400b88 5.13
400b64 4.00 400be4 1.54 400b64 3.76 400be4 1.50
400b88 3.43 41b630 1.01 400b88 3.52 41b630 1.02
41b540 2.43 41678c 0.37 41b540 2.59 41678c 0.38
40242c 1.94 413df0 0.08 40242c 2.08 415148 0.06
42f104 1.09 415148 0.06 42f104 1.14 416cbc 0.05
41b810 0.68 416cbc 0.05 41b800 0.73 413e3c 0.04
41b800 0.67 413e3c 0.04 41b810 0.73 4024c8 0.02
facesim
40be40 7.31 40708c 17.41 40be40 8.66 40708c 17.62
40c110 4.14 4075bc 2.91 40c110 4.89 4075bc 2.94
401438 2.55 40bf30 2.10 401438 3.10 40bf30 2.12
40298c 2.42 401438 0.68 40298c 2.85 401438 0.62
401418 1.11 4046f0 0.43 401418 1.32 401418 0.38
40bf24 1.08 4014a4 0.41 40bf24 1.28 4014a4 0.37
40c0f8 1.06 401120 0.40 40c0f8 1.25 401120 0.24
4014a4 0.89 401418 0.38 40708c 0.87 401540 0.21
40708c 0.73 401540 0.23 4075bc 0.81 401100 0.18
4075bc 0.68 401100 0.19 4027f0 0.60 405a48 0.14
fluidnanim
4062ac 17.32 40a9ac 14.37 4062ac 17.31 40a9ac 14.84
4072a0 9.50 40f850 7.43 4072a0 9.50 40f850 7.63
40f760 8.00 40805c 3.22 40f760 8.01 40805c 3.32
4062fc 5.47 408010 2.06 4062fc 5.48 404510 1.35
406378 1.93 404510 1.33 406378 1.93 40461c 0.94
40f844 1.53 40461c 0.93 40f844 1.53 404668 0.91
40fa30 1.51 404668 0.89 40fa30 1.50 40aedc 0.82
4072c4 1.40 40aedc 0.79 4072c4 1.40 40634c 0.64
4063d4 0.78 40634c 0.62 4063d4 0.78 40f3e4 0.61
4063c8 0.78 40f3e4 0.59 4063c8 0.77 407250 0.58
swaptions
408e24 12.05 405094 6.27 408e22 11.92 405094 6.46
408a94 3.70 40406c 4.62 408a94 3.66 40406c 4.77
408d74 3.06 401734 0.88 408d74 3.02 408ed4 0.57
400cd4 2.27 408ed4 0.55 400cd4 2.25 402a28 0.42
400f64 2.25 402a28 0.41 400f64 2.22 40459c 0.11
408f04 1.88 40174c 0.39 408f04 1.86 4034c8 0.06
4090f0 0.89 4016d0 0.31 4090f0 0.88 409600 0.02
408914 0.77 40459c 0.11 401734 0.88 406224 0.02
401734 0.34 4034c8 0.06 408914 0.77 408e22 0.02
40406c 0.28 40171c 0.05 4016d0 0.30 4015b0 0.02
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APPENDIX B
CACHE MISSES FOR DIFFERENT INPUTS
In this appendix, we perform experiments to verify if the cache misses occur in the same
places in the program across different inputs. This is important because, if cache misses
that occur frequently in one input set may not occur with different inputs, fixes applied
based on results from one input set could degrade the program runtime when run with
different input set. Therefore, it is necessary to verify that different inputs result in similar
program behavior with respect to cache misses suffered by various static instructions.
We use Splash-2 benchmarks with inputs shown in Table 16 and Parsec-1.0 benchmarks
with simlarge and simmedium input sets. We present the top ten offending instructions (PC)
that cause conflict misses and false sharing misses and check whether the instructions match
between two input sets. For conflict misses, we observe that the top offending instructions
mostly match except in a few cases. For example, in ocean benchmark (Table 18), conflict
misses caused by static instructions at addresses 426488 and 426470 contribute to about
40% of replacement misses in simlarge, but they account only for 12.5% on simmedium
inputs. Consequently, a profiling run using a smaller input may not lead the programmer to
fix the capacity miss problem that occurs with larger inputs. We observe a similar behavior
for false sharing misses in simlarge and simmedium inputs. For example, in lu benchmark
(Table 18), false sharing misses caused by static instructions at addresses 40ecb0 and
409e0c contribute to about 30% of coherence misses on the simlarge input whereas, they
account for roughly 12.75% on the simmedium input. However, in general, we observe that
the simlarge and simmedium inputs have similar trend in conflict and false sharing misses
in most benchmarks, and that runs with different inputs tend to have the same static in-
structions as primary culprits for each kind of cache misses, even though runs with smaller
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Table 16: Splash-2 Benchmarks with different inputs.












inputs underestimate the importance of top offending static instructions relative to lower-
ranked instructions.
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Table 17: Attribution of Conflict and False Sharing Misses for different inputs. Conflict
misses are shown as percentage of replacement misses and False Sharing Misses are shown
as percentage of coherence misses.
Simlarge input Simmedium input
Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
barnes
40677c 22.38 413c9c 11.96 40677c 21.73 413c9c 17.49
4067b8 11.65 4141cc 1.90 4067b8 12.30 4141cc 12.49
406698 6.20 4065ec 1.31 406698 6.36 408464 1.95
4068f0 5.15 408464 1.26 4068f0 5.65 4065ec 1.24
406660 1.10 406698 1.14 406660 0.98 4065dc 1.08
406814 0.92 4065dc 0.95 406814 0.74 408708 0.76
4067dc 0.88 408708 0.66 4067dc 0.67 40848c 0.76
4065dc 0.78 40848c 0.55 4065dc 0.65 406698 0.74
4065ec 0.44 418d10 0.33 418da0 0.39 408634 0.70
418da0 0.25 408634 0.28 418db8 0.13 418b34 0.66
cholesky
40ae68 11.77 40c2fc 29.97 40ae68 6.66 40c2fc 22.05
402ff4 8.15 41ae1c 19.15 402ff4 6.38 41ae1c 12.85
402fe8 5.45 40bdfc 8.34 405d9c 3.07 40bdfc 4.20
402ef4 3.27 40c29c 5.01 402ef4 2.92 40c29c 3.62
405d9c 2.76 40c2e4 3.87 402fe8 2.44 40c2e4 2.37
40ae58 2.06 40c2d4 3.50 41ff20 2.19 40aa7c 2.08
40aec0 1.63 40aa7c 2.66 40ae58 1.84 41b34c 1.42
41ff20 1.57 41b34c 2.11 403068 1.53 40bc24 0.57
40e848 1.43 40bc24 0.39 40aec0 1.52 40adf0 0.45
4028a0 1.39 40c2f0 0.36 41ff38 1.42 40c39c 0.39
fft
4138f0 6.63 40d1a8 33.93 4138f0 3.28 40d1a8 19.54
413908 5.91 40e7ec 9.52 413908 1.07 40e7ec 18.20
413904 4.07 40be50 1.79 413904 0.19 40fc80 6.90
40bde0 3.35 40bd78 1.19 40bde0 0.13 40beb0 2.49
401154 1.33 40fc80 0.60 401154 0.10 40d498 1.53
4011f8 0.54 40beb0 0.60 4011f8 0.09 41309c 0.96
401150 0.41 40d498 0.60 40d4a8 0.09 40cd20 0.19
40d4a8 0.41 41309c 0.60 410134 0.09 413908 0.19
410134 0.20 40cd20 0.60 435854 0.08 4109a4 0.00
435854 0.19 413908 0.60 410138 0.07 40bdc8 0.00
fmm
40c688 12.89 41b81c 14.34 40c688 17.19 41b81c 13.94
40c744 9.08 40c5d4 7.38 40c744 6.97 40c5d4 11.34
40b328 6.33 41bd4c 3.29 40b328 3.88 41bd4c 4.93
40c7e0 3.92 40c93c 2.93 420920 2.67 40c93c 4.42
420920 3.42 4206c0 1.48 40c7e0 2.48 4206c0 3.91
40b330 3.29 418e84 1.26 420938 1.93 418ecc 2.61
420938 2.12 418ecc 1.10 40b330 1.89 41a1d8 1.89
40c784 1.97 41a1d8 0.86 40c784 1.83 418ee0 1.12
40b32c 1.76 418ee0 0.78 402ef0 1.83 40ba7c 1.06
402ef0 1.51 40ba7c 0.70 402f88 1.52 40bdd0 0.29
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Table 18: Attribution of Conflict and False Sharing Misses for different inputs. Conflict
misses are shown as percentage of replacement misses and False Sharing Misses are shown
as percentage of coherence misses.
Simlarge input Simmedium input
Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses
Conflict Misses FalseSh Misses Conflict Misses FalseSh Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
lu
40ef10 13.49 40ecb0 21.30 40ef10 13.44 40ecb0 6.79
40ef28 11.61 409e0c 9.71 40ef28 10.55 409e0c 5.95
40ef24 6.09 407470 2.45 40ef24 2.41 402194 4.56
407400 5.73 402194 0.75 407400 0.77 4087c8 0.73
401764 2.93 4087c8 0.74 401764 0.77 40ef28 0.43
401784 2.40 40ef28 0.59 401780 0.62 4074bc 0.32
401780 1.69 4074bc 0.38 401784 0.22 40a33c 0.20
40b728 0.28 407398 0.37 40b728 0.21 4074d0 0.18
40eb9c 0.19 4074d0 0.25 4073f0 0.17 409268 0.13
4073f0 0.19 40a33c 0.25 407c3c 0.13 40ebc0 0.10
ocean
426488 20.54 42136c 9.94 426470 8.77 42136c 10.97
426470 19.99 406ca4 9.80 426488 4.93 406ca4 6.30
41e960 6.85 406c48 5.55 41e960 4.65 406c48 5.59
405d44 0.41 41e9d0 3.70 4264f0 4.19 4075f4 3.73
405000 0.33 41e8f8 2.98 426074 3.54 407340 0.94
405b7c 0.32 4075f4 1.24 405d44 3.36 42189c 0.54
4264f0 0.32 407340 0.91 422cb8 3.20 407268 0.46
405c48 0.28 41ea34 0.88 405000 2.98 426488 0.38
405b74 0.27 42189c 0.82 41e950 2.75 4074ac 0.36
426074 0.26 407268 0.81 426424 2.24 407588 0.35
radiosity
430d1c 17.11 42c4d8 11.34 430d1c 20.61 42c4d8 14.22
430cf4 12.16 4190f8 10.15 430cf4 10.83 4190f8 11.30
42a068 2.57 40a024 7.51 42a068 3.04 40a024 8.68
41991c 2.29 41e634 1.41 41991c 1.97 41e634 1.67
41b504 1.57 41913c 1.29 41b504 1.54 41913c 1.23
41b770 1.34 40ae40 0.85 41b770 1.07 40ae40 1.23
41ce8c 1.11 41991c 0.76 41ce8c 0.57 41991c 1.18
42c4d8 1.08 42c944 0.68 42c4d8 0.46 42c944 0.91
40ad24 0.92 418c04 0.63 40ad24 0.40 407598 0.85
41cedc 0.91 407598 0.55 41cedc 0.18 40aa98 0.71
radix
4019a4 10.57 405a3c 4.96 4019a4 8.57 405a3c 6.37
40ab40 5.77 400ddc 2.26 40ab40 5.99 400ddc 5.57
401970 3.54 4019a4 2.14 401970 5.42 4019a4 2.09
40ab58 2.60 403100 1.04 401470 5.13 403100 1.35
403030 2.09 40113c 0.63 40ab58 3.92 40113c 0.84
401470 1.88 4030a0 0.59 403030 3.65 4099b4 0.45
401854 1.46 4030ec 0.52 401854 3.60 4030ec 0.35
4012c8 0.91 4099b4 0.37 401990 3.29 405f6c 0.29
401990 0.88 4011f8 0.30 4012c8 3.28 4011f8 0.26
4012d0 0.55 405f6c 0.22 4012d0 3.10 403020 0.26
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Table 19: Attribution of Conflict and False Sharing Misses for different inputs. Conflict
misses are shown as percentage of replacement misses and False Sharing Misses are shown
as percentage of coherence misses.
Simlarge input Simmedium input
Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
raytrace
42d178 23.03 40ab8c 22.00 42d178 10.51 40ab8c 18.90
42d160 21.76 42805c 4.16 42d160 8.80 42805c 17.52
40abf8 0.85 42858c 2.62 42d174 7.50 42858c 3.22
40bc10 0.64 40a894 1.97 40abf8 5.17 40a894 3.09
402b0c 0.59 40e794 0.59 40bc10 5.10 40e794 0.96
4056c8 0.50 41145c 0.29 402b0c 4.30 41145c 0.36
405504 0.48 411420 0.18 4056c8 3.51 411420 0.17
42d174 0.47 40c880 0.11 40a92c 3.02 40c880 0.16
40a92c 0.44 426a18 0.10 402ba8 1.09 426a18 0.09
402ba8 0.43 40d0bc 0.08 42805c 1.01 40d0bc 0.05
water-sp
4200c0 9.45 41afbc 6.56 4200c0 11.49 41afbc 6.32
4200d8 6.60 41b4ec 4.39 4200d8 10.69 41b4ec 1.99
413c38 5.06 418620 1.64 413c38 7.46 400f58 1.65
413c34 4.21 400f58 1.61 413c34 3.55 41fe60 1.55
4185b0 3.68 41fe60 1.52 4185b0 3.14 418500 1.04
402ad4 3.32 418500 1.11 402ad4 3.10 404de4 0.90
4200d4 1.61 404de4 0.84 4200d4 3.06 419978 0.64
402ae8 0.85 419978 0.71 402ae8 2.62 41866c 0.50
402af4 0.75 41866c 0.37 402ab4 2.46 4200d8 0.50
402ab4 0.75 418548 0.31 402af4 2.44 418680 0.37
water-n2
420010 12.40 41b43c 25.18 420010 13.00 41b43c 22.70
420028 7.15 41af0c 5.04 420028 8.61 41af0c 14.75
418500 4.41 418570 1.04 418500 4.81 40e003 9.61
401a44 3.27 40e003 0.81 401a44 0.51 4198c8 1.00
413b88 3.21 4198c8 0.73 413b88 0.32 41a368 0.60
413b84 2.38 418498 0.28 413b84 0.23 4185bc 0.47
402ae0 0.32 41a368 0.10 419bc8 0.14 418450 0.33
419bc8 0.31 4185bc 0.08 401a24 0.12 420028 0.27
402a88 0.30 4185d0 0.08 402ae0 0.10 4185d0 0.20
401a24 0.29 418450 0.08 402a88 0.09 4184f0 0.07
blkscholes
40cdb0 14.88 400668 6.97 40cdb0 14.17 400668 5.96
40cdc8 14.24 400658 4.46 40cdc8 9.77 400658 5.77
40cdc4 6.15 40075c 2.65 40cdc4 3.74 40075c 4.13
4052a0 3.66 4009f8 1.96 4052a0 1.68 407cac 0.80
4035ac 1.27 407cac 1.81 4035ac 1.18 4009f8 0.59
407cac 0.59 40cb50 1.72 407cac 0.93 40cb50 0.48
40ca60 0.31 400aa0 1.44 40ca60 0.77 400aa0 0.39
40c9b4 0.26 40085c 1.27 40c9b4 0.71 40085c 0.37
40ce3c 0.21 4081dc 0.95 400840 0.41 4081dc 0.23
400840 0.21 400598 0.88 40ce3c 0.34 40171c 0.09
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Table 20: Attribution of Conflict and False Sharing Misses for different inputs. Conflict
misses are shown as percentage of replacement misses and False Sharing Misses are shown
as percentage of coherence misses.
Simlarge input Simmedium input
Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses Conflict Misses FalseSharing Misses
PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent PC Percent
bodytrack
400b64 5.48 400b64 19.73 400b64 6.93 400b64 17.60
41b8a8 5.41 400b20 10.79 41b8a4 5.23 400b20 14.22
41b8a4 5.37 400b88 5.23 4037cc 4.67 400b88 4.43
4037cc 5.34 400be4 1.54 41b8a8 4.51 400be4 3.51
41b890 4.43 41b630 1.01 400b20 4.30 41b630 2.22
400b20 4.02 41678c 0.37 41b890 4.07 41678c 1.34
4037ac 3.73 413df0 0.08 4037ac 3.15 415148 0.88
4010ec 3.60 415148 0.06 4010ec 2.46 416cbc 0.86
413d80 2.51 416cbc 0.05 413d80 1.98 413e3c 0.65
4004d4 1.53 413e3c 0.04 4004d4 1.20 4024c8 0.57
facesim
40c190 14.21 40708c 17.41 40c190 12.99 40708c 19.21
40c1a8 14.19 4075bc 2.91 40c1a8 11.05 4075bc 11.33
40c1a4 6.38 40bf30 2.10 40c1a4 7.98 40bf30 6.19
404680 2.59 401438 0.68 404680 3.44 401438 1.87
401418 1.19 4046f0 0.43 401418 2.99 401418 1.36
40708c 1.00 4014a4 0.41 40708c 1.77 4014a4 0.63
4013c8 0.92 401120 0.40 4013c8 1.20 401120 0.09
401538 0.38 401418 0.38 401538 1.10 401540 0.07
40298c 0.34 401540 0.23 40be40 0.50 401100 0.07
40be40 0.34 401100 0.19 40c21c 0.39 405a48 0.03
fluidanim
40fac8 17.65 40a9ac 14.37 40fac8 18.92 40a9ac 14.78
40fab0 16.29 40f850 7.43 40fab0 13.88 40f850 13.91
40fac4 6.79 40805c 3.22 40fac4 8.74 40805c 4.87
404680 2.49 408010 2.06 404680 2.00 404510 1.70
4062ac 2.36 404510 1.33 4062ac 1.94 40461c 1.49
407fa0 0.85 40461c 0.93 407fa0 1.77 404668 1.45
40a9ac 0.58 404668 0.89 404648 0.49 40aedc 0.69
404648 0.55 40aedc 0.79 40fb3c 0.43 40634c 0.68
40fb3c 0.50 40634c 0.62 40f6b4 0.42 40f3e4 0.47
40f6b4 0.42 40f3e4 0.59 40a9ac 0.26 407250 0.41
swaptions
400c24 13.56 405094 6.27 400c24 13.01 405094 6.40
400e52 13.35 40406c 4.62 400e52 10.72 40406c 3.47
409170 8.32 401734 0.88 409170 0.04 408ed4 0.72
400d28 1.23 408ed4 0.55 400b4c 0.04 402a28 0.12
400b4c 1.22 402a28 0.41 400d28 0.03 40459c 0.06
400bac 0.91 40174c 0.39 400bac 0.03 4034c8 0.06
400d88 0.90 4016d0 0.31 400d88 0.02 409600 0.00
409188 0.59 40459c 0.11 409188 0.02 406224 0.00
400b70 0.56 4034c8 0.06 400b70 0.02 408e22 0.00
400d44 0.54 40171c 0.05 400d44 0.02 4015b0 0.00
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